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SUMMARY
This thesis comprises four topics focusing on pricing and revenue management, a pow-
erful technique to enhance firm profitability through demand and supply management. Be-
cause of its efficacy, it has been adopted by small and big companies in a broad range of
industries.
In the first part of the thesis, joint work with He Wang, we consider a canonical quantity-
based network revenue management problem, where a firm accepts or rejects incoming cus-
tomer requests irrevocably in order to maximize expected revenue given limited resources.
We design a new heuristic, which builds upon a family of re-solving heuristics that peri-
odically re-optimize a deterministic approximation to the original problem. Our heuristic
proves to have a strong theoretical performance guarantee and desirable numerical results.
The second part is joint work with Martin Savelsbergh and He Wang. We consider an
integrated pricing and routing problem on a network which is motivated by applications in
freight transportation. We propose two algorithms for the solution of this problem: a Frank-
Wolfe type algorithm, and a primal-dual algorithm using an online learning technique.
Both algorithms prove to have desirable convergence rates. Numerical experiments show
significant profit improvement of integrated pricing and routing decisions over independent
pricing or routing strategies.
In the third part of this thesis, joint work with Sushil Mahavir Varma, Siva Theja Magu-
luri and He Wang, we study a two-sided queueing system under joint pricing and matching
controls. This problem is motivated by applications in the gig economy and online market-
places. We propose a two-price and max-weight matching policy which proves to achieve
the optimal rate. The proposed algorithm also shows promising numerical results when
compared to other algorithms in similar settings.
The fourth part of the thesis is joint work with He Wang. We study a discrete choice
model. The problem is motivated by the violation of regularity property, which states
xvi
that adding an option to a choice set cannot increase the choice probability for any of the
original choice options. This property can be observed in real-world applications but cannot
be represented by a widely-used random utility maximization (RUM) model. We propose
a more general choice model – a model based on a neural network framework – which
can explain any choice phenomenon. Numerical experiments show the model consistently




Revenue management is concerned with allocating limited resources to meet demand of
customers with the objective of maximizing the revenue. Traditional revenue manage-
ment method generally assumes that resource capacity or supply are exogenously given.
It typically deals with demand management through pricing or capacity allocation deci-
sions. However, focusing only on demand side only helps increase revenue which is one
part of profit equation. The other component of profit equation which is a cost reduction
should also be emphasized. An operating cost reduction can be obtained from supply chain
management which is concerned with the problem of sourcing and delivering resources to
satisfy demand with the objective of minimizing cost. That is, revenue management and
supply chain management interactively play an important role in increasing a firm’s profit
and should be simultaneously considered to create competitive advantages.
The main part of this thesis focuses on applying revenue management to supply chain,
logistics networks and on-demand services ranging from traditional service industries to
disruptive transportation network company. Chapter 2 concentrates on the model for tradi-
tional applications of revenue management such as airline, retail, advertising and hospital-
ity industries. Chapter 3 revolves around pricing in delivery services industry. Chapter 4
focuses on on-demand services and ride-sharing platforms. We consider different models
based on characteristic of each application. In airline, retail, advertising and hospitality
industries, firm is only able to manage limited resources by price or capacity allocation
decisions. Different form a traditional revenue management framework, delivery service
company also has a flexibility to determine distribution decision, along with demand man-
agement decision, to enhance business profitability. However, resource capacities are no
longer limited for ride-sharing platform as firm can set price to induce supply to the system.
1
Therefore, to increase the profit firm must determine jointly pricing decision of demand side
and supply side as well as how to efficiently match such demand and supply.
A common feature of the main part of the thesis is independent demand model assump-
tion. Independent demand model assumes that the demand of any product is irrelevant of
the availability of other products. That is, it assumes that customers purchase a particular
product and never substitute one product for another. However, in reality customers may
opt to substitute between similar products, which are available. Therefore, this assumption
is somewhat unrealistic and can potentially cause revenue loss. Therefore, it is important to
understand customer behavior to successfully tackle revenue management problems. The
last part of this thesis (Chapter 5) steps away from independent demand model and focuses
on discrete choice model.
1.1 Overview of results
The first part of the thesis (Chapter 2), we consider a canonical quantity-based network
revenue management problem, where a firm accepts or rejects incoming customer requests
irrevocably in order to maximize expected revenue given limited resources. Due to the
curse of dimensionality, the exact solution to this problem by dynamic programming is
intractable when the number of resources is large. We study a family of re-solving heuris-
tics that periodically re-optimize an approximation to the original problem known as the
deterministic linear program (DLP), where random customer arrivals are replaced by their
expectations. We find that, in general, frequently re-solving the DLP produces the same
order of revenue loss as one would get without re-solving, which scales as the square root
of the time horizon length and resource capacities. By re-solving the DLP at a few selected
points in time and applying thresholds to the customer acceptance probabilities, we design
a new re-solving heuristic whose revenue loss is uniformly bounded by a constant that is
independent of the time horizon and resource capacities.
An integrated pricing and routing problem on a network is considered in the second part
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of the thesis (Chapter 3). The problem is motivated by applications in freight transportation
such as package delivery and less-than-truckload shipping services. The decision maker
sets a price for each origin-destination pair of the network, which determines the demand
flow that needs to be served. The flows are then routed through the network given fixed
arc capacities and costs. Demand for the same origin-destination pair can be routed along
multiple paths in the network if desirable. The objective is to maximize the revenues from
serving demand minus the transportation costs incurred given the capacity constraints. We
propose two algorithms for the solution of this problem: (1) a Frank-Wolfe type algorithm,
which requires the objective function to be smooth, and (2) a primal-dual algorithm using
an online learning technique, which allows non-smooth objective functions. We prove that
the first algorithm has a convergence rate of O(1/T ) and the second algorithm has a con-
vergence rate of O(logT/T ), where T is the number of iterations. Numerical experiments
on randomly generated instances show that coordinating pricing and routing decisions can
improve profits significantly compared to independent pricing or routing strategies.
Motivated by applications in gig economy and online marketplaces, we study a two-
sided queueing system under joint pricing and matching controls in the third part of the
thesis (Chapter 4). The queueing system is modeled by a bipartite graph, where the ver-
tices represent customer or server types and the edges represent compatible customer-server
matches. Customers and servers sequentially arrive to the system and enter separate queues
according to their types. The arrival rates of different types depend on the prices set by the
system operator and the expected waiting time. At any point in time, the system opera-
tor can choose certain customers to match with compatible servers. The objective is to
maximize the long-run average profit for the system. We first propose a fluid approxima-
tion based pricing and max-weight matching policy, which achieves an O(
√
η) optimality
rate when all the arrival rates are scaled by η . We further show that a two-price and max-
weight matching policy achieves an improved O(η1/3) optimality rate. Under a broad class
of pricing policies, we prove that any matching policy has an optimality rate that is lower
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bounded by Ω(η1/3). Thus, the two-price and max-weight matching policy achieves the
optimal rate with respect to η . We also demonstrate the advantage of max-weight match-
ing over a randomized matching policy. Under the complete resource pooling condition,
we show that max-weight matching achieves O(
√
n) and O(n1/3) optimality rates for static
and two-price policies, respectively, where n is the number of customer and server types.
In comparison, the randomized matching policy may have an Ω(n) optimality rate.
A neural network choice model is considered in the last part of this thesis (Chapter 5).
We study a discrete choice problem, where a customer chooses an option from a finite set
of alternatives. The majority of discrete choice models are derived from the random utility
maximization (RUM) principle. This assumption implies regularity property, i.e., adding
an option to a choice set cannot increase the choice probability for any of the original choice
options. However, many empirical evidences suggest that the regularity property may be
violated. There are also several efforts to model choice behavior beyond the RUM class, but
their predicting performances generally tie with the nature of dataset. We propose a more
general choice model, which can explain any choice phenomenon. The model is based
upon a neural network framework. Our numerical results show that using the proposed
neural network choice model consistently outperforms other choice models, either RUM or
non-RUM models, in both synthetic and real datasets.
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CHAPTER 2
RE-SOLVING HEURISTIC WITH UNIFORMLY BOUNDED LOSS IN
NETWORK REVENUE MANAGEMENT
2.1 Introduction
The network revenue management (NRM) problem (Williamson, 1992; Gallego and Ryzin,
1997) is a classical model that has been extensively studied in the revenue management lit-
erature for over two decades. The problem is concerned with maximizing revenue given
limited resource and time, and has a wide range of applications in the airline, retail, adver-
tising, and hospitality industries (see examples in Talluri and Van Ryzin, 2004). However,
the exact solution to the NRM problem is difficult to compute when the number of re-
sources is large. Heuristics proposed in the previous literature typically have optimality
gaps, i.e., expected revenue losses compared to the optimal solution, that increase with the
time horizon and the resource capacities. In this chapter, we propose a new heuristic for
the NRM problem for which the revenue loss is independent of the time horizon and the
resource capacities.
The NRM problem is stated as follows: there is a set of resources with finite capacities
that are available for a finite time horizon. Heterogeneous customers arrive sequentially
over time. Customers are divided into different classes based on their consumption of
resources and the prices they pay. Each class of customer may request multiple types of
resources and multiple units of each resource. Upon a customer’s arrival, a decision maker
must irrevocably accept or reject the customer. If the customer is accepted and there is
enough remaining capacities, she consumes the resources requested and pays a fixed price
associated with her class. Otherwise, if the customer is rejected, no revenue is collected
and no resources are used. Unused resources at the end of the finite horizon are perishable
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and have no salvage value. The decision maker’s objective is to maximize the expected
revenue earned during the finite horizon.
We note that the formulation stated above is more specifically known as the “quantity-
based” NRM problem. In another formulation referred to as the “price-based” NRM prob-
lem, the decision maker chooses posted prices rather than accept/reject decisions. The two
formulations are different, but are equivalent in some special cases (Maglaras and Meissner,
2006). We focus on the quantity-based formulation in this chapter.
A classical application of the NRM problem is in airline seat revenue management
(Williamson, 1992; Gallego and Ryzin, 1997). Here, the resources correspond to flight
legs and the capacity corresponds to the number of seats on each flight. The resources
are perishable on the date of flight departure. Arriving customers are divided into separate
classes defined by combinations of itinerary and fare. A simple flight network of two
flight legs and three itineraries is shown in Figure 2.1. The objective of the airline is to
maximize the expected revenue earned from allocating available seats to different classes
of customers. Notice that the problem cannot be decomposed for each individual flight leg,
since some itineraries use multiple resources simultaneously (e.g., in Figure 2.1, customers
traveling from A to C would request itinerary A→ B→ C). In practice, the huge size of
airline networks makes solving this problem challenging.
Figure 2.1: A flight network of two flight legs (A→ B,B→C) and three itineraries.
2.1.1 Deterministic LP approximation and re-solving heuristics
In theory, the NRM problem can be solved by dynamic programming; however, since the
state space grows exponentially with the number of resources, the dynamic programming
formulation is often intractable. Therefore, we focus on heuristics with provable perfor-
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mance guarantees in this chapter. We define revenue loss as the gap between the expected
revenue of a heuristic policy and that of the optimal policy. As common in the revenue
management literature, the effectiveness of heuristic polices are evaluated in an asymptotic
regime where resource capacities and customer arrivals are both scaled proportionally by
a factor of k (k = 1,2, . . .). Intuitively, this asymptotic regime increases market size while
keeping resource scarcity, i.e., the ratio of capacity to demand, at a constant level. We
assume this standard asymptotic setting throughout the chapter.
One popular heuristic for the NRM problem that is extensively studied in the academic
literature and widely used in practice is based on the deterministic linear programming
(DLP) approximation, where the customer demand distributions are replaced by their ex-
pectations. The solution of the DLP can then be used to construct heuristic policies. Under
the asymptotic scaling defined above, Gallego and van Ryzin (1994) and Gallego and Ryzin
(1997) have shown that the revenue loss of DLP-based static control policies is Θ(
√
k)
when the system size is scaled by k. The book by Talluri and Van Ryzin (2004) provides a
comprehensive overview of different types of DLP-based control policies such as booking
limit control, bid-price control, etc., and their variations.
An apparent weakness of the DLP approximation is that it ignores randomness in the
arrival process and fails to incorporate information acquired through time. To include up-
dated information, a simple approach is to re-optimize the DLP from time to time, while
replacing the initial capacity in the DLP with the remaining capacity at each re-solving
point. The new solution to the updated DLP is then used to adjust control policies. The re-
solving approach is intuitive and widely used in practice. We refer to this family of solution
techniques as re-solving heuristics. One might expect that re-solving the DLP would yield
better performance since it includes updated information. Surprisingly, Cooper (2002)
provides a counter-example where the performance of booking limit control deteriorates
by re-solving the DLP. Furthermore, Chen and Homem-de-Mello (2010) give an example
where re-solving the DLP worsens the performance for bid-price control. Jasin and Kumar
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(2013) analyze the performance of re-solving of both booking limit and bid-price controls.
They showed that when the initial capacity and customer arrival rates are both scaled by k,
the revenue loss of re-solving heuristics is Ω(
√
k), even by optimizing over the re-solving
schedule or increasing re-solving frequency.
Despite those negative results, we note that there are several ways to construct control
policies from the DLP, so it is possible that some control policies are suitable for applying
the re-solving technique, while others are not. Some recent literature draws attention to a
specific type of control policy called probabilistic allocation, which seems suitable for ap-
plying the re-solving technique. Probabilistic allocation control is a randomized algorithm
that accepts each arriving customer with some probability. Using the probabilistic alloca-
tion control, Reiman and Wang (2008) propose a heuristic policy that re-solves the DLP
exactly once during the horizon. In their proposed policy, the re-solving time is random
and determined endogenously by the heuristic policy. In the asymptotic setting, Reiman
and Wang (2008) show that the revenue loss of their policy is o(
√
k). This is an improve-
ment over the Θ(
√
k) revenue loss of DLP-based static policies.
Jasin and Kumar (2012) consider the NRM problem with customer choice, which gen-
eralizes the quantity-based NRM problem. They analyze an algorithm that is based on
probabilistic allocation control and re-solves the DLP after each unit of time. They show
the algorithm has a revenue loss of O(1) when the system size is scaled by k→ ∞. A simi-
lar O(1) revenue loss is obtained by Wu, Srikant, Liu, and Jiang (2015) for the case of one
resource. However, both Jasin and Kumar (2012) and Wu, Srikant, Liu, and Jiang (2015)’s
results require the optimal solution to DLP (before any updating) to be nondegenerate; this
assumption will be formally stated in Section 2.3, which seems to be central to the hardness
of the NRM problem. Moreover, Wu, Srikant, Liu, and Jiang (2015) show that when the
optimal solution is nondegenerate but nearly degenerate, the constant factor in O(1) can
become arbitrarily large. In this chapter, we aim to establish a uniform O(1) loss for the
general NRM problem without assuming nondegeneracy.
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2.1.2 Main contributions
We propose a new re-solving heuristic that has a uniformly bounded revenue loss when the
system size is scaled by k→∞. (Recall that the rate of revenue loss is defined for a sequence
of problems indexed by k = 1,2, . . ., where the capacities and arrival rates are multiplied
by k, while other parameters are treated as constants.) The bound is uniform in the sense
that it does not depend on the ratio between capacities and time. Therefore, this result does
not require the nondegeneracy assumption. Our O(1) bound improves the o(
√
k) bound in
Reiman and Wang (2008), and also improves the O(1) bound in Jasin and Kumar (2012),
where the constant factor requires nondegeneracy assumption and depends implicitly on
problem instances. (However, as we noted before, Jasin and Kumar (2012) considered the
NRM problem with customer choice, which generalizes the quantity-based NRM problem.)
We call our new algorithm Infrequent Re-solving with Thresholding (IRT). The intuition
behind the IRT algorithm is that it is not necessary to update the DLP at early stage of the
horizon, as the solution to the DLP barely changes after updating. It is sufficient to re-solve
the DLP at a few carefully selected time points near the end of the horizon. In total, the IRT
algorithm has O(log logk) re-solving times for a system with scaling size k. Furthermore, a
“thresholding” technique is applied in case that the DLP solution after re-solving is nearly
degenerate. The re-solving schedule and the thresholds of the IRT algorithm are designed
in such a way that the accumulated random deviations before the re-solving point can be
corrected after re-solving with high probability.
Then, we give a tight performance bound of the re-solving heuristic proposed by Jasin
and Kumar, 2012, but without assuming the optimal solution to the DLP is nondegenerate.
The heuristic in Jasin and Kumar, 2012, which we call Frequent Re-solving (FR), re-solves
the DLP after each unit of time. One would expect that by re-solving the DLP frequently
and thus constantly updating capacity information, the decision maker can improve the
expected revenue. Indeed, Jasin and Kumar (2012) have shown that under the nondegener-
acy assumption, the revenue loss of this policy is O(1) when the system size is scaled by
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k→ ∞. However, we find that the revenue loss of this policy is Θ(
√
k) in general, which
has the same order of revenue loss as DLP-based static heuristics without any re-solving
(Gallego and Ryzin, 1997; Talluri and Ryzin, 1998; Cooper, 2002). In particular, Propo-
sition 2 shows that there exists a problem instance where the revenue loss of this policy is
at least Ω(
√
k). To analyze this instance, we used the Berry-Esseen bound and Freedman’s
inequality to show that the probability of revenue loss being larger than Ω(
√
k) is bounded
away from 0. This result suggests that the nondegeneracy assumption made by Jasin and
Kumar (2012) is necessary to obtain O(1) revenue loss, and explains why the O(1) factor in
Wu, Srikant, Liu, and Jiang, 2015 must be arbitrarily large when the DLP optimal solution
is converging to a degenerate point. Then, Proposition 3 shows that the revenue loss of this
policy is bounded above by O(
√
k) in the general case, which also improves the o(k) bound
in Maglaras and Meissner, 2006. The proof is based on a key inequality that bounds the
average remaining capacity as a function of the remaining time.
In Figure 2.2, we summarize the performance of existing re-solving heuristics for the
NRM problem. In this figure, the vertical axis represents the expected revenue which in-
creases from the bottom to the top. We highlight the gap between different heuristics and
upper bounds compared to the optimal revenue, which in principle can be obtained from
dynamic programming but is hard to compute directly. The main result of this chapter
(Theorem 1) simultaneously establishes an O(1) upper bound of the hindsight optimum
and an O(1) revenue loss of the IRT algorithm.
2.1.3 Other related work
The re-solving heuristics defined in the NRM context is generally known as certainty equiv-
alent control in dynamic programming. In certainty equivalent control, each random dis-
turbance is fixed at a nominal value (e.g., its mean), and then an optimal control sequence
for the certainty equivalence approximation is found. Only the first control in the sequence
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Figure 2.2: Summary of the results in the previous literature (on the left side) and our main
results (on the right side). The red node (•) represents the expected revenue of the optimal
policy (hard to compute); the blue nodes (•) represent upper bounds to the optimal revenue;
and the black nodes (•) refer to revenues earned under different heuristics. The factor k is
the scale of both time horizon and capacities.
stage. An introduction to certainty equivalent control can be found in Bertsekas (2005,
Section 6.1). Secomandi (2008) discussed whether certainty equivalent control guarantees
performance improvement in the network revenue management setting.
The quantity-based NRM model can be generalized in several ways. One extension
assumes that the decision maker offers a set of products to each arriving customer, and
customers choose some products from the offered set based on some discrete choice model
(Talluri and van Ryzin, 2004; Liu and Ryzin, 2008). Another stream of literature assumes
that either the customers’ arrival process or the distribution of their reservation price is un-
known, and requires the decision maker to learn the distribution exclusively from past ob-
servations (Besbes and Zeevi, 2012; Jasin, 2015; Ferreira, Simchi-Levi, and Wang, 2018).
Talluri and Van Ryzin, 2004; Maglaras and Meissner, 2006 discussed the case where the
decision maker posts price (price-based NRM) versus the case where the decision maker
chooses accept/reject (quantity-based NRM).
The NRM problem considered here is related to the online knapsack/secretary problem
studied by Kleywegt and Papastavrou (1998), Kleinberg (2005), and Babaioff, Immorlica,
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Kempe, and Kleinberg (2007), Arlotto and Gurvich (2019), and Arlotto and Xie (2020).
In particular, Arlotto and Gurvich (2019) considers a multi-selection secretary problem,
where the decision maker sequentially selects i.i.d. random variables in order to maximize
the expected value of the sum given a fixed budget. As such, by viewing each random
variable as a customer arrival, the multi-selection secretary problem is a special case of the
NRM problem in which there is only a single resource and each customer requests exactly
one unit of the resource. Arlotto and Gurvich (2019) proposes an online policy that has a
uniformly bounded regret compared to the optimal offline policy. Their policy accepts or
rejects an arriving customer by comparing the budget ratio, i.e., ratio of remaining budget to
remaining arrivals, to some fixed thresholds. However, it is unclear whether their technique
can be generalized to the general NRM setting with multiple resources, since the thresholds
in their policy are specifically defined for a single resource.
Recently, Vera and Banerjee (2021) studies an online packing problem, which has the
same mathematical formulation as the network revenue management problem. They pro-
pose a re-solving heuristic that achieves O(1) revenue loss without the nondegeneracy as-
sumption and under mild assumptions on the customer arrival processes. Unlike the IRT
algorithm, their proposed algorithm re-solves the DLP every time there is an arrival; the al-
gorithm then accepts that arrival if the acceptance probability from the DLP is greater than
0.5 and rejects it otherwise. Their proof is based on a novel argument that compensates
the optimal offline algorithm and forces it to follow the decisions of their online algorithm.
The design of their algorithm and their proof idea are significantly different from those in
this paper.
2.1.4 Notation
For a positive integer n, let [n] denote the set {1, . . . ,n}. Given two real numbers a ∈R and
b ∈ R, let a∧ b := min{a,b}, a∨ b := max{a,b}, and a+ := a∨ 0. For any real number
x, let bxc be the largest integer less than or equal to x, and let dxe be the smallest integer
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greater than or equal to x. For a set S, let |S| denote the cardinality of S. For two functions
f (T ) and g(T )> 0, we write f (T ) = O(g(T )) if there exists a constant M1 and a constant
T1 such that f (T ) ≤ M1g(T ) for all T ≥ T1; we write f (T ) = Ω(g(T )) if there exists a
constant M2 and a constant T2 such that f (T )≥M2g(T ) for all T ≥ T2. If f (T ) = O(g(T ))
and f (T ) = Ω(g(T )) both hold, we denote it by f (T ) = Θ(g(T )).
2.2 Problem Formulation and Approximations
Suppose there is a finite horizon with length T . There are n classes of customers indexed by
j ∈ [n]. The arrival process of customers in class j, {Λ j(t),0 ≤ t ≤ T}, follows a Poisson
process of rate λ j. We let Λ j(t1, t2) denote the number the arrivals of class j customers
during (t1, t2] for 0 ≤ t1 < t2 ≤ T , i.e., Λ j(t1, t2) = Λ j(t2)−Λ j(t1). Arrival processes of
different classes are independent. Upon arrival, each customer must either be accepted
or rejected. Let r j denote the revenue received by accepting a class j customer and r =
[r1, . . . ,rn]> be the vector of such revenues. There are m resources indexed by l ∈ [m],
where resource l has initial capacity Cl . The vector of the initial capacities is given by
C = [C1, . . . ,Cm]>. If a customer is accepted, al j units of resource l is consumed to serve
a class j customer; let A j = [a1 j, . . . ,am j]> be the column vector associated with class j
customers. Let A∈Rm×n be the bill-of-materials (BOM) matrix defined as A= [A1; . . . ;An].
If a customer is rejected, no revenue is collected and no resource is used. Unused resources
at the end of the horizon are perishable and have no salvage value. The objective of the
decision maker is to maximize the expected revenue earned during the entire horizon by
deciding whether or not to accept each arriving customer.
For a control policy π , let zπj (t1, t2) be the number of class j customers admitted during





A jzπj (0,T )≤C a.s., and zπj (t1, t2)≤ Λ j(t1, t2) a.s., ∀ j ∈ [n],0≤ t1 < t2 ≤ T.
13
Let Π be the set of all admissible policies. The expected revenue under policy π ∈ Π is








. We use v∗= supπ∈Π v
π to denote the expected revenue
under the optimal policy. If vπ is the expected revenue of a feasible policy π ∈ Π, we call
v∗− vπ the revenue loss of policy π .
2.2.1 Asymptotic framework
The standard asymptotic framework in revenue management measures performance of
heuristics when the capacities and customer arrivals are scaled up proportionally. Un-
der this asymptotic scaling, we consider revenue loss of a sequence of problems, indexed
by k = 1,2, . . ., where the capacities and arrival rates are multiplied by k, while all other
problem parameters are treated as constants.
To avoid cumbersome notation where lots of variables and quantities are indexed by k,
in the rest of the paper, we consider a different but equivalent asymptotic scaling, where
the customer arrival rates λ j ( j ∈ [n]) are kept as constants, the time horizon is scaled up by
T = 1,2, . . ., and the resource capacities are scaled up proportionally by Cl = blT (l ∈ [m]).
Since the arrivals follow Poisson processes, scaling up the arrival rates and scaling up the
horizon length have the same effect. We will thus express the revenue loss of heuristics in
the order of T . Note that the horizon length (T ) plays the same role as the scaling factor (k)
in the standard asymptotic regime. For example, if we say the revenue loss of an algorithm
is O(
√
T ), it implies that revenue loss of that algorithm is O(
√
k) under the standard scaling
regime.
2.2.2 Previous work on upper bound approximations
Deterministic linear program (DLP).
The DLP formulation is obtained by replacing all random variables with their expectations.
As the expected number of arrivals of class j customers during the horizon is λ jT for
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A jy j ≤C,and 0≤ y j ≤ λ jT, ∀ j ∈ [n]
}
. (2.1)
In this formulation, decision variables y j can be viewed as the expected number of class
j customers to be accepted in [0,T ]. The first constraint specifies that the expected usage
of all m resources cannot exceed their initial capacities, C = [C1, . . . ,Cm]>, and the second
constraint specifies that the number of accepted customers from class j cannot exceed the
expected number of arrivals, λ jT .
Suppose y∗ is an optimal solution to (2.1). The optimal value of DLP is given by
vDLP = ∑nj=1 r jy
∗
j . It can be shown that v
DLP is an upper bound of the expected revenue
of the optimal policy, v∗, namely v∗ ≤ vDLP (Gallego and Ryzin, 1997). Intuitively, DLP
is a relaxation of the original problem since it only requires the capacity constraints to be
satisfied in expectation, so vDLP is an upper bound of v∗.
Equivalently, we can reformulate the DLP in (2.1) by letting x j be the average number











A jx j ≤ b, and 0≤ x j ≤ λ j, ∀ j ∈ [n]
}
, (2.2)
where b = [b1, . . . ,bm]> refers to the vector of available resources per unit time, i.e., bl =
Cl/T,∀l ∈ [m]. Let x∗j for j ∈ [n] be an optimal solution to (2.2). The optimal value to the




The hindsight optimum is the optimal revenue obtained when the total number of arrivals
is known in advance. Recall that the random variable Λ j(T ) represents the total arrivals of
class j customers in [0,T ]. If the values of Λ j(T ) are known, let z j be the number of class
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j customers accepted in [0,T ]; the optimal acceptance policy is given by








A jz j ≤C, and 0≤ z j ≤ Λ j(T ), ∀ j ∈ [n]
}
. (2.3)
Let V HO be the optimal objective value and z̄ j, j ∈ [n] be the optimal solution; note that
V HO and z̄ j’s are random variables that depend on Λ j(T ). The hindsight optimum (HO) is
defined as the expectation of the optimal objective value, i.e, vHO =E[V HO] =E[∑nj=1 r j z̄ j].
The hindsight optimum is obviously an upper bound to the optimal revenue of the orig-
inal problem, since the decision maker does not know the future arrivals at time t = 0. In
fact, it can be shown that hindsight optimum is a tighter upper bound than the DLP, namely
v∗ ≤ vHO ≤ vDLP (Talluri and Ryzin, 1998). This is easily verified since the expectation of
the hindsight optimal solution, E[z̄ j], is a feasible solution to the DLP.
We use the following definition throughout the paper.
Definition 1. Let vπ be the expected revenue associated with an admissible control policy
π . We refer to vHO−vπ as the regret of that policy. (Note: since v∗ ≤ vHO, the revenue loss
of the control policy, v∗− vπ , is upper bounded by its regret.)
2.2.3 Static probabilistic allocation heuristic
There are various ways to construct heuristic policies using the optimal solution of DLP.
An overview can be found in Talluri and Van Ryzin (2004, Ch. 2). One intuitive approach
is to interpret the solution to DLP as acceptance probabilities. Suppose x∗ is an optimal
solution to DLP in (2.2). For each arriving customer, if the customer belongs to class j,
s/he would be accepted independently with probability x∗j/λ j throughout the time horizon.
Since customers from each class are accepted with probabilities that are static, we call
this heuristic Static Probabilistic Allocation (SPA). The SPA policy is formally stated in
Algorithm 1.
The expected revenue of the SPA policy, denoted by vSPA, can be computed as follows.
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Algorithm 1 Static probabilistic allocation heuristic: SPA




j=1 r jx j
∣∣∣ ∑nj=1 A jx j ≤ C/T, and 0 ≤ x j ≤ λ j,∀ j ∈ [n]};
C′←C
for all customers arriving in [0,T ] do
if the customer belongs to class j and A j ≤C′ (∀ j ∈ [n]) then
accept the customer with probability x∗j/λ j
if the customer is accepted, update capacity C′←C′−A j
else
reject the customer
Since the total number of arrivals from class j follows a Poisson distribution with mean
λ jT , the number of customers that the algorithm attempts to accept from class j follows a
Poisson distribution with mean (λ jT ) ·x∗j/λ j = x∗jT = y∗j . Due to limited capacity, we must
reject any customer from class j if the remaining capacity C′ does not satisfy A j ≤C′. It is
straightforward to show that the expected number of customers who are turned away due
to capacity limits is O(
√








T ) = vDLP−O(
√
T ).
Recall from §2.2.2 that vDLP is an upper bound of the expected revenue under the optimal
policy, namely v∗ ≤ vDLP. Thus, the revenue of SPA is bounded by vSPA ≥ v∗−O(
√
T ).
2.3 Frequent Re-solving and Degeneracy
An obvious drawback of the SPA policy constructed from the DLP is that it does not take
into account the randomness of demand or the updated information after t = 0. This mo-
tivates us to consider re-solving heuristics, which periodically re-optimize the DLP using
the updated capacity information to adjust customer admission controls.
In particular, the following re-solving heuristic, which we referred to as Frequent Re-
solving (FR), has been studied by Jasin and Kumar (2012) and Wu, Srikant, Liu, and Jiang
(2015). The FR policy divides the horizon into T periods and re-solves the LP at the
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beginning of each period. At time t = 0,1, . . . ,T−1, let Cl(t) denote the remaining capacity
of resource l ∈ [m]. We let bl(t) := Cl(t)T−t be the average available capacity of resource l in
period t. Let C(t) and b(t) denote the vectors of the remaining capacities and the average
remaining capacities per unit time at time t, respectively, for all the resources. We outline
the FR policy in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Frequent Re-solving Heuristic: FR
initialize: set C(0) =C and b(0) =C/T





j=1 r jx j
∣∣∣ ∑nj=1 A jx j ≤ b(t), and 0≤ x j ≤ λ j,∀ j ∈ [n]}
set C′←C(t)
for all customers arriving in [t, t +1) do
if the customer belongs to class j and A j ≤C′ (∀ j ∈ [n]) then
accept the customer with probability x j(t)/λ j
if the customer is accepted, update C′←C′−A j
else
reject the customer
set C(t +1)←C′ and b(t +1)← C(t+1)T−t−1
Jasin and Kumar (2012) show that when the optimal solution to DLP (2.2) is nonde-
generate, FR has a revenue loss of O(1), namely, the revenue loss is bounded when the
problem size k grows. The optimal solution x∗ is nondegenerate if
∣∣{ j ∈ [n] : x∗j = 0 or x∗j = λ j}∣∣+ ∣∣{l ∈ [m] : n∑
j=1
al jx∗j = b j}
∣∣= n. (2.4)
The O(1) loss is a significant improvement from the O(
√
T ) revenue loss of SPA.
However, the assumption of nondegenerate DLP solution is critical to achieve the O(1)
loss. The proofs by Jasin and Kumar, 2012 and Wu, Srikant, Liu, and Jiang, 2015 are
built on a key observation that the ratio of remaining capacities to remaining time, b(t),
is a martingale (see also Arlotto and Gurvich (2019) for a discussion on this martingale
property). If the optimal solution x∗ is safely far from any degenerate solutions, with high
probability, the adjusted solution x(t) in Algorithm 2 shares the same basis with x∗, so the
revenue loss of FR can be bounded. It is unclear from the analysis of Jasin and Kumar
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(2012) and Wu, Srikant, Liu, and Jiang (2015) whether the nondegeneracy assumption is
just an artifact of their analysis technique or something intrinsic to the performance of FR.
This motivates us to examine closely the role of the nondegeneracy assumption.
2.3.1 A degenerate example
We will illustrate the issue of degenerate DLP solutions using the following numerical
example, while deferring the theoretical analysis of the FR policy to Section 2.5.
Suppose there are two classes of customers and one resource. Customers from each
class arrive according to a Poisson process with rate 1. Customers from both classes, if
accepted, consume one unit of resource, but pay different prices, r1 and r2. First, we
compare the expected revenue loss of the FR policy and the SPA policy, which does not
re-solve after t = 0, to examine the effect of frequent re-solving. We simulate the FR policy
and the SPA policy when the average capacity per unit time b = 1 (so the total capacity is
T ) for two price scenarios: (a) r1 = 2 and r2 = 1; (b) r1 = 5 and r2 = 1 and for varying
horizon length T = 500, . . . ,5000. In both scenarios, the optimal solution to the DLP (2.2)
is x∗1 = 1,x
∗
2 = 0. From Equation (2.4), we have
∣∣{ j ∈ [n] : x∗j = 0 or x∗j = λ j}∣∣+ ∣∣{l ∈ [m] : n∑
j=1
al jx∗j = b j}
∣∣= 3 > n = 2,
thus the DLP solution in this example is degenerate.
Recall that the expected revenue loss of the FR policy is defined as v∗− vFR. Since
calculating v∗ requires solving dynamic programs, we use the regret vHO− vFR (see the
definition in §2.2.2) as a proxy of the expected revenue loss. In §2.4, we will show that
vHO− v∗ = O(1), so this substitution does not affect the rate of revenue loss. Figure 2.3
plots the regrets under the FR policy and the SPA policy over 1000 sample paths.
We make the following observations from Figure 2.3. First, while the revenue loss of FR
in scenario (a) is lower than that obtained from applying the SPA policy, the relationship
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(a) r1 = 2 and r2 = 1










(b) r1 = 5 and r2 = 1
Figure 2.3: Regret under the FR policy (with re-solving) and the SPA policy (without re-
solving).
is reversed in scenario (b). In other words, re-solving the DLP does not always lead to
better performance. The intuition behind this result is that when the ratio r1/r2 is large,
such as in scenario (b), rejecting a Class 2 customer to save the capacity for a potential
future Class 1 customer is more profitable. The SPA policy accepts every customer from
Class 1 and rejects all customers from Class 2, since the solution to the DLP (without
re-solving) is x∗1 = 1,x
∗
2 = 0. This static policy is indeed optimal when r1/r2 → ∞. In
contrast, the FR policy constantly adjusts accepting probabilities, and starts to accept Class
2 customers when the actual arrival of Class 1 customers falls below its average. Second,
we observe from Figure 2.3 that the revenue losses of both SPA and FR seem to have the
same growth rate as horizon length T increases. (It is well-known that the revenue loss
of SPA is of order Θ(
√
T ); see §2.2.3 and Proposition 11 in Online Appendix A.2.) This
result is in contrast with Jasin and Kumar (2012), which show that when the solution to the
DLP is nondegenerate, the expected revenue loss of FR is O(1). However, we note that the
nondegeneracy assumption made by Jasin and Kumar does not hold in this example, since
the DLP has a unique solution that is degenerate.
Next, we simulate the FR policy when r1 = 2, r2 = 1 and T = 50000 for varying av-
erage capacity per unit time b = 0.5, . . . ,2. Note that when b = 1 and b = 2, the optimal
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solutions to the DLP (2.2) are x∗1 = 1,x
∗




2 = 1, respectively, which are
degenerate according to Equation (2.4). When b 6= 1 and b 6= 2, the solution to the DLP
is nondegenerate. Therefore, by changing the value of b, we can evaluate the performance
of FR with either degenerate or nondegenerate DLP solutions. Figure 2.4 shows the regret
under the FR policy over 1000 sample paths.









Figure 2.4: Regret under the FR policy for r1 = 2,r2 = 1 and T = 50000.
The simulation result from Figure 2.4 shows that the expected revenue loss under the FR
policy is sensitive to the value of capacity rate b. When b is far away from the degenerate
points (i.e., b = 1 and b = 2), FR performs well and has small revenue loss. However, the
revenue loss increases significantly when the optimal DLP solution is close to degenerate
(e.g., b = 0.95).
We notice that the observation from Figure 2.4 is consistent with the analysis by Jasin
and Kumar, 2012. Even though Jasin and Kumar, 2012 proves that the revenue loss of FR is
bounded by a constant whenever the DLP solution is nondegenerate, their analysis does not
imply the constant is uniform over all b’s. Rather, the constant bound from their analysis
critically depends on the distance between b and its nearest degenerate point. When the
optimal DLP solution is close to degenerate, the bound in Jasin and Kumar, 2012 can be
arbitrarily large. Figure 2.4 shows that this phenomenon is not merely a consequence of
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the analysis technique from Jasin and Kumar, 2012, but reflects the actual performance of
the FR policy.
Let us now turn our attention to the dynamics of the DLP solutions after updating under
the FR policy. Figure 2.5 shows the trajectory of the DLP solutions of under FR when
r1 = 2,r2 = 1,b = 1 and T = 250. In the figure, we simulated the policy 1000 times, and
plotted the median, the 5th percentile, and the 95th percentile of the DLP solutions over
the 1000 sample paths. It can be observed that the DLP solution barely changes near the
beginning of the horizon, but changes significantly near the end of the horizon. These plots
shed some light on the importance of each re-solving time: re-solving near the beginning
of the horizon is not as important as re-solving near the end of the horizon.











(a) class 1 customer










(b) class 2 customer
Figure 2.5: The 5th percentiles and 95th percentiles of the DLP solutions (i.e., acceptance
probabilities) of the two customer classes under FR in each period for T = 250.
2.4 A Re-solving Heuristic with Uniformly Bounded Loss
In this section, we propose a new re-solving algorithm. The main result of this section is
to show that this algorithm has uniformly bounded revenue loss given any horizon length
T and starting capacity C, without requiring the nondegeneracy assumption.
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2.4.1 Definition of the IRT algorithm
We propose an algorithm called Infrequent Re-solving and Thresholding (IRT). The IRT
policy has two distinct features compared to the FR policy: 1) the DLP is not re-solved in
every period; 2) customers acceptance probabilities are adjusted by some thresholds.
Unlike the FR policy, the IRT policy re-solves the DLP for only O(log logT ) times
during a horizon of length T . The re-solving schedule is defined as follows. Given horizon





. Let {t∗u ,∀u ∈ [K]} denote a sequence of re-solving times,
where τu = T (5/6)
u
and t∗u = T − τu for all u ∈ [K]. In addition, let t∗K+1 = T . Thus, the




2), · · · , [t∗K, t∗K+1].
Figure 2.6 illustrates the re-solving schedule of the IRT policy.






Figure 2.6: The re-solving times of the IRT policy is constructed recursively.
At the beginning of each epoch u (0≤ u≤ K), the algorithm solves an LP approxima-
tion to the dynamic programming problem—th s LP is identical to the LP used in the FR
algorithm, which uses information about remaining capacities and the mean of remaining
customer arrivals. The optimal solution of the LP is then used to construct a probabilistic
allocation control policy. The IRT policy applies thresholds to the allocation probabilities.
In particular, in epoch u ∈ {0}∪ [K− 1] (except for the last epoch), the allocation proba-
bility for each class is rounded down to 0 if it is less than τ−1/4u , or rounded up to 1 if it is
larger than 1− τ−1/4u . The complete definition of IRT is given in Algorithm 3.
Before we present the formal analysis of the IRT algorithm, it might be helpful to
discuss the intuition behind the design of this algorithm. We start with the choice of the
first re-solving time, t∗1 . The analysis by Reiman and Wang, 2008 shows that by setting
t∗1 ≈ T −O(
√
T ), one re-solving of DLP is sufficient to reduce the regret to O(T 1/4). But
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Algorithm 3 Infrequent Re-solving with Thresholding (IRT)
initialize: set τu = T (5/6)
u










j=1 r jx j
∣∣∣ ∑nj=1 A jx j ≤C(t∗k )/τk, and 0≤ x j ≤ λ j,∀ j ∈ [n]}
if u < K then
for j ∈ [n] do
if xuj < λ jτ
−1/4
u then
set puj ← 0
else if xuj > λ j(1− τ
−1/4
u ) then
set puj ← 1
else
set puj ← xuj/λ j
else
set puj ← xuj/λ j for all j ∈ [n]
set C′←C(t∗u)
for t ∈ [t∗u , t∗u+1) do
observe requests from all arrival of customers
if an arriving customer belongs to class j and A j ≤C′ (∀ j ∈ [n]) then
accept the customer with probability puj





we note that if t∗1 is defined as in Reiman and Wang, 2008, additional re-optimizations after
t∗1 cannot improve the regret rate. In the IRT algorithm, we choose the first re-solving time
to be t∗1 = T −T 5/6, which is earlier than the re-solving time in Reiman and Wang, 2008. If
no further re-solving is used, this policy leads to a regret rate of O(T 5/12) (Proposition 1).
Even though the O(T 5/12) rate is worse than the O(T 1/4) rate in Reiman and Wang, 2008,
as we choose an earlier re-solving time, more time is left for making further adjustments.
Once we establish the O(T 5/12) regret rate with the first re-solving, we then use induction to
prove that subsequent re-optimizations of the DLP can further reduce the regret, eventually
reducing it to a constant. By definition, τu, the length of epoch u satisfies the recursive
relationship τu+1 = τ
5/6
u , ∀u ∈ [K]. This enables us to apply the induction hypothesis to
epochs u≥ 1.
The τ−1/4u thresholds in the algorithm are critical to bounding the regret. As we have
seen from the numerical example in §2.3.1, large losses can occur when the DLP solution
is nearly degenerate. If we use a nearly degenerate solution to construct probabilistic allo-
cation controls, some customer classes would have acceptance probabilities that are either
very close to 0 or very close 1. As a result, the mean number of accepted or rejected cus-
tomers is dominated by its standard deviation, making the control policy ineffective. More
specifically, if the acceptance probability of class j customers is ε → 0, the coefficient of
variation of the number of customer accepted in one unit time is 1/
√
λ jε → +∞. There-
fore, if the acceptance probability of a customer class is almost 0, we might as well reject
all customers from that class in the current epoch, as long as there is sufficient time left
to accept customers in the next epoch. Similarly, if the acceptance probability of a cus-
tomer class is almost 1, we might as well accept all customers from that class in the current
epoch. This is the intuition behind adding thresholds to the acceptance probabilities in the
IRT policy.
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2.4.2 Analysis of the IRT policy
We now formally analyze the revenue loss (regret) of the IRT policy. The main result of
this section is the following.
Theorem 1. The regret of IRT policy defined in Algorithm 3 is bounded by vHO− vIRT =
O(1). The constant factor depends on the customer arrival rate λ j (∀ j ∈ [n]), the revenues
per customer r j (∀ j ∈ [n]), and the BOM matrix A; however, this constant is independent
of the time horizon T and the capacity vector C.
Theorem 1 states that the regret of IRT policy is O(1). Moreover, this constant is inde-
pendent of time horizon and capacities, so the performance of IRT is uniformly bounded
when the capacity ratio C/T varies. Because degenerate DLP solution occurs only for
some specific capacity ratios, the result in Theorem 1 does not require the nondegeneracy
assumption in Jasin and Kumar, 2012.
Since the hindsight optimum vHO is an upper bound of the expected revenue of the
optimal policy v∗, we immediately get a bound on its revenue loss: v∗− vIRT ≤ vHO−
vIRT = O(1). Moreover, Theorem 1 implied that hindsight optimum is a tight upper bound,
satisfying vHO− v∗ ≤ vHO− vIRT = O(1).
The complete proof of Theorem 1 can be found in Appendix §A.1.1. We outline the
main idea of the proof here. In the proof, we define a sequence of auxiliary re-solving





is the number of
re-optimizations made by the IRT algorithm. For any u ∈ [K], we define a policy that fol-
lows the IRT heuristic exactly in [0, t∗u), but then applies static allocation control in [t
∗
u ,T ].
We refer to such a policy as IRTu. Notice that when u = K, IRTu coincides with IRT.
Similarly, we define HOu as a policy that is exactly the same as IRT in [0, t∗u) but applies
the hindsight optimal policy in [t∗u ,T ]. Our proof of Theorem 1 depends on the following
proposition, proved in Appendix §A.1.2.
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Proposition 1. Given horizon length T , suppose the first re-solving time is t∗1 = T −T 5/6,
then
1. the regret of HO1 is O(Te−κT
1/6
);
2. the regret of IRT1 is O(Te−κT
1/6
)+O(T 5/12).
Here, we define κ = λmin24(α|Jλ |+1)2 , where Jλ
:= { j : x∗j = λ j} (recall that x∗ is the solution to
DLP), λmin := min j∈[n]λ j, and α is a positive constant that depends on the BOM matrix A.
Notice that IRT1 is a non-anticipating and admissible policy, and its regret of O(T 5/12)
is an improvement over the O(
√
T ) bound of SPA. The policy HO1 is not non-anticipating
since it requires access to future arrival information; thus it is not practical and its sole
purpose is to bound the performance of IRT1 in the proof.
We then use Proposition 1 to prove Theorem 1 by induction. We illustrate the induction
step using IRT2, a policy that re-solves at t∗1 = T −T 5/6 and again at t∗2 = T −T (5/6)
2
. The
regret of IRT2 can be written as
E[V HO−V IRT
2

















The term (∗) is bounded by O(Te−κT 1/6) according to Proposition 1. For the term (∗∗),
the policies HO1 and HO2 are identical up to time t∗1 . So applying part (1) of Propo-
sition 1 to the subproblem in (t∗1 ,T ], we get E[VHO
1 −VHO2] = O(T 5/6e−κ(T 5/6)1/6) =
O(T 5/6e−κT
5/36
). For the last term (∗ ∗ ∗), using the well-known result that static proba-
bilistic allocation has a squared root regret, we have E[VHO2 −V IRT2] = E[V HO(t∗2 ,T )−
VSPA(t∗2 ,T )] = O(
√
T − t∗2) = O(T (5/6)







)+O(T 25/72) = O(T 25/72).
By induction, we show that if the decision maker re-solves for K ≥ 1 times, where the
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u-th (u = 1, · · · ,K) re-solving time is t∗u = T −T (5/6)
u























, the right-hand side of the above equation is bounded by a constant.
In additional, the policy IRTK is the same as IRT, so we prove that the regret of IRT is
vHO− vIRT = O(1).
2.4.3 Revisiting the degenerate example in Section 2.3.1
In Section 2.3.1, we considered a numerical example with two classes and one resource. We
simulated the FR policy when r1 = 2, r2 = 1 and T = 50000 for varying average capacity
b = 0.5, . . . ,2, and showed that FR has poor performance when the DLP solution is either
degenerate (i.e., b = 1 or b = 2) or nearly degenerate. We now test the IRT policy using the
same example and compare it to the FR policy. Figure 2.7 plots the average regret under
FR and IRT over 1000 sample paths.










Figure 2.7: Regret under the FR policy and the IRT policy for r1 = 2,r2 = 1 and T = 50000.
It can be observed from Figure 2.7 that the regret under the proposed IRT policy is not
sensitive to the average capacity per unit time. This result verifies Theorem 1 in that the
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regret of IRT is uniformly bounded with respect to the ratio between capacity and time.
In contrast, the regret under the FR policy has two spikes that are associated with the two
degenerate points (b = 1 and b = 2).
2.5 Analysis of the Frequent Resolving Policy
2.5.1 Lower bound of the revenue loss of FR
The simulation in Section 2.3.1 inspires us to analyze the performance of FR without the
nondegeneracy assumption in order to gain a better understanding of the effect of frequent
re-solving. First, we show that the regret under the FR policy is bounded below by Ω(
√
T ).
Proposition 2. There exists a problem instance for which the regret of the FR policy defined
in Algorithm 2 is bounded below by
vHO− vFR = Ω(
√
T ).
Proposition 2 implies that the expected revenue loss under FR policy is bounded below
by Ω(
√
T ) as well, because the revenue gap between the hindsight optimum (vHO) and the
optimal revenue (v∗) is O(1) (Theorem 1). That is, we have
v∗− vFR =−(vHO− v∗)+ vHO− vFR =−O(1)+Ω(
√
T ) = Ω(
√
T ).
To prove Proposition 2, we consider a problem instance with two classes of customers
and one resource. We assume that customers from each class arrive according to a Poisson
process with rate 1; the arrivals from two classes are independent. The initial resource ca-
pacity is T . Customers from both classes, if accepted, consume one unit of the resource, but
pay different prices, r1 > r2. We consider the event when the number of class 1 customers
that arrive during T period is more than T . If this event happens, the hindsight optimum
will accept T of class 1 customers and none of class 2 customers. Conditional on that
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event, we use Freedman’s inequality (Freedman (1975)) to show that with positive proba-
bility, the FR policy accepts Ω(
√
T ) of class 2 customers, and thus at most T −Ω(
√
T ) of
class 1 customers. So the revenue of FR is at least Ω(
√
T ) less than the hindsight optimum.
The complete proof can be found in Online Appendix §A.3.1.
2.5.2 Upper bound of the revenue loss of FR
In this section, we provide an upper bound of the expected revenue loss of the FR policy.
Proposition 3. The gap between the expected revenue of the FR policy defined in Algo-
rithm 2 and the optimal value of the DLP is bounded by
vDLP− vFR = O(
√
T ).
The constant pre-factor depends on the customer arrival rate λ j (∀ j ∈ [n]), the revenues
per customer r j (∀ j ∈ [n]), and the BOM matrix A; however, it does not depend on the
starting capacity Cl (∀l ∈ [m]).
Since vDLP is an upper bound of the expected revenue under the optimal policy (see
Section 2.2.2), Proposition 3 immediately implies that the expected revenue loss of the FR
policy when compared with the optimal revenue is bounded by O(
√
T ). That is, v∗−vFR ≤
vDLP− vFR = O(
√
T ). Combining Propositions 2 and 3 gives v∗− vFR = Θ(
√
T ).
The proof of Proposition 3 can be found in Online Appendix §A.3.2. The proof is based
on the following idea. Since the LP solved under the FR policy and the DLP (2.2) only
differ in the right hand side of the capacity constraints, b(t) and b, the expected revenue
loss of the FR policy when compared to the optimal value of the DLP can be expressed
in terms of b(t) and b. More specifically, we show that the expected revenue loss during
[t, t + 1) can be expressed as O(E[(bl − bl(t))+]) for each resource l ∈ [m]. Then, using
the relationship between the average remaining capacity, b(t), and the number of accepted
customers up to time t, we prove that O(E[(bl−bl(t))+]) = O( 1√T−t ). This completes the
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proof since ∑T−1t=0 O(
1√





T ) bound in Proposition 3 is looser than the O(1) bound of FR in
Jasin and Kumar (2012), it does not require the additional condition that the optimal so-
lution to the DLP is nondegenerate. Given that the expected revenue loss of SPA is also
O(
√
T ) (see Online Appendix §A.2.2), we conclude that re-solving at least guarantees the
same order of revenue loss compared to no re-solving.
2.6 Numerical Experiment
In this section, we evaluate the numerical performance of five different heuristics, which
include
1. SPA: static probabilistic allocation heuristic (Algorithm 1)
2. FR: frequent re-solving heuristic (Algorithm 2)
3. IRT: infrequent re-solving with threhoslding (Algorithm 3)
4. IR: this algorithm uses the same re-solving schedule as IRT but without applying
thresholding; i.e., the acceptance probability at iteration u is always set to puj← xuj/λ j
5. FRT: this algorithm is motivated by IRT. We apply the same τ−1/4 thresholds from
IRT to the frequent re-solving algorithm; see the complete description in Algo-
rithm 4.
Recall that IRT has two distinct features compared to FR: it uses an infrequent re-
solving schedule and adds thresholds for acceptance probabilities. The motivation to in-
clude IR and FRT in this test is to evaluate which of the two features plays a more important
role.
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Algorithm 4 Frequent Re-solving with Thresholding: FRT
initialize: set C(0) =C and b(0) =C/T





j=1 r jx j
∣∣∣ ∑nj=1 A jx j ≤ b(t), and 0≤ x j ≤ λ j,∀ j ∈ [n]}
set C′←C(t)
for all customers arriving in [t, t +1) do
if the customer belongs to class j and A j ≤C′ (∀ j ∈ [n]) then
if x j(t)< λ j(T − t)−1/4 then
reject the customer
else if x j(t)> λ j(1− (T − t)−1/4) then
accept the customer
else
accept the customer with probability x j(t)/λ j
if the customer is accepted, update C′←C′−A j
else
reject the customer
set C(t +1)←C′ and b(t +1)← C(t+1)T−t−1
2.6.1 Single resource
We consider a revenue management problem with a single resource and two classes of
customers. We assume that customers from each class arrive according to a Poisson process
with rate 1. The arrivals of two classes are independent. Customers from both classes, if
accepted, consume one unit of resource, but pay different prices, r1 and r2. We consider
two cases: 1) r1 = 2,r2 = 1 and 2) r1 = 5,r2 = 1. We also test three settings for the average
capacity per unit time: b =1, 1.1 and 1.5. When the average capacity per unit time is 1, the
solution to the DLP is degenerate. The scenario where the average capacity is 1.1 represents
a setting where the DLP solution is “nearly degenerate,” and the scenario of 1.5 represents
a setting where the DLP solution is far away from any degenerate point. We simulate the
heuristics for two price and three average capacity per unit time scenarios defined above
and for varying horizon length T = 500,1000, . . . ,5000.
Figure 2.8 plots the regret under SPA, FR, FRT, IR, and IRT over 1000 sample paths.
The first column shows the case when r1 = 2 and r2 = 1, while the second column shows
the case when r1 = 5 and r2 = 1. The first, the second and the third rows illustrate the case
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when b = 1, b = 1.1, and b = 1.5 respectively. We make the following observations:












(a) b = 1,r1 = 2 and r2 = 1













(b) b = 1,r1 = 5 and r2 = 1












(c) b = 1.1,r1 = 2 and r2 = 1














(d) b = 1.1,r1 = 5 and r2 = 1













(e) b = 1.5,r1 = 2 and r2 = 1













(f) b = 1.5,r1 = 5 and r2 = 1
Figure 2.8: Regret under the SPA, the FR, the FRT, the IR, and the IRT policies for T =
500,1000, . . . ,5000.
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1. When r1 = 2 and r2 = 1, the expected revenue loss under SPA is the largest for all
average capacity per unit time and horizon length. This does not hold when r1 =
5, r2 = 1 and b = 1, where SPA is better than either frequent re-solving (FR) or
infrequent re-solving (IR).
2. The expected revenue loss under IR is higher than the expected revenue loss under
FR except when the problem is degenerate (b = 1). We conclude that choosing an
infrequent re-solving schedule alone is not enough to achieve O(1) loss.
3. The expected revenue losses under IRT and FRT remain constant for all cases as the
horizon length increases. Moreover, although we don’t have theoretical guarantee for
FRT, the expected revenue loss under FRT often appears smaller than the expected
revenue loss under IRT. This implies that appropriate thresholding is the main factor
that leads to uniformly bounded regret for re-solving heuristics.
2.6.2 Multiple resources
Next, we consider a network revenue management problem with multiple resources. We
consider the problem when there are five classes of customers and four types of resources.
We assume that customers from each class arrive according to a Poisson process with rate
1; the arrivals of different classes are independent. The vector of the average capacities
per unit time is given by b = [1,1,1,1]>. The vector of the revenue earned by accepting
customers is given by r = [10,3,6,1,2]>. The bill-of-materials matrix is given by
A =

1 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 1 1
1 1 0 0 0




We simulate the heuristics for varying horizon length T = 500,1000, . . . ,5000. Notice that
in this example, the optimal solution to the DLP is degenerate.












Figure 2.9: Regret under the SPA, the FR, the FRT, the IR, and the IRT when compared
with the hindsight optimal for T = 500,1000, . . . ,5000.
Figure 2.9 plots the regrets under SPA, FR, FRT, IR, and IRT over 1000 sample paths.
The result shows that the revenue losses of SPA scales poorly with horizon length T . In
comparison, the revenue losses of FR and IR increase more slowly when T increases, and
IR seems to perform slightly better for large T . The revenue losses of FRT and IRT remain
constant as T grows. Moreover, the expected revenue loss under the IRT is higher than the
expected revenue loss under the FRT. Again, this result implies that among the two factors,
infrequent re-solving and thresholding, the latter plays a more important role.
2.7 Conclusion and Discussion
We study re-solving heuristics for the network revenue management (NRM) problem. A re-
solving heuristic periodically re-optimizes a deterministic LP approximation of the original
NRM problem. The main question considered in this paper is: can we find a simple and
computationally efficient re-solving heuristic, whose expected revenue loss compared to the
optimal policy is bounded by a constant even when both the time horizon and the resource
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capacities scale up?
We answer the above question in the affirmative by proposing a re-solving heuristic
called Infrequent Re-solving with Thresholding (IRT), whose revenue loss is bounded by
a constant independent of time horizon and resource capacities. This finding improves
a previous result by Jasin and Kumar, 2012, showing that Frequent Re-solving (FR), an
algorithm that re-solves the DLP after each unit of time, has O(1) revenue loss, but requires
the optimal solution to the DLP to be nondegenerate for the quantity-based NRM problem.
Moreover, we show that when both time horizon and resource capacities scale up by k =
1,2, . . ., Frequent Re-solving (FR) has a revenue loss of Θ(
√
k). This is a negative result,
as most DLP-based heuristics can achieve the same revenue loss rate without using re-
solving at all. However, we note that the analysis by Jasin and Kumar, 2012 considers
customer choice behavior, while we focus on the classical quantity-based problem with
independent demand model throughout this chapter. Jasin, 2014 and Atar and Reiman,
2012 also consider re-solving heuristics for the price-based NRM problem. It is unclear
if one can extend our analysis technique to either the NRM problem with customer choice
or the price-based NRM problem, because our proof is based on the notion of hindsight
optimum (Reiman and Wang, 2008), which is not well-defined for the NRM problem with
customer choice or the price-based NRM problem. We will leave this question for future
research.
Our simulation results show that when the controls from FR are adjusted by some
thresholds, the resulting algorithm FRT has very promising numerical performance and
seems to have a bounded revenue loss as well. So far, we are not able to prove this result,
mainly because the induction based proof we developed for IRT breaks down when the
DLP is re-optimized every period. Recently, Vera and Banerjee, 2021 propose a different
re-solving heuristic for the NRM problem, where the DLP is re-optimized every period
and a fixed acceptance probability threshold of 0.5 is applied to every class for all periods.
They show their heuristic also achieves O(1) regret. Although the fixed threshold used by
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Vera and Banerjee, 2021 is different from the time-varying thresholds we proposed in the
FRT algorithm, we think their analysis technique may be helpful to establish the revenue
loss bound of FRT.
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CHAPTER 3
INTEGRATED PRICING AND ROUTING ON A NETWORK
3.1 Introduction
Most network flow models assume that demands on nodes are exogenous (Ahuja, Mag-
nanti, and Orlin, 1993). In this chapter, we consider a generalization of the multicommod-
ity network flow problem where demands are determined endogenously by setting prices
on node pairs. This setup leads to an intricate interplay between pricing and network rout-
ing decisions: on the one hand, pricing decisions determine demand of flows and therefore
affect routing decisions; on the other hand, routing decisions affect the cost of serving de-
mand, which in turn informs how to optimally set the prices. In order to maximize overall
system profit, the decision maker needs to consider the integration between pricing and
routing decisions and optimize them jointly.
We consider a directed network represented by a set of nodes and arcs. Each arc has
a fixed capacity and a linear cost function. For each pair of nodes, the decision maker
sets a price, which induces a demand that needs to be served. The network may have
multiple paths connecting an origin and a destination, so the decision maker chooses how
to distribute a demand flow over the different paths, while taking into account the capacity
available on the arcs. The goal is to maximize the overall profit for the system, which
is determined by the revenues obtained from serving demand minus the costs incurred by
transporting demand through the network.
The problem described above has several applications in logistics and freight trans-
portation. For example, consider a package delivery carrier such as FedEx or UPS that op-
erates an expansive service network. The carrier charges prices for packages based on their
origins, destinations, and service classes (e.g., next morning, next day, two-day, etc.). The
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prices will determine the size of demand to be served, since customers are price-sensitive.
Because the carrier operates a dense service network, there are possibly multiple options
for sending packages from their origins to their destinations. Customers do not necessarily
care about which routes their packages take, as long as they are delivered on time. So the
carrier can select routes for packages based on transportation costs and capacities. Pric-
ing and routing decisions should ideally be coordinated and made in an integrated manner,
since both decisions affect the carrier’s profit.
We propose two algorithms for solving the integrated pricing and routing problem.
Both algorithms iteratively solves a sub-problem that can be formulated as a minimum cost
multicommodity flow (MCMCF) problem. The first algorithm is based on the Frank-Wolfe
algorithm (Frank and Wolfe, 1956) (also known as the conditional gradient method (Lev-
itin and Polyak, 1966)). We show that the rate of convergence of this algorithm is O(1/T )
where T is the number of iterations. To obtain this result, the algorithm requires the revenue
function to be smooth and concave. The second algorithm is a primal-dual algorithm that
updates pricing and routing decisions iteratively. In each iteration, the algorithm executes
two steps: the first step is to set prices to maximize profit that adjusted by dual variables;
the second step is to determine how to split such demands among multiple paths to mini-
mize cost, as well as updating the dual variables. When the objective function is strongly
concave, we show that this primal-dual algorithm has a rate of convergence of O(logT/T )
where T is the number of iterations. An advantage of the primal-dual algorithm over the
Frank-Wolfe algorithm is that it allows a non-smooth revenue function (e.g., a piece-wise
linear demand function).
Our numerical experiments, using randomly generated instances, show that joint pricing
and routing can improve profit by more than 10% compared to making pricing and routing
decisions separately. A more in-depth analysis of the resulting solutions shows that in por-
tions of the service network where several demands compete for transport capacity, prices
are adjusted to free up capacity for demand with a high profit margin. That is, the price of
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demand with a low profit margin is raised to reduce that demand and reduce the capacity
required to serve it, and the price of demand with a high profit margin is dropped to in-
crease that demand and use the capacity that has become available to serve it. The intricate
interactions between price adjustments and routing choices that are revealed demonstrate
that optimization techniques are necessary to identify and exploit these opportunities to the
fullest.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we review relevant
literature. In Section 3.3, we introduce the integrated pricing and routing problem and give
mathematical formulations. In Section 3.4, we present two algorithms for the solution of
the integrated pricing and routing algorithm. In Section 3.5, we discuss the result of our
computational experiments. In Section 3.6, we offer some final thoughts.
3.2 Literature Review
Despite the fact that there are numerous papers on network routing problems in which de-
mand is exogenous (e.g., Kennington, 1978), there are only a few papers which consider
integrated pricing and routing decisions. Mitra, Ramakrishnan, and Wang (2001) studied a
joint pricing and routing problem for revenue maximization in a multi-service network, as-
suming the set of possible routes is given. Sharkey (2011) studied an integrated pricing and
routing problem for a single product, and showed that the problem can be reformulated as a
minimum convex cost network flow problem. Lin, Lin, and Young (2009) and Lin and Lee
(2015) formulate joint pricing and routing problems for less-than-truckload transportation
as an integer concave programming problem.
The routing problem, i.e., finding origin-destination paths for commodities in a net-
work, is a critical component of Service Network Design (SND) problems. SND integrates
capacity and routing decisions, i.e., decisions regarding where and how much capacity to
install on the links in a network and decisions regarding the paths that commodities follow
from their origin to their destination in the network. For a review of SND, we refer the
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reader to Crainic, 2000 and Wieberneit, 2008.
Our proposed methods use the Frank-Wolfe algorithm (Frank and Wolfe, 1956; Levitin
and Polyak, 1966) and the online gradient descent algorithm (Zinkevich, 2003). the Frank-
Wolfe algorithm under different assumptions on the objective function and feasible set.
Zinkevich (2003) shows that the online gradient descent algorithm achieves O(
√
T ) regret
for a general convex function when using step size 1/
√
t at iteration t. Hazan, 2016 provide
a stronger regret bound, O(logT ), when running with step size 1/µt at iteration t for a µ-
strongly convex objective function.
Another core component of our methods is the solution of a minimum (linear) cost
multicommodity flow (MCMCF) problem. The MCMCF problems can be found in a wide
range of domains, for example, in transportation and logistics (Krile, 2004), in communica-
tion networks (Resende and Pardalos, 2006, Chapter 10) and in scheduling (Vaidyanathan,
Jha, and Ahuja, 2007). Even though the MCMCF problem can be formulated as a linear
programming and thus solved by a general linear programming solver, the size of instances
makes this often inefficient or impractical. As a result, many custom solution methods have
developed for solving the MCMCF problem. Comprehensive surveys by Assad (1978) and
Kennington (1978) describe many such solution techniques. In addition, a detailed survey
of solution approaches for minimum convex cost multicommodity flow problems can be
found in Ouorou, Mahey, and Vial (2000).
3.3 Problem Description
We study an integrated pricing and routing problem on a fixed network represented by a
directed graph G = (N ,E ), where the set of nodes, N , represents a set of cities and the
set of arcs, E , represents connections between pairs of cities. Each arc e ∈ E has a per-unit
traversal cost ce and a capacity ke.
The set of origin-destination (OD) cities for which delivery service is offered is denoted
by J ⊆N ×N . We assume that demand is a function of price for each OD pair j ∈J
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and that this demand function, d j(p), is known. We also assume that d j(p) is strictly
decreasing, which implies that there is a one-to-one mapping between demands and prices.
Let p j(d) be the inverse demand function of d j(p), which allows us to recover the price for
a given demand. Let r j(d) := d p j(d) denote the revenue function, the revenue collected
for OD pair j ∈J for demand d. We assume that each revenue function r j is concave.
The demand of an OD pair j ∈J must be delivered via one or more paths in the
network connecting the origin and destination (respecting the capacities of the arcs in the
network). We let P j denote the set of possible (directed) paths connecting the origin and
destination of OD pair j ∈J .
The decision maker wants to maximize the profit, i.e., the total revenue collected minus
the total delivery cost incurred. The decision maker can set the price (or, equivalently,
demand) and choose the delivery routes for each OD pair, where the arc flows induced by
the delivery routes cannot exceed the capacity of the arcs.
Let z j be the demand of OD pair j. We use xp to represent the demand delivered using
path p and ve to represent the demand carried on arc e. We let arc-path indicator δe(p)
equal to 1 if arc e is in path p and 0 otherwise. We write v, x and z to denote the vectors of




r j(z j)− ∑
e∈E
ceve (3.1a)
s.t. z j = ∑
p∈P j





δe(p)xp, ∀e ∈ E , (3.1c)
ve ≤ ke, ∀e ∈ E , (3.1d)
xp ≥ 0, ∀p ∈P j, j ∈J . (3.1e)
Constraints (3.1b) ensure that the demand for an OD pair is delivered using one or more fea-
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sible paths for that demand. Constraints (3.1c) determine the flow on an arc in the network.
Constraints (3.1d) ensure that the flow on an arc does not exceed the arc’s capacity. Con-
straints (3.1e) ensure that the demand allocated to a path is non-negative. This path-based
formulation has |J |+∑ j∈J |P j |+ |E | decision variables and |J |+2|E | constraints.
Note that the number of paths, |P |= ∑ j∈J |P j |, is typically large and grows exponen-
tially in the size of network. As the total number of paths becomes prohibitively large even
for moderate-size networks, customized solution methods are needed for its solution.
The problem has an equivalent arc-based formulation, which can be found in Appendix
B.1, but our proposed algorithms use the path-based formulation because it is more flexible
and can incorporate additional constraints on paths arising in real-world applications. For
example, suppose we want to impose constraints on feasible prices such that the prices in
the solution do not deviate too much from the current prices. If the new price of OD pair
j is restricted to the interval [
¯
p j, p̄ j], then, because of the one-to-one mapping between
price and demand, the demand z j has to lie in the interval [¯
d j, d̄ j], where ¯
d j and d̄ j are
the value of the inverse demand function at p̄ j and
¯
p j, respectively. More importantly, the
path-based formulation can be solved efficiently by the column generation technique (Ford
and Fulkerson, 1958).
3.4 Algorithms
In this section, we propose two algorithms to solve the pricing and routing problem. Before
we describe these algorithms, we review some definitions for convex functions. We say
∇ f (x) is a subgradient of f at x if for any x1, it holds that
f (x1)≥ f (x)+∇ f (x)>(x1− x).
The set of subgradients of f at the point x is called the subdifferential of f at x, and is
denoted ∂ f (x). If a function f is convex and differentiable, then a subgradient is unique at
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any x and equal to its gradient at x. A subgradient can exist even when f is not differentiable
at x. Note that a subgradient of convex function f always exists. We write ‖x‖ for the
euclidean norm of x, i.e., ‖x‖=
√
x>x. We say a function f is µ-strongly convex if, for any
x1 and x2, it holds that




Recall that ∇ f (x) a subgradient of f at x and ∂ f (x) the subdifferential (i.e., the set of
subgradients) of f at x. We say a function g is µ-strongly concave if −g is µ-strongly
convex. We say a continuous differentiable function f is β -smooth if




which is equivalent to say that a continuous differentiable function f has a β -Lipschitz
continuous gradient, i.e.,
‖∇ f (x1)−∇ f (x2)‖ ≤ β‖x1− x2‖.
3.4.1 Frank-Wolfe Algorithm with Column Generation (FW-CG)
The Frank-Wolfe algorithm (Frank and Wolfe, 1956), also known as the conditional gra-
dient method (Levitin and Polyak, 1966), is a popular first-order method for smooth con-
strained convex optimization problem of the form max{ f (x) | x ∈ X}, where f is a concave
and smooth function and X is a polyhedron.
At each iteration t, the Frank-Wolfe algorithm evaluates the gradient of function f at
current solution xt , i.e., ∇ f (xt). Then, it solves a linear programming subproblem given by
wt = argmaxw∈X ∇ f (xt)>w before updating the solution suing the solution obtained from
the linear programming subproblem as xt+1 = xt +γt(wt−xt) where γt is step size. The for-
mal description can be found in Algorithm 5. Notice that the Frank-Wolfe algorithm does
44
Algorithm 5 The Frank-Wolfe (FW) Algorithm.
Input: x0 ∈ X ,γt = 2/(t +2) and T
for t = 0,1,2, . . . ,T do
Set wt ← argmaxw∈X ∇ f (xt)>w
Set xt+1← xt + γt(wt− xt)
Output: xT
not require a projection onto the feasible set but only depends on solving a linear optimiza-
tion problem over the constrained set. That is, the Frank-Wolfe algorithm performs well if
it is inexpensive to solve the linear programming subproblem. The rate of convergence of
the Frank-Wolfe algorithm described in Algorithm 5 in the β−smooth concave objective
function is O(1/T ) (Lemma 13 in Appendix B.3, Jaggi, 2013, Theorem 1).
When we apply the Frank-Wolfe algorithm to the integrated pricing and routing prob-
lem, we solve a convex optimization problem by solving a sequence of linear optimization
problems. It is easy to verify that the linear programming subproblem becomes minimum-
cost multicommodity flow problem (MCMCF). One way to efficiently solve this linear
programming problem is to apply column generation method to path-flow formulation of
MCMCF (Ahuja, Magnanti, and Orlin, 1993).
Column generation can be used to solve LP with a large number of decision variables.
Ford and Fulkerson (1958) outline the idea of using column generation form a maximal
multicommodity flow problem, where MCMCF is one of its variation, as follows. The
problem is solved by considering two problems: the master problem which includes only
a subset of decision variables and the pricing problem which determines if a new variables
should be included in the master problem to improve objective function.


















δe(p)xp ≤ ke, ∀e ∈ E ,
xp ≥ 0, ∀p ∈P j, j ∈J .
(3.2)
The objective function of (3.2) is defined as f (x), and a feasible set of (3.2) is defined as
X To apply the Frank-Wolfe algorithm (see Algorithm 5), we first need to compute the
gradient of f (x) . Each element of the gradient ∇ f (x) is given by, for path p ∈P j,
∂
∂xp































δp(e)wp ≤ ke, ∀e ∈ E ,
wp ≥ 0, ∀p ∈P j, j ∈J ,
(3.3)
where xp,t is the demand delivered on path p obtained in the current iteration t from
the Frank-Wolfe algorithm. This linear optimization subproblem can be viewed as the











on path p ∈P j. It can be observed that the number of decision variables which equals
to the number of paths is exponentially large in the network size. To solve this linear
programming subproblem, we apply column generation method. The master problem is
defined similar to (3.3) but contains only a subset of paths (decision variables). A new
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variable is added to the master problem if it can improve the objective function. For maxi-
mization problem, the objective function might increase when a new variable with positive
reduced cost is included. Therefore, a new variable is included to the master problem when
reduced cost is positive. Let ye,t be a dual variable associated with a capacity constraint on












δe(p)(ce + ye,t)> 0 ⇐⇒ ∑
e∈E
δe(p)(ce + ye,t)< r′j( ∑
p∈P j
xp,t). (3.4)
If there exists a path which satisfies the condition in (3.4), we include it to the master
problem. Otherwise, the solution is optimal. Such path is easy to find by running shortest
path algorithm, e.g. Dijkstra’s algorithm (Dijkstra, 1959), with modified cost ce + ye,t on
each arc e for each OD pair j ∈J at iteration t. Notice that by apply column generation
method all possible paths need not be generated beforehand; instead, path will be generated
only as required. The complete definition of the Frank-Wolfe with column generation
algorithm (FW-CG) for solving the integrated pricing and routing problem can be found in
Algorithm 6.
Before we formally state a theorem, let us recall the definition of big O notation. For
two functions f (T ) and g(T ) > 0, we write f (T ) = O(g(T )) if there exists a constant
M1 and a constant T1 such that f (T ) ≤ M1g(T ) for all T ≥ T1. The convergence rate of
Algorithm 6 follows immediately from Lemma 13 in Appendix B.3 and Theorem 1 in
Jaggi (2013) and can be stated as follows.
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Algorithm 6 The Frank-Wolfe with Column Generation (FW-CG) Algorithm.
Input: x0 = 0,y0 = 0,γt = 2/(t +2) and T
Initialize: For each OD pair j ∈J , consider a path with minimum cost, i.e., L j =
argminp∈P j ∑e∈E δe(p)ce.
























δe(p)wp ≤ ke, ∀e ∈ E (ye,t),
wp ≥ 0, ∀p ∈L j, j ∈J ,
for OD pairs j ∈J do
if minp∈P j ∑e∈E δ
p
e (ce + ye.t)< r′j(∑p∈L j x
p
t ) then
Set L j←L j∪argminp∈P j ∑e∈E δ
p
e (ce + ye.t)
Set i← i+1
while i > 0
Set xt+1← xt + γt(wt− xt)
Output: xT
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Theorem 2. When revenue function is smooth and concave, under Algorithm 6, we have







Next, we propose a Primal-Dual (PD) algorithm. This algorithm uses an iterative method
based on applying online learning technique on the Lagrangian relaxation of the original
integrated pricing and routing problem. The capacity constraints, which are the only bundle
constraint in (3.2), are removed from the constrained set and placed into the objective
function. In each iteration, the algorithm has two steps which can easily be solved. In
the first step, it determines total demand, or equivalently price, for each OD pair (pricing
decision). Then, it decides how to deliver such demand through one or more paths (routing
decision).
In online convex optimization framework, a decision maker chooses xt at iteration t
before seeing a convex cost function `t . The cost of `t(xt) is then realized to the decision
maker. Many algorithms is proposed with the aim to minimize the regret, where the regret










Online Subgradient Descent (Zinkevich, 2003) which will be used in the first step of the
proposed algorithm is a well-known and simple online learning algorithm. The formal
description of the algorithm can be found in Algorithm 7, where ΠX(u) is a projection of
u onto a convex set X . For a general convex loss function, Zinkevich (2003) shows that
Algorithm 7 The Online Subgradient Descent Algorithm.
Input: x0 ∈ X ,ηt and T
for t = 0,1,2, . . . ,T do
Set xt ←ΠX [xt−1−ηt∇`t(xt)]
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Algorithm 7 with an appropriate step size has O(
√
T ) regret. Hazan (2016) shows that
O(logT ) regret is attainable for a strongly convex loss function. This result is formally
stated in Lemma 14. Note that the result still holds for a non-smooth convex loss function.
To obtain the Lagrangian dual problem of integrated pricing and routing problem (3.2),
we relax the capacity constraints. Let ye ≥ 0 be Lagrange multipliers associated with the






























where x∗ and y∗ be the optimal solutions of (3.7). Because a revenue function is assumed
to be concave in a demand for each OD pair j ∈J , it follows that the Lagrangian function
(3.6) is concave in total demand z j of each OD pair j ∈J as well as concave in flow on
path xp for each p ∈P j. Moreover, we can observe that the Lagrangian function (3.6) is
convex (linear) in dual variable ye for all e ∈ E .
In the first step of the algorithm, we want to determine the total demand of each OD
pair so that the Lagrangian function (3.6) is maximized. Recall that z j = ∑p∈P j xp. Let z
be the vector of z j for all j ∈J . Suppose y is constant. We want to find
z = argmax
z≥0




z j=∑p∈P j xp
∑
j∈J
r j(z j)− ∑
e∈E






It is obvious that the problem is separable for each OD pair j, i.e., for all j ∈J , we have
z j = argmax
z j≥0
z j=∑p∈P j xp
r j(z j)− ∑
e∈E
(ce + ye) ∑
p∈P j
δe(p)xp. (3.8)
That is, z j is the solution of the profit maximization for each OD pair j ∈J . We observe
that to obtain z j the second term in (3.8) must be minimized. Since the term is basically the
modified cost of routing demand of j through paths, all demand must be delivered using
only the smallest adjusted cost path. Such path is easily identified by running shortest
path algorithm, e.g. Dijkstra’s algorithm (Dijkstra, 1959) with modified cost ce + ye on
each arc. Let p∗j be the shortest cost path of OD pair j with modified cost ce + ye, i.e.,
p∗j = argminp∈P j ∑e∈E (ce + ye)δe(p). Therefore, we can write
z j = argmax
z j≥0
r j(z j)− cp∗j z j, (3.9)
where cp∗j is the cost of the shortest cost path with modified cost ce + ye of OD pair j, i.e.,
cp∗j = ∑e∈E δe(p
∗
j)ce. At each iteration the first step applies Online Supergradient Ascent
to the maximization problem in (3.9). That is, for each j ∈J , z j moves in the direction of
a supergradient of objective function found in (3.9).
There are three main underlying reasons why we choose to operate on the total demand
on each OD pair instead of the flow on each possible path. Firstly, we do not require
to enumerate all possible paths. Secondly, the number of OD pairs is much smaller than
the number of all possible paths, which makes the algorithm computationally efficient.
Lastly, the algorithm provides a stronger regret guarantee when r j is assumed to be strongly
concave in z j for all j ∈J . This result follows from the result of Online Supergradient
Ascent. However, when r j is assumed to be strongly concave in z j, it does not imply that
r j is strongly concave in xp for all p ∈P j (see more discussion in Section 3.5.1).
As we mention earlier, the convergence guarantee of Online Supergradient Ascent does
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not require the Lagrangian function to be smooth in total demand z j for all j ∈J . That is,
the result still follows when, for example, price function p j is piece-wise linear in z j. This
relationship is often observed when there is a price competition.
In the second step of the algorithm, suppose the total demand of each OD pair is fixed
from the first step, we want to determine the amount of demand to be delivered on different
paths. Based on the Lagrangian dual problem in (3.7), because z is fixed from the first stage






























xp = z j, ∀ j ∈J ,
xp ≥ 0, ∀p ∈P j, j ∈J ,
and it can be observed that ye ≥ 0 for all e ∈ E can be viewed as Lagrange multipliers




















δe(p)xp ≤ ke, ∀e ∈ E (ye ≥ 0),
xp ≥ 0, ∀p ∈P j, j ∈J .
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The first term in objective function, ∑ j∈J r j(∑p∈P j xp) = ∑ j∈J r j(z j), is independent of x,
















δe(p)xp ≥−ke, ∀e ∈ E (ye ≥ 0),
xp ≥ 0, ∀p ∈P j, j ∈J ,
(3.11)
which is the minimum-cost multicommodity flow problem (MCMCF) in path-flow formu-
lation. That is, in the second stage the total demand must be spit in the way that minimize
the total cost while satisfying the capacity constraints. Observe that the problem (3.11)
might be infeasible because the demand constraints which force the total demand of each
OD pair to be predetermined z j might cause the violation in capacity constraints. Therefore,
we introduce a dummy arc which is uncapacitated for each OD pair to take care residual
demand which cannot satisfy the capacity constraints. A large enough per-unit cost of such
arc must be set so that the arc will not be used if not necessary.
We can apply the same technique, column generation method, as described in Section
3.4.1 to solve MCMCF. Specifically, a new variable (path) is added to the master problem
when the reduced cost is negative, that is, the pricing problem is to check if for OD pair j
there exists a path which satisfies
∑
e∈E
δe(p)(ce + ye)−σ j < 0 ⇐⇒ ∑
e∈E
δe(p)(ce + ye)< σ j, (3.12)
where σ j is a dual variable associated with the demand constraint of OD pair j. Such
path can be found easily by running shortest path algorithm such as Dijkstra’s algorithm
(Dijkstra, 1959) with modified cost ce + ye on arc e. Therefore, the MCMCF problem in
(3.11) can be solved efficiently by applying column generation method without having to
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enumerate all possible path. We state the formal description of PD when objective function
is strongly concave in Algorithm 8. Note that we write max(x,0) as [x]+.
Algorithm 8 The Primal-Dual (PD) Algorithm for Integrated Pricing and Routing.
Input: x0 = 0,y0 = 0,z0 = 0,µ and T
Initialize: For each OD pair j ∈J , add an uncapacitated dummy arc with cost r′j(0)
and consider a path with minimum cost, i.e., L j = argminp∈P j ∑e∈E δe(p)ce.
for t = 1,2, . . . ,T do
































δe(p)xp ≥−ke, ∀e ∈ E (ye ≥ 0),
xp ≥ 0, ∀p ∈P j, j ∈J ,
for OD pairs j ∈J do
if minp∈P j ∑e∈E δe(p)(ce + ye,t)< σ j then
Set L j←L j∪argminp∈P j ∑e∈E δe(p)(ce + ye,t)
Set i← i+1
while i > 0
Output: x̄ = ∑Tt=1 xt/T and ȳ = ∑
T
t=1 yt/T
Theorem 3. When revenue function is strongly concave in total demand, under Algorithm
8, we have







Appendix B.2.1 provides the detailed proof.
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Theorem 4. When revenue function is strongly concave in total demand, under Algorithm
8, we have






The proof can be found in Appendix B.2.2.
We remark that unlike the Frank-Wolfe algorithm, the PD algorithm (Algorithm 8) does
not require the objective function to be smooth. We obtain the same rates of convergence in
Theorem 3 and Theorem 4 for strongly concave and both smooth and non-smooth objective
function. Moreover, the PD algorithm can be applied even if the objective function is not
strongly concave. In that case, Equation (3.13) in Algorithm 8 needs to be modified. Specif-
ically, for general concave (not necessarily strongly concave) objective function, Equation
(3.13) can use a step size of 1/
√
t in place of the step size 1/µ jt. However, for general
concave objective, we can only conclude that rate of convergence in term of average regret
of this algorithm is O(1/
√
T ).
To summarize this section, we proposed two algorithms, Frank-Wolfe with Column
Generation (FW-CG) and primal-dual algorithm (PD), for solving integrated pricing and
routing problem. When revenue function is smooth and concave, FW-CG achieves the rate
of convergence in term of objective function of O(1/T ). However, PD still works without
a smoothness assumption. We show that for strongly concave revenue function the rates of
convergence of PD in term of average regret and total demand are both O(logT/T ). We
note that we can alter PD so that the algorithm allows general concave revenue function.
Specifically, step size in the first step when updating total demand of each OD pair needs
to be modified. At iteration t, modified PD uses step size 1/
√
t instead of 1/µ jt. This
modified algorithm with new step size has the rate of convergence in term of average regret
of O(1/
√
T ) for general concave revenue function. The proof is similar to The proof of
Theorem 3, but we use O(
√
T ) bound (Zinkevich, 2003) when we apply Online Supergra-
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dient Ascent. Note that when revenue function is not strongly concave, we are not able to
conclude the rate of convergence in term of total demand.
3.5 Numerical Experiments
In the experiments below, we consider a service network with 10 cities and connections
between all cities, i.e., a complete directed graph G = (N ,E ) with |N |= 10 and |E |=
90, resulting in |∑ j∈J Pj| = 9,864,090 paths. Let U{¯
u, ū} denote the discrete uniform
distribution which can have integer values from
¯
u and ū. The per-unit traversal cost and
the capacity are drawn from U{1,5} as well for all arcs e ∈ E , i.e., ce ∼ U{1,5} and
ke ∼U{1,5}.
3.5.1 Demand Models
We consider two different types of demand models.
Linear Demand Model.
We assume linear demand models for all origin-destination (OD) pairs j ∈ J with different
parameter values:
d j(p) = a j−b j p,









Recall that the revenue function r j(d) := p j(d)d requires to be concave. For linear demand







which is strongly concave in d, because r′′j (d) = −2/b j < 0. Note that although revenue
function of linear demand model is strongly concave in total demand, it is concave but
not strongly concave in the flow on each path. To see this, we write total demand as a
summation of flows on each possible path. We have ∇2r j(d) = −2J|P j |, where Jn is an
n× n matrix of ones. Its eigenvalues are −2|P j | and 0, which are less than or equal
to zero. Therefore, revenue function of linear demand model is concave but not strongly
concave in flow on each path. We assume that the slope parameter of the price function is
drawn from U{1,5} for all OD pairs j ∈J , i.e., 1/b j ∼U{1,5}.
Piece-wise Linear Demand Model.
We assume that, for each OD pair j ∈ J, the demand function can be written as
d j(p) =

a j,1−b j,1 p p≤ p0
a j,2−b j,2 p p > p0,
where a j,1 > 0,a j,2 > 0,b j,1 > 0 and b j,2 > 0. Equivalently, we can write the price as a





− 1b j,1 d d ≤ d0
a j,2
b j,2
− 1b j,2 d d > d0.
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− 2b j d d >
a j
4 .





d− 1b j d
2 d ≤ a j4
5a j
4b j
d− 2b j d
2 d > a j4 .
It can be seen that this revenue function is not differentiable at a j/4. The subdifferential of
revenue function is













d = a j4
a j
b j
− 4b j d d >
a j
4 ,
which is decreasing function in d. Therefore, the revenue function is concave. However,
because the revenue function is non-smooth, only PD is applicable to this setting. We
assume that the slope parameter of the price function is drawn from U{1,5} for all OD
pairs j ∈J , i.e., 1/b j ∼U{1,5}.
3.5.2 Experimental Results
We test four different distributions, U{7,11}, U{9,13}, U{11,15}, and U{13,17} for the
intercept parameter of the price function, a j/b j. Consequently, the same demand can be
induced by setting a higher price, and higher profit is obtained for the same demand. We
generate three instances for each distribution of the intercept parameter of price function
while assuming other parameters have the same distributions.
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We investigate the benefit of integrating pricing and routing decisions by considering
three different settings:
1. PRICING ONLY: The decision maker sets optimal prices for each OD pair given that
the demand for the OD pair only uses the path consisting of the direct arc that links
the origin to the destination.
2. PRICING → ROUTING: The decision maker sets optimal prices for each OD pair
assuming that the demand for the OD pair only uses the path consisting of the direct
arc that links the origin to the destination, but after setting the prices, the decision
maker optimally chooses one or more routes for each OD pair to serve the resulting
demand.
3. PRICING + ROUTING: The decision maker simultaneously and optimally determines
the prices and the routes to serve the resulting demand for each OD pair, i.e., solve
the integrated pricing and routing problem.
Linear Demand Model.
Figure 3.1 shows the average profit for the three settings when the intercept term of the
price function, a j/b j, is drawn from U{7,11}, U{9,13}, U{11,15}, and U{13,17}. We
observe a slight increase in profit, 5.23%, 3.17%, 1.87%, and 1.08%, respectively, for
PRICING → ROUTING over PRICING ONLY, and a significant increase in profit, 11.39%,
10.96%, 11.08%, and 11.54%, respectively, for PRICING + ROUTING over PRICING ONLY.
We also see that the improvement in average profit of PRICING → ROUTING over
PRICING ONLY decreases as the intercept term of price function increases. The reason
is that the optimal demand for each OD pair never decreases (and likely increases) when
the intercept term of price function increases. As a result, the capacity utilization increases
which restricts the allocation of demand across the different paths when deciding the routes
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Figure 3.1: The average profit of PRICING ONLY, Pricing → Routing and PRICING +
ROUTING when the intercept term of the price function, a j/b j, is drawn from U{7,11},
U{9,13}, U{11,15} and U{13,17}.
for the demands.
Figure 3.2 shows the average arc capacity utilization in the PRICING ONLY, PRICING
→ ROUTING, and PRICING + ROUTING solutions when the intercept term of the price
function, a j/b j, is drawn from U{7,11}, U{9,13}, U{11,15}, and U{13,17}. This graph
shows that effectively using the capacity in the service network is critical to achieving
high profits. Even though the demand is the same in the PRICING ONLY and PRICING →
ROUTING settings, the arc capacity utilization increases because some of the demand is
allocated to longer, but cheaper, alternative paths.
Figure 3.1 clearly shows that simultaneously optimizing pricing and routing decisions
pays off. In the PRICING + ROUTING solution, the price for an OD pair often differs from
the price for the same OD pair in the PRICING ONLY solution to induce more demand
for more profitable OD pairs and less demand to less profitable OD pairs. Two factors
impact the profit that can be achieved when simultaneously optimizing pricing and routing
decisions: (1) the number profitable paths, i.e., paths for which the per-unit revenue is
greater than the per-unit cost, and (2) the capacity utilization. As mentioned earlier, an
increase in the intercept term of the price function increases the capacity utilization, which,
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Figure 3.2: The average capacity utilization of PRICING ONLY, PRICING→ ROUTING and
PRICING + ROUTING when demand function is linear, and the intercept term of the price
function, a j/b j, is drawn from U{7,11}, U{9,13}, U{11,15} and U{13,17}.
in turn, reduces the routing flexibility. The larger the number of profitable paths for an OD
pair, the more options can be exploited by the optimization.
Figure 3.3 shows the average number of paths for which the per-unit revenue is greater
than the per-unit cost when using the prices set in the PRICING ONLY solution, when the
intercept term of price function a j/b j is drawn from U{7,11}, U{9,13}, U{11,15}, and
U{13,17}. We see that the average number of profitable paths increases exponentially
when the intercept term of the price function increases.
The interaction between these two factors has different effects in different instances,
which explains why we do not see a monotonic change in average profit when the intercept
term of the price function is increased.
Next, we investigate the solution to a single instance in more depth (the intercept term
of price function for this instance is drawn from U{11,15}). We focus on portion of the
service network consisting of four nodes and five arcs; the arcs with their cost and capacity
are shown in Figure 3.4.
In Table 3.1, we show, for each of the five OD pairs corresponding to the five arcs, the
size of the demand, along how many paths the demand is routed, and the profit obtained
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Figure 3.3: The average number of profitable paths when using the prices of the PRICING
ONLY solution when demand function is linear, and the intercept term of price function








Figure 3.4: Cost (first element) and capacity (second element) of a subset of arcs in the
network
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from serving the demand in the optimal solution for the PRICING ONLY and for the PRIC-
ING + ROUTING setting. Furthermore, in Table 3.2, we show, for each of the arcs, the total
demand on the arc and the arc’s capacity utilization in the optimal solution for the PRICING
ONLY and for the PRICING + ROUTING setting as well as the specific demands allocated
to the arc and their contribution to the arc’s capacity utilization.
Table 3.1: Demands of a subset of OD pairs in PRICING ONLY and PRICING + ROUTING
OD
PRICING ONLY
price demand total profit
(5,2) 10.00 1.00 9.00
(5,7) 8.00 1.00 5.00
(5,8) 6.00 1.00 5.00
(7,2) 9.00 1.50 9.00
(8,2) 7.00 1.50 9.00
OD
PRICING + ROUTING
price demand #routes avg per-unit profit total profit
(5,2) 9.22 1.39 3 7.87 10.93
(5,7) 8.00 1.00 1 5.00 5.00
(5,8) 7.82 0.64 1 6.82 4.33
(7,2) 9.22 1.44 1 6.22 8.99
(8,2) 7.40 1.40 1 6.40 8.96
We see in Table 3.1 that the demand for an OD pair in the solution for the PRICING
+ ROUTING setting can go up or down when compared to the demand in the solution for
the PRICING ONLY setting. Because in the PRICING + ROUTING setting, the demand
can be delivered using multiple paths, the OD pairs are competing for the capacity on the
arcs. Therefore, in an optimal solution, the capacity should be used by the more profitable
OD pairs. In fact, for OD pairs with a high per-unit profit, it may be beneficial to induce
more demand, by setting a lower price, while for OD pairs with low per-unit profit, it may
be beneficial to induce less demand, by setting a higher price, in order to create capacity
that can be exploited by more profitable OD pairs. For example, in the solution for the
PRICING + ROUTING setting, the demand for OD pair (5,2), which has a high per-unit
profit, is increased and delivered using the paths 5→ 8→ 2 and 5→ 7→ 2. The demands
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Table 3.2: Flows and utilization of a subset of arcs in PRICING ONLY and PRICING +
ROUTING
arc
PRICING ONLY PRICING + ROUTING
OD flow utilization OD flow utilization
5→2 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
(5,2) 1.00 1.00 (5,2) 1.00 1.00
5→7 1.00 0.25 1.02 0.26
(5,7) 1.00 0.25 (5,2) 0.02 0.01
(5,7) 1.00 0.25
5→8 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
(5,8) 1.00 1.00 (5,2) 0.36 0.36
(5,8) 0.64 0.64
7→2 1.50 0.30 5.00 1.00





8→2 1.50 0.50 3.00 1.00






of OD pairs (5,8), (5,7), and (7,2), which have a low per-unit profit, are decreased to free
up capacity for the demand of OD pair (5,2).
In the PRICING + ROUTING setting, where demand can be satisfied using multiple
paths, the arc capacity has to be shared by OD pairs. Because different OD pairs have
different price functions, it becomes virtually impossible to construct solutions with high
profit solutions without the use of optimization. To illustrate, the demand of OD pair (5,2)
is 1.0 in the solution to the PRICING ONLY setting, which uses the entire capacity of arc
(5,2). If the arc (5,2) would have been uncapacitated, the optimal demand for OD pair
(5,2) in the PRICING ONLY setting would have been 2.75. In the PRICING + ROUTING
setting, the optimal demand for OD pair (5,2) is no longer restricted (only) by the capacity
of arc (5,2). Therefore, the price for OD pair (5,2) is reduced from 10.00 to 9.22 to induce
a higher demand of 1.39. This is still much less than 2.75, because (1) the costs of the
alternative paths, and (2) the competition for capacity on the arcs on the alternative paths.
In the solution for the the PRICING + ROUTING setting, the demand of OD pair (5,2) is split
among paths 5→2 (1 unit), 5→8→2 (0.36 units), and 5→7→2 (0.02 units). The per-unit
cost of path 5→2 is 1.0, while the per-unit costs of the paths 5→8→2 and 5→7→2 are 2
and 6, respectively; these paths are clearly more expensive. Since 0.36 of the capacity of
arc 5→8 is allocated to the demand of OD pair (5,2), the demand of OD pair (5,8), which in
the solution for PRICING ONLY setting used the entire capacity of arc 5→ 8, is decreased
to 0.64 by increasing its price from 6.00 to 7.82.
Piece-wise Linear Demand Model.
Figure 3.5 shows the average profit for the three settings when the demand function is piece-
wise linear and the intercept term of the price function, a j/b j, is drawn from U{7,11},
U{9,13}, U{11,15}, and U{13,17}. Similar to linear demand case, we observe a slight
increase in profit, 6.62%, 4.36%, 2.86%, and 2.01%, respectively, for PRICING→ ROUT-
ING over PRICING ONLY, and a significant increase in profit, 12.95%, 12.79%, 13.41%,
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and 14.38%, respectively, for PRICING + ROUTING over PRICING ONLY.



















Figure 3.5: The average profit of PRICING ONLY, Pricing → Routing and PRICING +
ROUTING when demand function is piece-wise linear and the intercept term of the price
function, a j/b j, is drawn from U{7,11}, U{9,13}, U{11,15} and U{13,17}.
Figure 3.6 shows the average arc capacity utilization in the PRICING ONLY, PRICING
→ ROUTING, and PRICING + ROUTING solutions when the demand function is piece-wise
linear and the intercept term of the price function, a j/b j, is drawn from U{7,11}, U{9,13},
U{11,15}, and U{13,17}. Figure 3.7 shows the average number of paths for which the











Figure 3.6: The average capacity utilization of PRICING ONLY, PRICING→ ROUTING and
PRICING + ROUTING when demand function is piece-wise linear and the intercept term of
the price function, a j/b j, is drawn from U{7,11}, U{9,13}, U{11,15} and U{13,17}.
per-unit revenue is greater than the per-unit cost when using the prices set in the PRICING
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ONLY solution, when the demand function is piece-wise linear and the intercept term of
price function a j/b j is drawn from U{7,11}, U{9,13}, U{11,15}, and U{13,17}.











Figure 3.7: The average number of profitable paths when using the prices of the PRICING
ONLY solution when the intercept term of price function a j/b j is drawn from U{7,11},
U{9,13}, U{11,15} and U{13,17}.
As discussed in Section 3.5.2, because of limited arc capacity, we observe a monotonic
decrease in average profit improvement of PRICING → ROUTING over PRICING ONLY
when the intercept term of the price function increases. However, because of the interaction
between the capacity utilization and the number of profitable paths, we cannot observe such
trend in average profit improvement of PRICING + ROUTING over PRICING ONLY.
3.5.3 Computation Time and Convergence Rates.
In this section, we will study the convergence rate to the optimal solution of the Frank-
Wolfe algorithm with column generation (FW-CG) and the Primal-Dual algorithm (PD)
when applicable. We test one problem instance with the intercept term of the price function
a j/b j drawn from U{11,15}.
We apply the proposed algorithms, when applicable, to the simulated network for 10000
iterations. We measure performance of the algorithms using the metrics found in Table 3.3.
The first metric, log loss, measures the gap between objective value obtained from pro-
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posed algorithm and optimal objective value. The second metric, log optimal demand gap
measures the total difference between demand solutions obtained from proposed algorithm
and optimal demands. The third metric, log optimal path flow gap measures the total dif-
ference between path flow solutions obtained from proposed algorithm and optimal path
flows, and the last metric, log optimal arc flows gap, measures the total difference between
arc flow solutions obtained from proposed algorithm and optimal arc flows.
Table 3.3: The performance metrics.
Metric FW-CG PD
log loss log( f (x∗)− f (xt)) log |1t ∑
t
s=1 L(xs,ys)−L(x∗,y∗)|
log optimal demand gap log‖zt− z∗‖2 log‖z̄t− z∗‖2
log optimal path flow gap log‖xt− x∗‖2 log‖x̄t− x∗‖2
log optimal arc flows gap log‖vt− v∗‖2 log‖v̄t− v∗‖2
Linear Demand Model.
Recall that we assume that each OD pair has a linear relationship between demand and
price. That is, the revenue function is both smooth and strongly concave. Therefore, both
the Frank-Wolfe algorithm with column generation (FW-CG) and the Primal-Dual algo-
rithm (PD) can be applied in order to solve the integrated pricing and routing problem.
We compare the convergence results of two algorithms when measured against log
iteration across four metrics in Figure 3.8. Note that we will suppress base 10 of logarithmic
function and write log to represent log10 in this section.
Figure 3.8 shows that log loss and log iteration has linear relationships with negative
slope for both algorithms. This numerical result coincides with the theoretical results in
Lemma 13 and Theorem 3. Moreover, we can observe that FW-CG has a faster convergence
rate in term of objective value than PD. Note that although FW-CG converges faster, it
requires an additional condition, smoothness, on revenue function, while PD only needs
revenue function to be strongly concave. Even though we only show the convergence of
demand when using PD in Theorem 4, Figure 3.8 show numerically the convergence of
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Figure 3.8: The plots compare log loss (upper left), log optimal demand gap (upper right),
log optimal path flow gap (lower left) and log optimal arc flows gap (lower right) of PD
and FW-CG against log iteration (x-axis) when demand function is linear.
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demand, path flow and arc flow from both proposed algorithms. In fact, we can observe
that they seem to converge in the same order. When we examine the run time, PD and
FW-CG take 96.93 seconds and 67.65 seconds per 10000 iterations respectively.
Next, we show how sensitive of running time to an increase in the number of nodes
of both algorithms. Figure 3.9 plots average time per iterations (seconds) used by PD
and FW-CG when demand function is linear and the number of nodes is 10,20, . . . ,50. It







Time per iteration (seconds)
PD FW-CG
Figure 3.9: The plot shows average time per iteration (seconds) used by PD and FW-CG
when demand function is linear and the number of nodes is 10,20, . . . ,50.
can be seen that the running time of PD increases exponentially as the number of nodes
increases, while the running time of FW-CG seems to increase linearly as the number of
nodes increases. One reason why we observe larger running time in PD is because linear
programming subproblems of PD require more time to solve than those of FW-CG due to
the number of decision variables generated from column generation method (See Figure
3.10).
Piece-wise Linear Demand Model.
Recall that when we assume demand function to be piece-wise linear, we can show that the
revenue function is concave but non-smooth. Since the Frank-Wolfe algorithm with column
generation (FW-CG) requires smooth objective function, only the Primal-Dual algorithm
(PD) can be applied to solve this problem.
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Figure 3.10: The plot shows the number of decision variables involved in linear program-
ming subproblem of PD and FW-CG when demand function is linear and the number of
nodes is 10,20, . . . ,50.
We run the Primal-Dual algorithm (PD) on the simulated network for 10000 iterations.
The convergence results can be found in Figure 3.11. It can be seen that the slope of log
loss and log optimal demand gap in Figure 3.11 scale linearly with log(iteration) which are
consistent with Theorem 3 and Theorem 4. When we examine the run time, PD takes 92.95
seconds per 10000 iterations.
3.6 Final Remarks
We have studied an integrated pricing and routing problem on a service network. The
problem can be formulated as a convex optimization problem, although the size of this op-
timization problem prohibits us from solving it directly. We have proposed two algorithms
to solve the problem. First, we modified the classical Frank-Wolfe algorithm with column
generation (FW-CG). When the objective function is smooth, we show that the rate of con-
vergence in terms of the objective function is O(1/T ). Second, we propose a primal-dual
algorithm (PD), which allows a non-smooth objective function (e.g., a piece-wise linear
pricing function). We show that when the objective is strongly concave, the rate of conver-
gence of PD in terms of average regret is O(logT/T ). Numerical experiments demonstrate
the benefit of joint pricing and routing; it can increase profit by more than 10%.
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Figure 3.11: The plots compare log loss (upper left), log optimal demand gap (upper right),
log optimal path flow gap (lower left) and log optimal arc flows gap (lower right) of PD
against log iteration (x-axis) when demand function is piece-wise linear.
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There are many possible directions for future research. We mention only two here. We
have assumed that the service capacity in the service network is known. A natural extension
is to let the optimization decide whether it is beneficial to acquire additional capacity on
some of the links in the network. This can be done by allowing demand on an arc to exceed
capacity at a cost. Another natural extension is to consider convex arc cost, e.g., per unit
cost is an increasing step function as a result of resource scarcity. In this case, we can
apply PD to solve the problem; however, the sub-problem becomes a nonlinear MCMCF
problem where the objective function is piece-wise linear.
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CHAPTER 4
DYNAMIC PRICING AND MATCHING FOR TWO-SIDED QUEUE
4.1 Introduction
Most queueing models consider a fixed set of servers with sequentially arriving customers.
In this chapter, we consider a two-sided queueing system where servers also arrive se-
quentially and then wait to be matched with customers. Several applications of online
marketplaces and gig economy platforms can be modeled as two-sided queues—for exam-
ple, Uber and Lyft where passengers are matched with drivers, Grubhub and DoorDash
where customer orders are matched with meal delivery couriers, and crowdsourced work-
force platforms such as TaskRabbit where tasks are matched with contributors. Most of
these platforms use both dynamic pricing and dynamic matching as levers to control mar-
ket profitability and delay efficiency.
Motivated by these applications, we consider a canonical model of two-sided queues
with multiple types of servers and multiple types of customers. Each customer type is
compatible with a certain subset of server types. For example, in the case of ride-hailing
marketplaces, the types of servers (drivers) and customers are determined by the proximity
of their current locations, as well as other factors such as numbers of seats needed and
vehicle capacities. Our model assumes a fairly general setting with arbitrary numbers of
customer and server types, with their compatibility modeled by a bipartite graph.
At each point in time, the system operator posts a price for each customer and server
type. Then, customers and servers who are willing to accept the quoted prices (after they
factor in expected waiting costs) will enter the system. Those who entered will wait in
queues separated by their types until they are matched to a compatible counterpart type.
Once a customer-server pair is matched, the pair will leave the queueing system immedi-
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ately in order to complete the service. The system operator earns a profit that is equal to
the difference between the price charged to the customer and the price quoted to the server.
We formulate the above system as a Markov decision process (MDP) in the infinite
time horizon. The operator can vary the prices for different customer and server types, as
well as decide when to match and which customer-server pair to match. The objective is to
maximize the long-run average profit obtained by the system operator.
There are several technical challenges to analyze this stochastic system. The first chal-
lenge is the curse of dimensionality in solving and analyzing the MDP. As the number of
customer or server types increases, the dimension of the state space increases exponentially
(even when the buffer size of each queue is bounded). It is hence intractable to solve the
exact MDP for large-scale systems with multiple types. In this chapter, we propose several
approximate policies to obtain near optimal solutions for the MDP.
The second challenge is that the stochastic behavior of the two-sided queueing system
is complicated by the interplay between pricing and matching decisions. Our proposed
policies use dynamic pricing to ensure the stability of the two-sided queue system, so the
arrival rates of customers and servers vary with the queue lengths. As the queue lengths
change, the matching decisions among different types are adjusted dynamically, which in
turn affects the system state and pricing decisions. As a result, the queue lengths of different
types are intricately correlated. The system cannot be decomposed into a set of simple
queue and the pricing and matching decisions cannot be decoupled and analyzed separately.
To solve this challenge, we use the Lyapunov drift method to analyze the stochastic system
as a whole in order to bound the total queue length.
4.1.1 Summary of Results
We first present a fluid model for the two-sided queueing system (Section 4.3) and show
that the profit obtained by the fluid model is an upper bound on the achievable profit under
any policy. Based on the fluid model, we propose several approximate policies.
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We analyze the proposed policies in a large-scale setting in which all the arrival rates
are scaled by a factor η ∈ Z+. Under this scaling regime, any policy within o(η) of the
optimal expected profit is asymptotically optimal. We first consider a fluid pricing policy
combined with the max-weight matching algorithm (Tassiulas and Ephremides, 1992). We
show that the profit loss of this policy from the fluid solution is O(
√
η) (Section 4.3). We
then propose a generalization of the fluid pricing policy that uses two prices for each queue
type (Kim and Randhawa, 2017). For this two-price policy combined with max-weight
matching policy, we show that the profit loss from the fluid profit is reduced to O(η1/3)
(Section 4.4). Furthermore, we prove that for a broad class of pricing policies, using any
matching policy will result in a profit loss lower bounded by Ω(η1/3) (Section 4.5).
Next, we compare the max-weight matching policy with other matching policies and
show its superiority (Section 4.6.2). We show that the max-weight algorithm is delay op-
timal in the limit as η → ∞. In particular, under the fluid pricing policy, max-weight
matching minimizes the revenue loss due to hitting the queue buffer size threshold. Under
the two-price policy, max-weight matching minimizes the expected sum of queue lengths.
Using these results, we characterize the profit loss of max-weight matching as a function
of the number of customer/server types n: the profit loss scales as O(
√
n) for fluid pricing
policy and O(n1/3) for two-price policy. In contrast, if one directly applies the solution of
the fluid model as a state-independent randomized matching policy, the profit loss can scale
as Ω(n) for either fluid pricing or two-price policies.
Finally, we analyze the structure of the MDP model and propose approximate DP so-
lutions. In some special cases, we are able to show structural properties of the optimal
dynamic pricing policy (Appendix C.1.2). In addition, we present an LP-based approxi-





Dynamic matching markets have numerous applications such as ride sharing (Banerjee,
Freund, and Lykouris, 2017), e-commerce marketplaces like Amazon.com or Ebay, kidney
exchange (Roth, Sönmez, and Ünver, 2007; Anderson, Ashlagi, Gamarnik, and Kanoria,
2017), and payment processing networks (Sivaraman, Venkatakrishnan, Ruan, Negi, Yang,
Mittal, Fanti, and Alizadeh, 2020). Below, we will discuss previous work involving dy-
namic matching in the context of two-sided queues.
Caldentey, Kaplan, and Weiss (2009) and Adan and Weiss (2012) considered bipartite
matching for two-sided queues on a first-come-first-served basis: each arriving customer is
matched to a compatible server who has the earliest arrival time and has not been matched.
Under this matching rule, they analyzed steady-state matching rates between certain cus-
tomer and server types. Furthermore, they deduced the necessary conditions on the fre-
quency of arrivals for stability of the system and also derived the stationary distribution.
Gurvich and Ward (2014) analyzed a general multi-sided queuing system, which includes
the two-sided queueing system as a special case. Their objective was to minimize holding
cost in a finite horizon. They presented a periodic review matching algorithm and showed
asymptotic optimality as arrival rates become large.
Hu and Zhou (2018) studied a two-sided matching system similar to ours. Their goal is
to maximize the discounted reward obtained by matching customers and servers in a finite
horizon, while accounting for the holding costs. They study conditions such that a priority
rule is optimal. In addition, they present a matching algorithm based on fluid approximation
and show that it is asymptotically optimal. The main distinction of Hu and Zhou (2018)
with our work is that they do not consider dynamic pricing. In addition, while they use
fluid approximation to generate static (open-loop) matching decisions, we use max-weight
algorithm to generate (closed-loop) matching decisions that are adaptive to queue lengths.
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Dynamic matching problems were also studied in the context of kidney exchanges al-
beit in a non-two-sided setting in Anderson, Ashlagi, Gamarnik, and Kanoria (2017) and
Akbarpour, Li, and Gharan (2020). Due to legal requirements, pricing is usually not al-
lowed in kidney exchanges. These papers study the value of “batching”, i.e., holding com-
patible matching pairs in hope that better matching will arrive in future. However, both
papers find that batching in general does not provide significant benefit.
Dynamic Pricing for Queues.
First we discuss the literature involving dynamic pricing in the context of single-sided
queues and then review those involving two-sided queues.
Low (1974a) is one of the earlier works studying dynamic pricing in a single sided
queue. The paper considered price dependent customer arrivals with a finite buffer; the
rewards include the payment by customers and holding costs incurred by the operator.
Monotonicity of the optimal pricing policy is showed. It was later extended to infinite
buffer capacity in Low (1974b). Chen and Frank (2001) considered a queuing model with
customers who are sensitive to both waiting time and price. They presented structural
properties on optimal pricing decisions and monotonicity of optimal bias function. In the
context of network services like call centers, Paschalidis and Tsitsiklis (2000) considered
a system with finite total resource. They consider different types of price dependent cus-
tomers arrivals which requests for a fraction of the resource. The objective is to find a
pricing policy to maximize revenue. They show multiple structural properties like concav-
ity of value function and monotonicity of optimal policy.
Kim and Randhawa (2017) considers a single server queuing system and studies the
benefit of dynamic pricing over static pricing. They assume that the customers are delay
sensitive and consider a revenue maximization objective. They present a static pricing
policy and a two-price policy, and also provide the rate of convergence of these policies.
Our two-price policy considered in Section 4.4 is motivated by the results from Kim and
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Randhawa (2017). The method of Kim and Randhawa (2017) involves applying the Taylor
series expansion to the revenue function and then bounding the expected steady-state queue
length.
The main distinction of Kim and Randhawa (2017) with our work is that they consider
a single server queue, whereas we consider a network of two-sided queues with matching
decisions. It is non-trivial to generalize the method presented in Kim and Randhawa (2017)
to a two-sided queueing network, as an exact analysis of the steady-state distribution is in-
tractable due to the complex interaction among different queues. In addition, unlike the
single server setting in Kim and Randhawa (2017), matching decisions play a critical role
in our model and cannot be decoupled from the pricing decisions. Aside from establish-
ing asymptotic rates with large arrival rates, we also complement the result in Kim and
Randhawa (2017) by showing the advantage of two-price pricing (when combined with
appropriate matching policies) for large network sizes.
The joint problem of dynamic pricing and matching was also studied by Özkan and
Ward (2020) under the objective of maximizing the number of successful matches. They
proposed an asymptotically optimal pricing and matching policy with large arrival rates.
The differences with our work are that they proposed static policies based on the fluid
model and analyzed the system for a finite time horizon.
A two-sided queueing model with both customer and server arrivals is studied by
Nguyen and Stolyar (2018). They consider a setting where the arrival rate of the servers can
be controlled. However, the focus in Nguyen and Stolyar (2018) was to establish system
stability and process level convergence, while the objective in our model is to maximize
profit.
Several recent papers have studied dynamic pricing in the context of ride hailing sys-
tems (Yan, Zhu, Korolko, and Woodard, 2019; Besbes, Castro, and Lobel, 2018; Hu,
Hu, and Zhu, 2019). Banerjee, Freund, and Lykouris (2017) and Banerjee, Kanoria, and
Qian (2018) studied a closed queuing network, where the number of cars in the system
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is a constant and the customers abandon the system if they are not matched immediately.
Banerjee, Freund, and Lykouris (2017) considered a state-independent pricing policy and
prove the approximation ratio with respect to optimal pricing policy. (Banerjee, Johari, and
Riquelme, 2016) proposed a state-dependent pricing policy and argue that the benefit of
dynamic pricing is in the robustness of the performance of the system.
In sum, most of the previous work on dynamic matching is either in the context of
single-sided queues or not coupled with revenue optimization. Of the few that consider
both of these, the matching policy considered is an open-loop policy. On the other hand,
we consider all of these aspects and show the asymptotic optimality under closed-loop
matching policies.
Max-Weight Algorithm.
In this work, we apply a max-weight matching algorithm to two-sided queuing systems.
This algorithm was first proposed by Tassiulas and Ephremides (1992) in the context of
communication networks. After that, the max-weight algorithm and the backpressure al-
gorithm, which is a generalization of the max-weight algorithm, are studied intensively in
the literature. The book by Srikant and Ying (2014) provides an excellent summary. The
performance of the max-weight algorithm in the context of a switch operating in heavy
traffic has been studied by Maguluri and Srikant (2016). The backpressure algorithm was
used in the context of online ad matching in Tan and Srikant (2012) and in the context of
ride hailing in Kanoria and Qian (2019).
Heavy traffic analysis of the max-weight algorithm in the context of single-sided queue
has a long line of literature. One analysis approach is based on fluid limits, diffusion lim-
its and reflected Brownian motion (RBM) (Harrison, 2013). In this approach, the queueing
process is studied under an appropriate scaling and the corresponding limiting fluid or diffu-
sion process is shown to converge to a lower dimensional RBM. This phenomenon is called
state space collapse (SSC). If the RBM is single dimensional, then it is called complete re-
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source pooling (CRP). Examples on this line of work to study SSC under the max-weight
algorithm in the context of single-sided queues are Williams (1998), Stolyar et al. (2004),
and Gamarnik, Zeevi, et al. (2006). In this chapter, we employ another approach based on
the Lyapunov drift method developed by Eryilmaz and Srikant (2012) and later used by
Maguluri and Srikant (2015) for switch systems. We generalize the Lyapunov function for
two-sided queues and analyzed the max-weight algorithm under the CRP condition similar
to that in Gurvich and Whitt (2009) and Shi, Wei, and Zhong (2019).
4.1.3 Notation
Throughout the chapter, vectors are denoted by boldface letters. Functions applied on
vectors are defined entrywise; e.g., F(λ) is defined to be (F(λ1), . . . ,F(λm)). For any
two vectors a ∈ Rn and b ∈ Rm, we denote the concatenated vector of dimension n+m by
(a,b). We denote the n-dimensional vector with all 1’s by 1n, and the n-dimensional vector
with all 0’s by 0n; we omit the subscript n if the sizes of these vectors are clear from the
context. If x and y are of the same dimension, we use 〈x,y〉 to denote the inner product,
and x◦y to denote the Hadamard product (i.e., entrywise product). Any inequality x≤ y is
also defined entrywise. We use the superscript “s” to denote variables related to servers and
the superscript “c” for variables related to customers. We use e(c)j and e
(s)
i to represent unit
vectors with a 1 for type j customer and type i server, respectively, and all 0’s otherwise.
4.2 Model
We represent the types of customers and servers by a bipartite graph G(N ∪M,E), where
N is the set of server types with |N|= n, M is the set of customers type with |M|= m, and
E is the set of edges representing customer and server types that are compatible with each
other (see Figure 4.1). A pair (i, j) ∈ E if and only if a type j customer can be served by
a type i server. Each node in the bipartite graph is a queue of customers or servers waiting
to be matched with any one of the compatible counterparts. Our convention is to refer to
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Figure 4.1: Bipartite graph representation for two-sided queues.
At each point in time, the system operator posts a price for each customer and server
type. Customers willing to pay the quoted prices, as well as servers who are willing to
provide their service at the posted prices (i.e., wages), are admitted to the system. Thus,
the system operator can vary the prices to control the arrival rates of customers and servers.
Customers and servers then wait in queues until they are matched. The first-come-first-
serve (FCFS) discipline is employed for each queue separately, but it may not hold among
different types of customers and servers. Once a customer is matched with a compatible
server, we assume that they depart from the system instantaneously to complete the service
process. The system operator’s objective is to find a joint pricing and matching policy under
which the system is stable (positive recurrent) and the long-run average profit is maximized.
We assume that customers and servers arrive according to nonhomogeneous Poisson
processes. For each server type i ∈ N, there exists a supply curve µi : R+→ R+, such that
if the system operator sets a price p(s)i and the expected waiting time is w
(s)
i , the resulting








, where the constant s(s)i is the unit waiting cost of server
type i. Similarly, for each customer type j ∈M, there exists a demand curve λ j :R+→R+,
such that if the system operator sets a price p(c)j and the expected waiting time is w
(c)
j , the








, where s(c)j is the unit waiting cost of customer
type j. We make the following assumption on the supply and demand curves.
Assumption 1. The supply curves µi :R+→R+ (∀i ∈ N) are strictly increasing and twice
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continuously differentiable. The demand curves λ j : R+ → R+ (∀ j ∈ M) are strictly de-
creasing and twice continuously differentiable.
Since λ j and µi are strictly monotone, their inverse functions exist, and we denote them
by Fj :R+→R+ (∀ j ∈M) and Gi :R+→R+ (∀i∈N), respectively. In addition, we define
the revenue and cost functions as r(c)j (λ j)
∆
= λ jFj(λ j) for all j ∈M and r(s)i (µi)
∆
= µiGi(µi)
for all i ∈ N. We make the following assumption on the revenue and cost functions.
Assumption 2. The revenue function r(c)j (λ j) is concave (∀ j ∈ M). The cost function
r(s)i (µi) is convex (∀i ∈ N).
The concavity assumption on revenue function follows from the economic law of di-
minishing marginal return: as the system operator increases the customer arrival rate λ j, the
marginal revenue dr(c)j (λ j)/dλ j decreases, which implies that the revenue function r
(c)
j (λ j)
is concave. This assumption is often assumed in the revenue management literature (Gal-
lego and Van Ryzin, 1994; Kim and Randhawa, 2017). We assume that the marginal cost
dr(s)i (µi)/dµi increases with µi, since it becomes harder to recruit servers when we try to
increase server arrival rate. This implies that the cost function r(s)i is convex.
For those customers and servers waiting in queues, the system operator uses matching
controls to govern the queueing process. At any given time, suppose q(s)i is the number
of type i servers waiting in queue, and q(c)j is the number of type j customers waiting in
queue. We denote the vector of all queue lengths by q = (q(c)j ,∀ j ∈M, q
(s)
i ,∀i ∈ N). We
denote the number of type i servers to be matched to type j customers by yi j. The set of
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When a pair of customer and server is matched by the system, they both depart from the
system. Since a customer is only compatible to a subset of server types, the system operator
may have an incentive to hold some customers or servers in queue in order to achieve better
matches in future.
Example: Ride Hailing. An application of the two-sided queueing model is in ride
hailing systems. In such a system, the customer and server (drivers) types, as well as the
matching compatibility graph, are determined by their geographical locations. A simple
example with three regions is shown in Figure 4.2. (Here, we ignore issues such as vehi-
cle capacity and number of seats requested by customers, which can be accounted for by
creating additional customer and server types.) Based on the price and the waiting time
quoted to customers, only a fraction of them who open the app will book a ride, which
determines the customer arrival rate. Similarly, based on the price quoted to the drivers,
they will choose whether or not to provide service. Thus, the arrival rates of customer and
drivers depend on price and wait time and are governed by the demand and supply curve of
each region. Once a customer confirms the price and books a ride, the system operator can
determine which driver (from what region) should be matched to the customer. If a driver
accepts the ride request, then they immediately become unavailable for any other ride re-
quests (departing from the system). After the ride is complete, the car becomes available
again, possibly in a different region. A simplifying assumption in our model is that we treat
















Figure 4.2: A ride hailing system with three regions where we assume that riders can only
be matched to cars in their own region or any neighboring regions. The two-sided system
generated from the map is shown in Subfigure (b).
4.2.1 Continuous-Time MDP Formulation
We now formulate the system operator’s decision problem as a continuous-time Markov
decision process (CTMDP) and specify its states, actions, transition rates, and rewards. The
system state is represented by the queue lengths of all customer and server types q∈Zn+m+ .
The actions of the CTMDP include both pricing and matching decisions. The matching
decision must satisfy x ∈ X(q) defined by Eq (4.1). For the pricing decision, in order to
leverage Assumption 2, it is more convenient to use arrival rates (λ,µ) rather than prices
as the control variables. In particular, for customer type j ∈ N, setting the arrival rate to λ j




j (q). Similarly, for server type





i (q). Thus, the action is a tuple z
∆
= (λ,µ,x) ∈ R2(m+n). Given this action, the
transition rate from state q to state q+e(c)j −x (i.e., having a new arrival of type j customer)
is λ j (∀ j ∈ M), and a reward of p(c)j is received upon the new arrival. The transition rate
from state q to state q+e(s)i −x (i.e., having a new arrival of type i server) is µi (∀i ∈ N),
and a cost of p(s)i is paid upon the new arrival. The system operator’s objective is to find
a pricing and matching policy such that the long run average profit earned by the system
operator is maximized. We restrict our attention to policies that make the system stable in
the long run, which is defined as follows.
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Definition 2. A joint pricing and matching policy is said to be stable, if the continuous-time
Markov chain (CTMC) induced by this policy has a positive recurrent communicating class
that contains the state q= 0.
Remark 1 (Average waiting time.). It is technically challenging to analyze the exact wait-
ing time w(s)i (q) and w
(c)
j (q), since the waiting time of one type may depend on the queue
lengths of all the types as well as the policy and matching policy used by the system op-
erator. Additionally, in some applications, real-time queue length information may not be
visible to all market participants (Zohar, Mandelbaum, and Shimkin, 2002). Therefore,
we make a simplifying assumption that the waiting time perceived by the customers and
servers is the long-run average waiting time. That is, we assume












i (q)] ∀i ∈ N.
The scheme of announcing the long-run average waiting time to (impatient) customers is
commonly assumed in the literature (Zohar, Mandelbaum, and Shimkin, 2002; Armony,
Shimkin, and Whitt, 2009). Additionally, in the large scale setting that will be considered
in the following sections, approximating real-time estimated waiting time with the long-run
average waiting time will only result in a negligible error term of a higher order (see Kim
and Randhawa (2017), Section 6.1 for a similar argument).
Equivalence to Holding Cost Models.
The above model assumes that customers and servers are sensitive to both prices and wait-
ing costs when they decide to enter the queueing system. We now consider an alternative
model, where customers and servers only react to prices, while the system operator pays
additional holding costs for market participants waiting in queues. In particular, in this
alternative model, the states, actions, and transition rates remain the same. Given a state q
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where s(c)j and s
(s)
i are the customers’ and servers’ impatience parameters introduced in the
original model. The following result shows that the two modelling approaches are indeed
equivalent.
Proposition 4. For any given control policy, the delay-sensitive model and the holding cost
model have the same long-run average profit.
The proof of Proposition 4 follows an application of Little’ Law and can be found in
Appendix C.1.1. The advantage of considering the holding cost model is that the reward
function R(q,z) does not explicitly depend on the waiting time. Hence, we use the holding
cost model in the rest of the paper.
4.2.2 Discrete-Time MDP Formulation by Uniformization
Instead of analyzing the CTMDP directly, we use the well-known uniformization technique
(e.g. Puterman, 1994, Chap. 11) to obtain an equivalent discrete-time Markov decision
process (DTMDP), which will simplify our analysis. The uniformized process works as
follows. We first choose a uniformization parameter c defined below.
Definition 3. Suppose there exists constants λmax ∈ Rm+ and µmax ∈ Rn+ such that for any
price vector p ≥ 0 we have, λ(p) ≤ λmax, and µ(p) ≤ µmax. Let c be any constant such
that c≥ 〈1m,λmax〉+ 〈1n,µmax〉 .
The uniformized DTMDP is endowed with the same state q and action z = (λ,µ,x)
as the CTMDP. Let Z(q) = [0,λmax]∪ [0,µmax]∪X(q) be the set of feasible actions for
queue length q ∈ Rm+n+ . In the uniformized DTMDP, there is at most one customer arrival
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or one server arrival in each period: the state transitions from q to q+e(c)j −x with prob-
ability λ j/c (∀ j ∈M); it transitions from q to q+e(s)i −x with probability µ j/c (∀i ∈ N);
otherwise, no arrival happens in this period, and the state remains at q with probability
1− (〈1m,λ〉+ 〈1n,µ〉)/c. The expected reward in one period is given by R(q,z)/c. Let











, ∀q ∈ Zn+m+ , (4.3)
where


























In the above equation, the solution γ is the optimal long-run average profit, and h(q) is
the bias function associated with state q (∀q ≥ 0). (Note that the optimal solution of the
uniformized DTMDP satisfies that the above Bellman equation because we require the
optimal policy to be stable, see Definition 2.) The term E[h(q′) | q,z] is the expectation
of the bias function h after one transition in the uniformized process. The expectation is
taken with respect to the one-period transition probabilities conditional on the state q and
the action z.
In Appendix C.1, we present additional analysis of the uniformized DTMDP. We show
the monotonicity structure of the optimal pricing policy in the single-link queueing sys-
tem (i.e., m = n = 1). Unfortunately, as the number of customer and server types becomes
large, solving the DTMDP becomes intractable due to the curse of dimensionality. We pro-
pose two approximation methods to obtain near optimal solutions to the DTMDP. The first
method is based on fluid approximation. The remainder of the chapter primarily focuses
on this approach. The second method uses value function approximation. We defer details
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of this method to Appendix C.1, because the remaining parts of the chapter do not rely on
it.
4.2.3 Max-Weight Matching Policy
In the following sections, we will extensively use the max-weight matching policy, so we
provide its definition here. Suppose the system has state q and the set of feasible matches




In other words, under the max-weight policy, when there is either a customer or a server
arrival, a match will be made if any of the compatible types has a nonempty queue, and we
will always match the arriving customer/server to the compatible type with the most num-
ber of customers/servers waiting in queue. Otherwise, if all the compatible counterparts’
queues are empty, then the arrival is inserted into the queue of its own type.
The max-weight matching policy, originally proposed by Tassiulas and Ephremides
(1992), is extensively studied in the queueing literature. This literature is reviewed in
Section 4.1.2. Apart from the queueing literature, in the our model specifically, there is
also an alternative way to motivate the max-weight matching policy through quadratic value





, then the optimal matching policy of the DTMDP will be very close to a
max-weight policy define in Eq (4.5). Appendix C.1.3 contains a detailed discussion of the
value function approximation method.
4.3 Asymptotic Optimality of the Fluid Pricing Policy
In this section, we consider a fluid approximation of the queueing system where random
arrivals are replaced by deterministic arrival processes. Based on the fluid model, we pro-
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Algorithm 9 Max-Weight Matching Policy
input: current queue length q(k), new arrival a(k) # k is a decision epoch
initialization: y(k) = 0
for i ∈ N do
if a(s)i (k) = 1 and max j:(i, j)∈E q
(c)
j > 0 then
choose j∗ ∈ argmax j:(i, j)∈E q
(c)
j (breaking ties arbitrarily)
set yi j∗(k) = 1
for j ∈M do
if a(c)j (k) = 1 and maxi:(i, j)∈E q
(s)
i > 0 then
let i∗ ∈ argmaxi:(i, j)∈E q
(s)
i (breaking ties arbitrarily)
set yi∗ j(k) = 1
output: matching decision y(k)
pose a static pricing and max-weight matching policy and show that it is asymptotically
optimal.
4.3.1 Fluid Model
We consider a deterministic optimization problem to maximize the long-run average profit.
Suppose customers arrive with constant rates λ and servers arrive with constant rates µ.
Let χi j be the average rate of type i server matched to the type j customer for all (i, j) ∈ E.














χi j, ∀i ∈ N, (4.6c)
χi j = 0, ∀(i, j) /∈ E, χi j ≥ 0, ∀(i, j) ∈ E. (4.6d)
We denote an optimal solution to the above fluid problem by (λ∗,µ∗,χ∗).
To interpret the fluid model above, note that Eqs (4.6b) and (4.6c) are the balance equa-
tions for the number of customers and servers matched. Eq (4.6d) specifies that matching
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is only allowed among compatible customer-server pairs. Intuitively, it is easy to see that
these constraints are necessary, because if the balance equations do not hold, then some
customer or server types will keep accumulating over time. Thus, the optimization pro-
gram Eq (4.6) serves as an upper bound on the achievable profit under any pricing and
matching policy that makes the system stable. This is formally shown in the following
proposition. The proof can be found in Appendix C.2.1.
Proposition 5. The optimal value of the fluid problem Eq (4.6) is an upper bound on the
long run expected profit rate under any policy that makes the system stable.
4.3.2 Fluid Pricing Policy
Using the fluid model, we study the two-sided queueing system in a large-scale regime
where the arrival rates of all customer and server types are simultaneously scaled by a
factor of η ∈ N.
Definition 4 (Large-Scale Regime). Consider a family of two-sided queueing systems as-
sociated with the same bipartite graph G(N ∪M,E) parametrized by η ∈ N. For the η th
system, the demand and supply curves satisfy Fη(ηλ) = F(λ) for all 0m ≤ λ≤ λmax and
Gη(ηµ) = G(µ) for all 0n ≤ µ≤ µmax.
Definition 5 (Profit Loss). The profit loss (denoted by Lη ) of a policy is the difference
between the optimal value of the (scaled) fluid model, denoted by γη∗ , and the long run
average profit (including the penalty incurred due to waiting) under that policy.
According to Definition 4, it is easily verified that the fluid solution to the η th scaled
system is given by ηλ∗ and ηµ∗, where λ∗ and µ∗ is the optimal solution of the unscaled
fluid model Eq (4.6). The optimal value of the η th fluid model is γη∗ = ηγ∗. Therefore,
if the profit loss of a policy is sublinear in η , namely Lη = o(η), we say the policy is
asymptotically optimal in the large-scale regime.
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We use the fluid model to define a fluid pricing policy defined as follows:
λ j(q) =

















Here, qηmax denotes the maximum queue buffer size; it is a parameter that depends on η ,
which will be specified later.
The main intuition of the fluid pricing policy is the following. When all queues are
below their maximum buffer capacity qη , the profit rate of the fluid pricing policy is exactly
equal to ηγ∗. If any customer queue is full, say, q(c)j = q
η
max, then all future arrivals to queue
j will be rejected until at least one customer waiting in queue j is matched. Thus, a fraction
of revenue is lost due to customer rejections. More specially, let γη be the long run average
profit of the fluid pricing policy (excluding waiting costs). Let I(s)(qηmax) be a (vector)
indicator function representing whether server queues are at the maximum capacity, and let
I(c)(qηmax) be a (vector) indicator function representing whether customer queues are at the
maximum capacity. Then, we have
























where the first equality follows from Definition 5, and the second equality uses the def-
inition of the fluid pricing policy. As a result, Eq (4.8) shows that the profit loss of
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the fluid pricing policy depends on the parameter qηmax. If we increase the buffer capac-
ity qηmax, then the probability of dropping customers/servers will reduce, i.e., E[I(qηmax)]
will decrease. However, increasing the buffer capacity will lead to increasing in the ex-
pected queue lengths, which will increase the penalty incurred due to waiting. Thus, we
choose buffer capacity to balance the trade-off in order to minimize the overall profit loss.
Precisely, we will see that choosing qηmax ∼
√
η will result in E[I(qηmax)] ∼ η−1/2 and
E[〈1m+n,q〉]∼
√
η , which attains the optimal profit loss.
Theorem 5. Suppose a family of two-sided queues is given by the bipartite graph G(N ∪
M,E) parameterized by η . The profit loss Lη under the fluid pricing policy Eq (4.7) and
max-weight matching (Algorithm 9) is O(
√
η), where qηmax = γ
√
η for any positive constant
γ .
The proof of Theorem 5 can be found in Appendix C.2.2. In addition, it can be shown
that the O(
√
η) profit loss rate cannot be improved using any fluid pricing policy. The
proof of the proposition below is presented in Appendix C.2.3.
Proposition 6. For a family of two-sided queues parametrized by η , any fluid pricing policy
will have a profit loss Lη that is at least Ω(
√
η). The choice of qηmax = γ
√
η for any positive
constant γ provides the optimal profit loss rate Θ(
√
η).
4.4 Asymptotic Optimality of the Two-Price Policy
A main drawback of the fluid pricing policy is that the prices are not adaptive to the system
state. In this section, we consider a policy that uses two different prices for each cus-
tomer/server type. The proposed two-price policy is built on the two-price policy in Kim
and Randhawa (2017) for single server queues. Our contribution lies in a joint analysis of
two-price and dynamic matching policies in a two-sided queueing network.
The two-price policy can be viewed as a generalization of the fluid pricing policy. We
introduce additional parameters θ ∈ Rm+, φ ∈ Rn+ and ση > 0, which governs the arrival
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rates of the customers and servers respectively when the queue length is greater than a
certain threshold τηmax. The two-price policy is defined as
λ j(q) =






ηλ ∗j −θ jση otherwise










The policy sets a threshold τηmax for all customer and server types. It uses the fluid
arrival rates when queue lengths are below this threshold, and then reduces the arrival rates
by θ jση outside this threshold for type j customer. Similarly, the policy reduces the server
arrival rates outside the threshold by φiση for type i server. Here, τ
η
max, ση , θ and φ are
parameters that will be specified later. (Our convention is to use superscript η to denote
any parameter or quantity that is associated with the η th scaled system.) Intuitively, for
any type of customer/server, if we increase ση , the queue length will have a larger negative
drift when it exceeds the threshold τηmax, so the expected queue length E[〈1m+n,q〉] will be
smaller. However, if ση are too large, the arrival rates outside the threshold τηmax will be far
from the optimal fluid arrival rates, which will result in a larger profit loss. Thus, there is
a trade-off between the expected queue length and profit loss. For the matching algorithm
associated with the two-price policy, here we use the max-weight matching algorithm as
defined in Eq (4.5). (Other matching algorithms will be considered in Section 4.6.2.) The
following theorem provides a bound on the asymptotic performance of the two-price policy
as η tends to infinity.
Theorem 6. Consider a family of two-sided queues parametrized by η represented by the
bipartite graph G(N ∪M,E). The profit loss Lη under the two-price policy Eq (4.9) and
the max-weight matching (Algorithm 9) is O(η1/3) for any τηmax ≤ η1/3, ση = η2/3 and
constants θ > 0m, φ> 0n.
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The above theorem shows that the profit loss of the two-price policy is O(η1/3), which
is better than the O(
√
η) loss in the fluid pricing policy. The proof of the theorem contains
two main steps. The first step is to show that the system is stable under the two-price policy
and the expected queue lengths are bounded. We also give an upper bound of the expected
queue lengths (Lemma 1). The second step in the proof is to estimate the profit loss Lη
(Lemma 2) by applying the KKT conditions of the fluid problem.
Lemma 1. For a system of two-sided queues operating under the two-price policy and the
max-weight matching algorithm parameterized by η , the system is positive recurrent for
any θ > 0m, φ> 0n, ση > 0 and τ
η
































Lemma 2. For a system of two-sided queues operating under two-price policy and max-
weight matching policy, for any θ > 0m, φ> 0n and τ
η







































In this section, we will obtain lower bounds on the profit loss under a broad family of poli-
cies, and thus establish that the O(η1/3) rate obtained by the two-price policy in Theorem 6
is optimal. In particular, we consider a family of pricing policies that have the following
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form:
λ j = ηλ
∗















β ∀i ∈ N. (4.11)
The motivation for this policy is as follows. The first terms in Eqs (4.10) and (4.11) (i.e.,
ηλ ∗j and ηµ
∗
i ) are static and result from the solution of the fluid model; the second terms
account for dynamic adjustments as the queue length changes. We assume the adjustment
terms can be further decomposed into two terms: a function that scales the queue length,
f j(·) or gi(·), and a term that determines the scaling of price adjustments, ηβ , for some 1 >
β > 0. Moreover, as the arrival rates are scaled up, the queue length will be asymptotically
large. Thus, we also scale the queue length in function f j(·) and gi(·) for all i ∈ N and
j ∈M by ηα for some 1≥ α ≥ 0.
In addition, we require the pricing policy to satisfy the following conditions.
Condition 1. (a) There exists M ∈ Rm+ and N ∈ Rn+ such that | f j (q/ηα) | ≤M j for all
j ∈M and |gi (q/ηα) | ≤ Ni for all i ∈ N for all q ∈ S and for all η ≥ 1.
(b) It holds that 0 < α +β ≤ 1.
(c) There exists K > 0 and δ > 0 such that for all j ∈ M, if q(c)j /ηα > K, then ei-
ther f j (q/ηα) < −δ or there exists i : (i, j) ∈ E such that gi (q/ηα) > δ for all η .
Similarly for all i ∈ N, if q(s)i /ηα > K, then either gi (q/ηα) < −δ or there exists
j : (i, j) ∈ E such that f j (q/ηα)> δ for all η .
We now interpret the conditions above.Condition 1(a) requires the functions f and g
to be bounded, given appropriately scaling of the queue lengths q as η increases. Con-
dition 1(b) states that the rate of queue length re-scaling (α) should not exceed the rate
of re-scaling pricing adjustment terms (1−β ). This condition is needed so that the price
adjustment terms are sufficiently large to make the system stable. (In the special case of
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single-link system, this assumption is not needed; the extension is presented later in Propo-
sition 7.) Condition 1(c) states that if a queue is too long, we should either decrease the
arrival rate of this queue or increase the arrival rates of those matched to this queue.
Aside from the above conditions, the pricing forms in Eqs (4.10-4.11) are fairly gen-
eral, because the pricing function of any queue can depend on the entire system state vector
(q), and we do not make any strong assumptions such as monotonicity, continuity or dif-
ferentiablity on functions f and g. Finally, note that we do not require any assumption on
the form of matching policies.
The two-price policy in Section 4.4 satisfies the above condition with
f j(q) =−θ j1q(c)j >τmax
(∀ j ∈M), gi(q) =−φi1q(s)i >τmax
(∀i ∈ N), β = 2/3. (4.12)
Now we present the result on the lower bound.
Theorem 7. For a two-sided queue defined by a graph G(N ∪M,E) operating under any
pricing policy of the form Eq (4.10) and (4.11) that satisfies Condition 1, if the resulting
system is stable, there exists a constant K(F,G, f ,g) such that
Lη ≥ Kη1/3.
The details of the proof are deferred to Appendix C.4.1. We present below an intuitive
explanation of the rate in the lower bound.
Remark 2 (Intuitive explanation of η1/3). The main reason we obtain O(η1/3) profit loss
is due to the trade-off between the expected queue length and the loss in revenue. Consider
a pricing policy that deviates from the fluid optimal pricing policy by ε > 0, that is, for all
q ∈ S, we have |λ j(q)−λ ∗j |< ε for all j ∈M and |µi(q)−µ∗i |< ε for all i ∈ N. One can
show that under such a policy, the expected queue length is of the order 1/ε and revenue
loss is of the order ηε2. Specifically, the queue length can be coupled to that of an M/M/1
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queue in heavy-traffic with parameter ε , whose mean queue length is known to be of the
order 1/ε by the Kingman’s bound. The loss in revenue can be estimated by the Taylor
series expansion of the revenue function. Since we are operating closed to the optimal
price of the fluid model, the first order term vanished, and the dominant term of the second
order, viz., ηε2. The co-efficient of this term is shown to be strictly positive by analyzing




, Lη ∼ ηε2.
To achieve the optimal trade-off between expected queue length and profit loss, we choose
ε ∼ η−1/3, which results in the η1/3 profit loss in Theorem 7.
We can further relax Condition 1(b) in the special case of single-link systems (m = n =
1) operating under any two-price policy. The result is stated below and the proof can be
found in Appendix C.4.2.
Proposition 7. For a family of single-link two-sided queue parametrized by η , any two
pricing policy given by Eq (4.9) with ση = ηβ for some β < 1 and τηmax = ηα for some
α ∈ R+, will have a profit loss Lη at least Ω(η1/3). The choice of τηmax = η1/3 and ση =
η2/3 and any positive constants θ and φ provides the optimal profit loss Θ(η1/3).
4.6 Further Analysis on Max-Weight Matching
In this section, we present further insights into the max-weight matching algorithm in two-
sided queues. First, we show that under the fluid pricing policy, max-weight matching
minimizes the probability of hitting the queue length threshold among all matching poli-
cies. Second, under the two-price policy, we show that max-weight matching minimizes
the expected sum of queue lengths among all possible matching policies. Third, we com-
pare max-weight matching with a randomized matching policy with probabilities specified
by the fluid model and show that max-weight has smaller loss in terms of the number of
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customer/server types. Together, these results show the superiority of the max-weight pol-
icy.
We start by establishing state space collapse under max-weight matching. State space
collapse means that all the customer queues are almost equal in length and all the server
queues are almost equal in length; hence, with high probability, only customers or only
servers are waiting in the system. This implies that max-weight ends up matching the
maximum possible number of customer-server pairs, as only the excess customers/servers
are waiting in the system. To achieve state space collapse in the sense discussed above, we
propose a complete resource pooling condition on the graph. Similar conditions have been
proposed for single-sided queues Gurvich and Whitt (2009, Assumption 2.4) Shi, Wei, and
Zhong (2019, Definition 1).
Condition 2 (Complete Resource Pooling (CRP)). There exists an optimal solution (λ∗,µ∗)


















It is straightforward to verify that the CRP condition implies the connectedness of the
graph G(N ∪M,E). The CRP condition also implies that the optimal solution of the fluid
problem is in the interior of the feasible region. The following lemma formalizes this
observation.
Lemma 3. If Condition 2 is satisfied, there exists χ∗ ≥ 0 such that χ∗i j > 0 for all (i, j) ∈ E
and (λ∗,µ∗,χ∗) is an optimal solution to the fluid problem Eq (4.6).
(The proofs for this section can be found in Appendix C.5.) The above result is not
surprising as it is known in the heavy traffic literature (Eryilmaz and Srikant, 2012; Lange
and Maguluri, 2019) that if the arrival rate is approaching a point on the boundary of the
capacity region in the interior of a facet, then the system exhibits complete resource pool-
ing. However, the analysis of state space collapse for two-sided queues does not follow
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immediately from the literature of single-sided queues and is more involved. We propose
a Lyapunov function approach and use the drift method to show state space collapse. To
simplify the analysis, in this section we restrict to a setting where m = n and there exists a
perfect matching in the graph G(N∪M,E).
Condition 3. The graph G(N ∪M,E) has a perfect matching. Without loss of generality,
we assume that server type i is connected to customer type i for all i ∈ [n].
In general if m 6= n, and if the above condition is not satisfied, we show in Appendix C.5.5
that the pricing and matching problem under a given general graph can be reformulated as
a problem under a new graph where the above condition is satisfied. Thus, the results in the
following propositions and the theorem can be applied (with minor modifications as shown
in Appendix C.5.5) even when the above condition does not hold.
4.6.1 Delay Optimality
We first show the delay optimality of the max-weight matching algorithm among all possi-
ble matching algorithms under the fluid pricing policy.






























Furthermore, under the fluid pricing policy with the max-weight matching algorithm, if
































The above proposition states that the max-weight algorithm (asymptotically) minimizes
the proportion of time spent in the threshold state among all possible matching algorithms,
hence minimizing the revenue loss caused by hitting the queue length thresholds.
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Similarly, the max-weight matching algorithm is delay optimal under the two-price
policy. The following proposition states that the max-weight algorithm (asymptotically)
minimizes the expected total queue length under the two-price algorithm among all possible
matching algorithms.
Proposition 9. Under the two pricing policy with θ=φ= 1n and any matching policy, the







Furthermore, under the two-price policy with θ = φ = 1n and the max-weight matching
policy, if limη→∞ ση/η = 0 and limη→∞ σητ
η









Notice that the queue length bound in Proposition 9 is tighter than the bound in Lemma 1,
because former requires the CRP condition (Condition 2) whereas the latter does not require
such condition. Together, Propositions 8 and 9 establish the asymptotic delay optimality of
the max-weight algorithm.
4.6.2 Max-Weight versus Randomized Matching
In this section, we compare the max-weight policy with a randomized matching policy
(defined in Algorithm 10) resulting from the fluid model. The randomized matching al-
gorithm matches an incoming arrival to compatible types at fixed probabilities, which are
determined by the fluid solution χ∗ (see Eq (4.6)). If some queues are empty, the probabil-
ities are rescaled proportionally to match only nonempty queues. Unlike the max-weight
algorithm, the randomized matching algorithm does not use information about the queue
lengths (except for the emptiness of the queues).
We analyze the profit losses of these two matching algorithms and its dependence on
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Algorithm 10 Randomized Matching (Nonempty Queues First)
input: new arrival a(k), queue length q(k), the fluid solution χ∗ # k is a decision epoch
initialization: y(k) = 0
for i ∈ N do
if a(s)i (k) = 1 then








for all j ∈M.
for j ∈M do
if a(c)j (k) = 1 then








for all i ∈ N.
output: matching decision y(k)
the number of customer/server types n when η → ∞. First, we consider the fluid pric-
ing policy. The theorem below shows that even though both max-weight and randomized
matching have O(η1/2) profit loss, max-weight matching is order n1/2 better than random-
ized matching policy.
Theorem 8. Suppose a family of two-sided queues is given by the bipartite graph G(N ∪
M,E) parametrized by η . Under the fluid price policy Eq (4.7) and randomized matching
policy (Algorithm 10), for qηmax = γη1/2, we have Lη =O(η1/2). For any γ > 0, there exists
























Next, we compare the max-weight and randomized matching algorithms for the two-
price pricing policy. The theorem below shows that both algorithms achieve O(η1/3) profit
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loss, whereas max-weight is order n2/3 better than randomized matching.
Theorem 9. Suppose a family of two-sided queues is given by the bipartite graph G(N ∪
M,E) parametrized by η . Under the two-price policy Eq (4.9) and randomized matching
policy (Algorithm 10), for ση = η2/3 and τηmax = γη1/3, we have Lη = O(η1/3). For any







In addition, under the two-price policy Eq (4.9) and max-weight matching Eq (4.5) with
θ = 1n and φ= 1n, ση = n−1/3η2/3, if limη→∞ τ
η
max/η










































Our first experiment analyzes a single-link system with one server type and one customer
type. In this case, the system state of the MDP is represented by a single variable, namely,
the difference between the customer queue length and the server queue length (a detailed
discussion of this system is included in Appendix C.1.2). We will solve the optimal policy
of the MDP and compare it with the fluid pricing policy and two-price policy.
We assume a supply curve given by p1 = λ 0.5 and a demand curve given by p2 =
4µ−0.5. With these supply and demand curves, the optimal profit of the fluid model is 3.08
when λ = µ = 4/3, p1 = 1.15 and p2 = 3.46. We then calculate the optimal pricing policy
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of the long-run average cost MDP using relative value iteration. Figure 4.3 shows the opti-
mal pricing policy under three different values of the penalty coefficient (s), as well as the
optimal price of the fluid model. The result shows that the optimal customer price is always
above the server price, and both prices are increasing with the queue length difference. Intu-
itively, if the system has more customers, the customer price should be increased to reduce
the customer arrival rate and server price should be increased to increase the server arrival
rate. This observation verifies Proposition 12 in Appendix C.1.2. As s increases, more
weight is given to the waiting cost (or equivalently, customers and servers become more
sensitive to delays), so the price increases more steeply as the number of customers and
servers waiting in the system increases. Figure 4.4 show the stationary distribution and the
mean of queue length for different values of the penalty coefficient (s). As expected, when
s increases, the queue length is more concentrated around 0. Furthermore, we simulate
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Figure 4.3: Optimal pricing policies under different values of penalty coefficients.
the profit loss under the fluid pricing policy and two-price policy and compare it with the
theoretical result presented before and also with the exact solution obtained by solving the
MDP. The result is presented in Figure 4.5. The profit loss under the fluid pricing policy
has an order of
√
η and that under the two-price policy has an order of η1/3, verifying
Theorem 5 and Theorem 6. Also observe that the profit loss under the two-price policy is
not much different from that of the optimal profit loss, demonstrating the effectiveness of a
two-price policy.
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s=0.01;   E[q]=3.27
s=0.05;   E[q]=1.88
Figure 4.4: Stationary distribution of queue length under different penalty coefficients.
















Figure 4.5: Performance of two-price and fluid pricing policy compared to the exact solu-
tion.
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4.7.2 Systems with Multiple Types
Next, we analyze the general two-sided queues with multiple customer and server types.
We examine the profit losses under the following four different algorithms:
1. FP+MW represents the fluid pricing (Eq (4.7)) and max-weight matching (Eq (4.5))
policy;
2. FP+Rand represents the fluid pricing (Eq (4.7)) and randomized matching (Algo-
rithm 10) policy;
3. TP+MW represents the two-price policy (Eq (4.9)) with max-weight matching (Eq
(4.5));
4. TP+Rand represents the two-price policy (Eq (4.9)) with randomized matching (Al-
gorithm 10).
In this numerical experiment, we first consider a setting where the number of servers and
the number of customers are equal (m = n) and CRP condition (Condition 2) is satisfied.
We assume the compatibility graph is given by
E = {(i, j) ∈ [n]× [n] : j ∈ {i+ k}∪{(i+ k−n)+},k = 0,1,2,3}.
The demand and supply curves are given by
Fj(λ j) = 2−λ j/2, ∀ j ∈ [m], and Gi(µi) = µi/2 ∀ j ∈ [n],
respectively. We assume the unit holding cost is s = 1. The parameter of the fluid pricing
policy is set to qηmax = 2
√
η/n. The parameters of the two-price policy are chosen to be
τ
η
max = 0 and ση = η2/3n−1/3.
We report the profit loss for η ∈ {10,100,500,1000,2000,5000,10000} when m = n =
6 in Figure 4.6 (left). We find that when η is larger, the profit loss of TP+MW grows
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the slowest, followed by the profit loss of TP+Rand, FP+MW, and FP+Rand. This result
confirms the advantage of the two-price policy over the fluid pricing policy, as well as
the advantage of the max-weight matching policy over the randomized matching policy.
Figure 4.6 (right) shows the same plot in logarithmic scale. Note that the slope of log-log
plot in Figure 4.6 (right) can be interpreted as the order of profit loss with respect to η . The
fitted slopes of FP+MW and TP+MW are 0.51 and 0.33 respectively. This is consistent with
Theorem 5 and Theorem 6, which state that FP+MW and TP+MW have the orders of profit
loss with respect to η of O(η1/2) and O(η1/3) respectively. Figure 4.6 shows that FP+MW
and FP+Rand yield the same order of profit loss with respect to η of approximately 1/2.
Moreover, the two-price policy combined with either max-weight matching or randomized
matching yields the same order of profit loss with respect to η of approximately 1/3. That
is, choosing max-weight or randomized matching does not affect order of profit loss with
respect to η .






































Figure 4.6: Profit losses under FP+MW, FP+Rand, TP+MW and TP+Rand for for different
η (left) and its associated log-log plot (right) when m = n = 6.
Our next experiment investigates how the profit loss changes with the number of cus-
tomer and server types. We first consider a setting when the types of two sides are balanced
(m= n). Figure 4.7 shows the profit loss for n∈ {4,6,8, . . . ,20}when η = 10000 (a large η
is chosen so that the asymptotic trend becomes clear) and its associated plot in logarithmic
scale. It can be observed that the profit losses when a pricing policy is combined with the
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randomized matching policy grow faster than those when a pricing policy is combined with
the max-weight matching policy as n increases. In other words, the max-weight matching
policy performs better than the randomized matching policy. Figure 4.7 suggests that the
orders of profit loss with respect to n of FP+MW and FP+Rand are 0.49 and 1.18 respec-
tively, which are close to those predicted by Theorem 8. Moreover, the orders of profit loss
with respect to n of TP+MW and TP+Rand are 0.34 and 1.28, which are close to those
predicted by Theorem 9. Clearly, in both cases, the max-weight algorithm performances
much better than the randomized matching algorithm for large n.





































Figure 4.7: Profit losses under FP+MW, FP+Rand, TP+MW and TP+Rand for different n
(left) and its associated log-log plot (right) when η = 10000.
We also consider the setting where the number of server queues and the number of
customer queues are not equal. Specifically, we assume that the number of server queues
is twice as many as the number of customer queues, i.e., m = 2n. The compatibility graph
is given by
E = {(i, j) ∈ [2n]× [n] : j ∈ {i+ k}∪{(i+ k−n)+},k = 0,1}.
The demand and supply curve are assumed to be
Fj(λ j) = 6−λ j, ∀ j ∈ [m] and Gi(µi) = µi, ∀i ∈ [n],
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respectively. The parameters of pricing policy are similar to the previous case when m = n.
We report the profit loss for η ∈ {10,100,500,1000,2000,5000,10000} when m = 8 and
n = 4 and its associated plot in logarithmic scale in Figure 4.8. The result shows that when
η is larger, the profit loss when using the two-price policy grows significantly slower,
compared to when using the fluid pricing policy. Moreover, we can observe that in this
case the benefit of the max-weight matching policy over the randomized matching policy
when combined with any pricing policy is negligible. Figure 4.8 (right) shows that the fitted
orders of profit loss with respect to η of FP+MW and FP+Rand are 0.49 and 0.48 and those
of TP+MW and TP+Rand are 0.33 and 0.32. This observation confirms the results from
Theorem 5 and Theorem 8 as well as Theorem 6 and Theorem 9, which state that the orders
of profit loss with respect to η of FP+MW and FP+Rand are 1/2 and those of TP+MW and
TP+Rand are 1/3 respectively. Figure 4.9 shows the profit loss for n ∈ {4,6,8, . . . ,20} and
m = 2n when η = 10000 and its associated log-log plot. This figure shows the superiority
of the max-weight policy over the randomized matching policy discussed in Section 4.6.2.





































Figure 4.8: Profit losses under FP+MW, FP+Rand, TP+MW and TP+Rand for different η
(left) and its associated log-log plot (right) when m = 8 and n = 4.
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Figure 4.9: Profit losses under FP+MW, FP+Rand, TP+MW and TP+Rand for different n
(left) and its associated log-log plot (right) when η = 10000.
4.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, we present a model of dynamic pricing and matching for two-sided queue-
ing systems. The system is formulated as a Markov decision process, and a fluid approxi-
mation model is considered. We presented a fluid pricing and max-weight matching policy
and showed that it achieves O(
√
η) optimality rate. Furthermore, we proposed a dynamic
pricing and max-weight policy, which achieves O(η1/3) optimality rate. We also show that
this scaling of O(η1/3) matches the lower bound for a broad family of policies. We also
demonstrate the advantage of max-weight matching over randomized matching. Under the
complete resource pooling condition, we show that max-weight matching achieves O(
√
n)
and O(n1/3) optimality rates for static and two-price policies, respectively, where n is the
number of customer and server types. In comparison, the randomized matching policy may
have an Ω(n) optimality rate.
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CHAPTER 5
NEURAL NETWORK CHOICE MODEL
5.1 Introduction
One problem that often arises for business, e.g. e-commerce, hotel, airline, is to decide
which subset of products to offer to customers. The subset of products offered to customers
is called an assortment. The goal of the firm is to, for example, decide which assortment to
offer to maximize the expected revenue.
One important ingredient for the firm to answer this problem is to understand customer
preference. Historically, independent demand model, which a customer prefers a particular
product regardless of which assortment is offered, is commonly assumed. However, this is
an unrealistic assumption, because it ignores product substitution effect. Therefore, choice-
based demand model is considered. Discrete choice model is known as one of essential
tools to model individual behavior. It describes decision makers’ choice when a different
subset of products is offered.
One of the most popular choice models belongs to this class is the multinomial logit
(MNL) model (McFadden, 1974). The main advantage of MNL is its simplicity in terms
of estimation and interpretation. However, the MNL is derived from one restrictive as-
sumption, i.e., independently and identically distributed (IID) error terms. This results in
a well-known Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) property or Luce’s Axiom of
Choice (Luce, 1959). This property implies that the relative likelihood of choosing any two
alternatives from the choice set is independent of the availability of other alternatives in the
choice set. This IIA property seems to be too restrictive and may be violated in reality. To
overcome this shortfall, researchers have come up with a variety of other discrete choice
models, which relax this restrictive assumption, such as nested logit (NL) model (Domen-
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cich and McFadden, 1975) , mixed logit model (McFadden and Train, 2000; Hensher and
Greene, 2002) and latent class logit model (Greene and Hensher, 2003).
All choice models mentioned earlier is derived from random utility maximization (RUM)
principle, where customers are assumed to choose items which have the highest utility
among the offered products. The assumption that choice is based on utility maximiza-
tion implies regularity property, i.e., adding an option to a choice set cannot increase the
choice probability for any of the original choice options. This phenomenon can be ob-
served in wide range of situations. However, in reality customers might not act rationally;
therefore, the regularity property might no longer hold; see, e.g., Huber, Payne, and Puto
(1982) and Tversky, Slovic, and Kahneman (1990). In this case, any model, no matter
how complex it is, in this RUM class cannot explain this behavior. Recently, Jagabathula
and Rusmevichientong (2019) are able to identify when RUM model is not suitable for the
dataset in predicting the choice behavior through the limit of rationality (LoR), which is
the degree of inconsistency between the observed data and RUM model.
Because some choice behaviors cannot be explained by models which derive from RUM
principle, there are several efforts in explaining the behavior beyond RUM class. Some ex-
amples include the general attraction model (GAM) (Gallego, Ratliff, and Shebalov, 2015),
the generalized Luce model (Echenique and Saito, 2018), and the perception adjusted Luce
model (PALM) (Echenique, Saito, and Tserenjigmid, 2018). However, these choice mod-
els do not subsume the RUM class. Therefore, they potentially perform worse than the
RUM class. Berbeglia (2018) propose the generalized stochastic preference (GSP) model,
which subsumes the RUM class and can explain some choice phenomena that are outside
the RUM class. Nevertheless, there exists choice behaviors which cannot be explained by
this model. This motivates the study of more general choice model, which is able to explain
any choice behavior.
Due to the success of machine learning (ML) method in extracting complex behaviors,
some researchers apply machine learning techniques to model general choice behavior. For
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instance, Osogami and Otsuka (2014) introduce the restricted Boltzmann machine (RBM)
choice model, which extends the MNL model. The RBM choice model can capture irra-
tional behaviors and can be trained easily using existing algorithms for RMB. Moreover,
Chen and Mišić (2019) and Chen, Gallego, and Tang (2021) uses a set of decision trees
(decision forest) to model customer choice. They show that any type of choice behavior
can be modeled a probability distribution over a set of decision trees.
This chapter aims to develop a neural network framework which is able to explain cus-
tomer choice behavior. We investigate the performance of our proposed model and compare
with other well-known discrete choice models through extensive numerical experiments
using both synthetic dataset and real world datasets. We show that our proposed model,
which builds upon neural network structure, consistently outperforms the other models in
all datasets.
5.1.1 Notation
For a positive integer m, let [m] denote the set {1,2, . . . ,m}. For a set S , let |S | denote
the cardinality of S . Suppose v and w are vectors of dimension m and n respectively.
We denote the concatenated vector of dimension m+ n by (v,w). Whenever we refer to a
vector, we mean a column vector. Let 1{·} denote an indicator function.
5.2 Model
Let n be the total number of product, which includes a no-purchase or outside optionand
and J = [n] denote a set of all products. An assortment A is a subset of products, i.e.,
A ⊆J . When an assortment A is offered, the customer can choose any item j in that
assortment, that is, j ∈A . We want to study the discrete choice model, which is a condi-
tional probability P(·|·) : J ×2J → [0,1]. Specifically, P( j|A ) denotes the probability
that an item j ∈A is chosen from an assortment A ⊆J . We note that the choice model
must satisfy the following properties:
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• P( j|A )≥ 0 for all j ∈J and A ⊆J ,
• P( j|A ) = 0 for all j /∈A and A ⊆J ,
• ∑ j∈A P( j|A ) = 1 for all A ⊆J .
We will use a neural network architecture to model choice behavior. A neural network
aims to approximate an output as some complex function of an input. It generally consists
of an input layer I , optional hidden layer(s) H k for k ∈ [K], where K is the number of
hidden layers and k is the kth hidden layer, and an output layer O . Each node in hidden
layers and output layers can do non-linear transformation of the input through the activation
function. This allows the network to learn and model more complex behaviors.
The input layer represents an offered assortment. It consists of n nodes, i.e., |I | = n,
where n is the number of products. Each node i ∈I takes a binary variable which equals
to 1 when product i is in an assortment A and 0 otherwise. Each node in hidden layers
possesses an activation function. The number of hidden layers, K, and the number of nodes
in each hidden layer, |H k | for k ∈ [K] are hyperparemeters which can arbitrarily set. Our
network has one more layer called utility layer U , which is an intermediate layer before
producing probability in the output layer. The number of nodes in this utility layer equals to
the number of items n, i.e., |U |= n. The utility layer represents the utility or score of each
product. The last layer is the output layer O , which consists of n nodes, that is, |O | = n.
This layer represents the probability of selecting each product in an assortment. Note that
nodes, which correspond to the products which are not offered in assortment, have value of
zero in the output layer.
The input layer, the hidden layers and the utility layer are fully connected, e.g., all the
nodes in one layer are connected to every node in a subsequent layer. Let W (I ) and b(I )
be a weight vector and a bias vector of an input layer respectively. Moreover, we let W (H
k)
and b(H
k) denote a weight vector and a bias vector of a hidden layer k for k ∈ [K]. Let
a(H
k) denote an activation function of a hidden layer k for k ∈ [K]. Suppose x is an input
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vector of binary variables of dimension n, i.e., x ∈ {0,1}n, and u is a real value vector of
dimension n, i.e., u ∈Rn, in the utility layer. Note that, for a product j ∈J and an offered
assortment A ⊆J , we have
x j =

1, if j ∈A
0, otherwise
.



























k) is the output of the kth hidden layer for k ∈ [K].
Unlike a normal multi-class neural network, we do not apply softmax function directly
to the utility layer to get choice probability of each product. We instead apply softmax
function only to items which appear in the assortment. Suppose p is a probability output
vector of dimension n, i.e., p ∈ [0,1]n. We can write, for j ∈ [n],
p j =





This is to ensure that the probability of choosing product outside an offered assortment is
zero.
Figure 5.1 shows an example of neural network architecture for modeling choice be-
havior when the total number of products is five, the number of hidden layers is two, and
the number of nodes in each hidden layer is ten.
Suppose T train is a collection of customers in training set. For each customer t ∈T train,
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input hidden-1 hidden-2 utility
softmax
output
Figure 5.1: An example of neural network architecture for choice modeling when there are
five products and two hidden layers whose number of nodes is ten.
we let xt be an input vector of binary variables of dimension n, xt ∈ {0,1}n, associated with
an offered assortment A t ⊆J . Specifically, xt, j = 1 if j ∈A t and xt, j = 0 otherwise. Let
pt denote a probability output vector from the model of dimension n of customer t. To train
the model, we consider cross-entropy loss function. The cross-entropy measures the per-
formance of classification model, whose output is a probability distribution. Specifically, it
measures the difference between two probability distributions, the true and estimated dis-
tributions. For customer t, we let yt be a unit vector of dimension n represents an actual
choice, i.e., yt, j = 1 if item j is chosen by customer t and yt, j = 0 otherwise. Let P and P̂
be the true distribution and the estimated distribution respectively. Suppose Y is a random
variable of item selected. The cross-entropy loss function is defined as
H(P, P̂) =− 1




P(Y = j|A t) log P̂(Y = j|A t)
=− 1




yt, j log pt, j.
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It can be seen that, for each t ∈ T train, when the estimated model produces the probability
of the right class as 1, the cross-entropy term of customer t equals to 0. Moreover, this term
grows, as the produced probability of the right class decreases. That is, when the cross-
entropy loss is small, the estimated model is close to the true model. The training procedure
aims to minimize this cross-entropy loss. In other words, it tries to get the estimated model
which resembles the true model. In fact, it is easy to verify that this problem is equivalent
to maximum log-likelihood estimation.
5.2.1 Model with Features
We can extend the neural network choice model we discussed earlier to incorporate ob-
served choice characteristics. In this case, the input vector x is no longer a binary vector
and its dimension of input vector is no longer n. Suppose R is the number of observed
features after feature engineering. The input vector is split into R+1 parts of equal length,
which equals to the number of products n. The vector x(0) represents an offered assort-
ment, similar to the input vector in no feature case. Particularly, x(0) is a binary vector of
dimension n, and x(0)j equals to 1 when product j is in an assortment A and 0 otherwise.
For r ∈ R, the vector x(r) is a vector corresponds to feature r, where each element x(r)j de-
scribes feature r of product j. For j /∈A , we set x(r)j = 0. Let x
(r)
scaled denote the min-max
normalized vector of x(r) for r ∈ [R]. Note that we have x(r)scaled ∈ [0,1]
n for all r ∈ [R] in
training set. The input vector x is then constructed as x = (x(0),x(1)scaled, . . . ,x
(R)
scaled), where
x(0),x(1)scaled, . . . ,x
(R)
scaled are vectors of dimension n. Therefore, the input vector x has dimen-
sion of (R+1)n, whose value is between 0 and 1 inclusive, i.e., x ∈ [0,1](R+1)n.
5.3 Numerical experiment
In this section, we will compare the effectiveness of different discrete choice models through
numerical experiments. To quantify the effectiveness of the models, we test the out-of-
sample predictive ability. Specifically, we randomly divide the data into training data and
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testing data of equal size. The training data is used to estimate the model, and the testing
data is then used to measure the predictive power of the models. Suppose T test is a col-
lection of customers in testing set. The metric we use is cross-entropy which is defined
as
H(P, P̂) =− 1
|T test | ∑t∈T test
∑
j∈A t
yt, j log pt, j.
Recall that the model which has smaller cross-entropy means it has better predicting power.
The empirical cross-entropy is given by
H(P̂, P̂) =− 1
|T test | ∑t∈T test
∑
j∈A t
pt, j log pt, j.
It can be shown by Jensen’s inequality that the empirical cross-entropy is the smallest
achievable cross-entropy any model can be obtained.
The models we consider include
1. The neural network choice model discussed in Section 5.2. We note that the number
of hidden layers, the number of nodes in each hidden layer and an activation function
of each node in each hidden layer can be arbitrarily set. For simplicity, we let each
hidden layer have the same number of nodes, which equal to a multiple of the number
of nodes in the input layer. Specifically, the number of nodes in each hidden layer
|H k | = cn for k ∈ [K], where c ∈ N is a multiplier of the number of nodes in the
input layer. We assume that each node has the same activation function, which is
a leaky rectified linear unit (leaky ReLU) (Maas, Hannun, and Ng, 2013). A leaky
ReLU is defined as
a(x) =





where α is a hyperparameter. We consider when the number of hidden layers K is
0,1 and 2, namely
(a) the neural netwok choice model with zero hidden layer (NN-0),
(b) the neural netwok choice model with one hidden layer (NN-1),
(c) the neural netwok choice model with two hidden layers (NN-2).
We test the model when the number of nodes in each hidden layer is 1,2, . . . ,10
times of the number of products. For the activation function of each node in the
hidden layers, we use the Leaky ReLU activation function with parameter α = 0.1.
We use TensorFlow Keras to train the neural network choice model. Adam optimiza-
tion with default parameters is used. We use early stopping to avoid overfitting. We
let the procedure terminate if the cross-entropy of validation set, which accounts for
20% of training set, does not decrease by 0.001 for 8 consecutive epochs.
2. The multinomial logit (MNL) model. In this model, a customer chooses product
j ∈A when an assortment A is offered with probability




where parameter u j is utility of product j for j ∈J . The parameters are obtained
from maximum likelihood estimation.
3. The restricted Boltzmann Machine (RBM) choice model proposed by Osogami and
Otsuka (2014). The model extends the MNL model. Specifically, a customer chooses
product j ∈A when an assortment A is offered with probability
P(Y = j|A ) =
eu j ∏m∈M (T mA +V
m
j )




where T mA := ∑`∈A T
m




j for j ∈A
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and m ∈M , where M is a set of indices. They show that this choice model can be
represented by RBM. So, we use existing algorithm for RBMs to estimate parame-
ters. Specifically, we use sklearn.neural network.BernoulliRBM with learning rate
0.01 for 100 epochs to learn parameters.
4. The spiked multinomial logit (SMNL) model proposed by Cao, Kleywegt, and Wang
(2019). Let c denote the cheapest product in an assortment A . In this model, a
customer given an assortment A chooses product j ∈A with probability
P(Y = j|A ) =





where u j is a regular utility and v j is a special utility when product j is the cheap-
est product in an assortment A for all j ∈J . The parameters are obtained from
maximum likelihood estimation.
5. The general attraction model (GAM) proposed by Gallego, Ratliff, and Shebalov
(2015). Let j0 ∈J denote a no-purchase option. In this model, a customer given an
assortment A chooses product j ∈A with probability
P(Y = j|A ) =

eu j
∑`∈A eu`+∑`∈J \A e
v` , if j 6= j0
e
u j0+∑`∈J \A e
v`
∑`∈A eu`+∑`∈J \A e
v` , if j = j0
,
where u j is a regular utility and v j is a shadow utility when product j is not offered
in an assortment. The model is fit by maximum likelihood estimation.
5.3.1 Synthetic Data
Dataset
We follow Cao, Kleywegt, and Wang (2019) for synthetic data generation process to obtain
data which has a spike phenomenon. Specifically, there are p types of customer whose
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arrival rates are all equal. Each type of customer considers different subset of products
and will choose the cheapest product in her consideration set that is available in an offered
assortment. If no product in her consideration set available, the customer will choose no-
purchase option.
Suppose product 1 refers to a no-purchase option. The remaining n+1 types of products
are ranked from high to low price. Specifically, product 2 has the highest price, and product
n has the lowest price. Each type of customer ` ∈ [m] considers product only in specific
range [
¯
i`, ī`]. Let U{¯
u, ū} denote the discrete uniform distribution which can have integer
values from
¯
u and ū. For each type of customer ` ∈ [m],
¯
i` is drawn from U{2,n}, and then
ī` is drawn from U{¯
i`,n}. If the range [¯
i`, ī`] coincides with the range of any preceding
type of customer, we keep regenerating until the range is unique. Let τ be the number of
customers. For each t ∈ τ , assortment A t is [nt ] where nt is drawn from U{2,n}. The type
of customer arrives at t is drawn from U{1, p}.
We consider n = 15 and p = 30. We generate 3000 customers for training set, and
another 3000 customers for testing set.
Result
Figure 5.2 illustrates cross-entropy of the MNL, SMNL, GAM, NN-0, NN-1, NN-2 and
RBM models for training set (left) and testing set (right) when the number of nodes in
each hidden layer is 1,2,. . . ,10 times the number of products. It can be seen that the
performances of each model are consistent in both training and testing set. That is, the
RMB choice model is the worst performer. the GAM and MNL models have roughly the
same level of cross-entropy, but the GAM performs slightly better than the MNL mod-
els. The SMNL model does significantly better, because the data we consider has a spike
phenomenon which the SMNL model can capture. However, the neural network choice
models, NN-0, NN-1 and NN-2, can do better than the SMNL model. This is an interesting
result, as the SMNL model requires the additional knowledge of price ranking of products,
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Figure 5.2: Cross-entropy of the MNL, SMNL, GAM, NN-0, NN-1, NN-2 and RBM mod-
els for training set (left) and testing set (right) of synthetic data.
while the neural network models (and others) do not. This result shows how powerful the
neural network choice models are in predicting underlying choice behavior. Moreover, we
can observe that the RMB choice model does not perform well as the number of nodes in
the hidden layer increases in both training and testing sets. As we fix the number of epochs
when we train the RMB choice model, this might happen because of under-training in more
complex model. However, we cannot observe such trend in the NN-1 and NN-2 models.
Moreover, for this synthetic dataset, it is inconclusive whether the number of hidden layers
helps improve the performance of the neural network models.
Table 5.1 summarizes the improvement of cross-entropy of the neural network models,
NN-0, NN-1 and NN-2, over the MNL and SML models for synthetic testing data. It
can be seen that the neural network models outperform the MNL and SMNL models by
approximately 10.07% and 1.25% respectively.
5.3.2 Hotel Data
Dataset
We apply each model to “Hotel 1” in publicly available hotel data found in Bodea, Fergu-
son, and Garrow (2009). The data includes transient customers whose check-in dates be-
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Table 5.1: Improvement of cross-entropy of the NN-0, NN-1 and NN-2 models over the
MNL and SMNL models for synthetic testing data.
Multiplier
Improvement over MNL Improvement over SMNL
NN-0 NN-1 NN-2 NN-0 NN-1 NN-2
1 10.39% 10.20% 10.20% 1.60% 1.38% 1.39%
2 10.39% 9.97% 9.23% 1.60% 1.13% 0.32%
3 10.39% 10.23% 10.28% 1.60% 1.41% 1.47%
4 10.39% 9.67% 9.68% 1.60% 0.80% 0.82%
5 10.39% 10.08% 10.40% 1.60% 1.26% 1.61%
6 10.39% 10.37% 9.21% 1.60% 1.57% 0.29%
7 10.39% 10.03% 10.21% 1.60% 1.20% 1.40%
8 10.39% 9.27% 9.52% 1.60% 0.36% 0.64%
9 10.39% 10.07% 9.75% 1.60% 1.24% 0.89%
10 10.39% 9.52% 10.40% 1.60% 0.64% 1.60%
tween March 12, 2007, and April 15, 2007, in one of the continental U.S. hotels. We only
consider bookings which associate with product availability information, i.e., the merge in-
dicator equals to 1. We define product as a combination of room type and rate code. Each
booking record corresponds to one customer. An assortment offered to each customer is
defined as all available products associated with such booking record plus a no-purchase
option. For each booking record, if the purchased product indicator equals to one, it means
customer chooses such product in an assortment. However, if all purchased product in-
dicators equal to zero, it means customer chooses no-purchase option. As we need price
ranking of products to estimate the SMNL model, we use an average arrival rate of each
product as a proxy of its price.
After data preprocessing, “Hotel 1” data has n=81, 191 different assortments and 1595
booking records (customers). We randomly select 50% of booking records, which is equiv-




Figure 5.3 shows cross-entropy of the MNL, SMNL, GAM, NN-0, NN-1, NN-2 and RBM
models for training set (left) and testing set (right) when the number of nodes in each hid-
den layer is 1,2,. . . ,10 times the number of products. We observe that the neural network
models generally outperforms other models in both training and testing sets, with the ex-
ception of the NN-2 model with multiplicative factors of 5, 8, 9 and 10. For the neural
network models, we can observe that more complex models fit data better, in particular, the
NN-2 model fits data better than the NN-1 model, and the NN-1 model fits data better than
the NN-0 model. In training set, we also observe that when the number of nodes in hidden
layer increases, both the NN-1 and NN-2 models tend to have smaller cross-entropy. How-
ever, when it comes to predicting power, more complex models performs worse. Moreover,
we can see large discrepancies between cross-entropy of training and test sets. These ob-
servations might be caused by model over-fitting, since the number of training data is small
comparing to the number of products and the number of assortments. Moreover, we can
see that the predicting power of the MNL model, which belongs to the RUM class, is better
than the GAM and SML models, which can model behaviors beyond the RUM class. This
result is consistent with what Jagabathula and Rusmevichientong (2019) mention. Table











































Figure 5.3: Cross-entropy of the MNL, SMNL, GAM, NN-0, NN-1, NN-2 and RBM mod-
els for training set (left) and testing set (right) of hotel data.
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5.2 summarizes the improvement of cross-entropy of the neural network models, NN-0,
NN-1 and NN-2, over the MNL model for hotel testing data. It can be seen that majority
of the neural network configurations outperform the MNL model.
Table 5.2: Improvement of cross-entropy of the NN-0, NN-1 and NN-2 models over the




1 7.61% 8.76% 8.06%
2 7.61% 8.50% 6.63%
3 7.61% 8.15% 6.08%
4 7.61% 7.22% 5.35%
5 7.61% 6.84% -1.11%
6 7.61% 6.88% 2.94%
7 7.61% 7.11% 1.35%
8 7.61% 6.69% -2.82%
9 7.61% 6.42% -5.01%
10 7.61% 5.65% -0.21%
5.3.3 IRI Data
Dataset
We focus on IRI Academic Dataset (Bronnenberg, Kruger, and Mela, 2008). This dataset
includes purchase transactions of consumer packaged goods for both grocery stores and
drug stores over 47 markets across the US. We note that the same dataset is used by Jaga-
bathula and Rusmevichientong (2019) and Chen and Mišić (2019).
Due to the large volume of dataset, we consider the data from the first four weeks
of 2007 from drug stores. Specifically, we focus on “milk” product category. We define
product as the items with the same vendor code, which can be found from digits 4 to
8 in the universal product code (UPC). We focus on the top 30 purchased vendor codes
and we aggregate the remaining purchased transaction as the 31th product. Therefore,
we have n = 31. The aggregation by vendor code is a commonly-used technique for data
preprocessing; see Bronnenberg and Mela (2004) and Nijs, Srinivasan, and Pauwels (2007).
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An assortment offered to each customer is defined as all products, which is purchased at
least once, during a week and at a particular store. As we need price ranking of products
to estimate the SMNL model, we use an average price per unit of all items with the same
vendor code as a proxy of the price.
5.3.4 Result
Figure 5.4 shows cross-entropy of the MNL, SMNL, GAM, NN-0, NN-1, NN-2 and RBM
modles for training set (left) and testing set (right) when the number of nodes in each
hidden layer is 1,2,. . . ,10 times the number of products. We observe that the results from
training set and testing set are consistent. Specifically, the RBM choice model is the worst
performer. The MNL and SMNL models have roughly similar performance, while the
GAM does slightly better. The neural network, NN-0, NN-1 and NN-2, models perform
well, as we observe some improvement gaps from the other choice models.
After data preprocessing, “milk” data has n=31, 108 different assortments and 21864
transactions. We randomly select 50% of booking records, which is equivalent to 10932
entries, to construct training set and the remaining 10932 entries go to testing set. Table











































Figure 5.4: Cross-entropy of the MNL, SMNL, GAM, NN-0, NN-1, NN-2 and RBM mod-
els for training set (left) and testing set (right) of milk category from IRI Academic Dataset.
5.3 summarizes the improvement of cross-entropy of the neural network models, NN-0,
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NN-1 and NN-2, over the MNL model for milk testing data. It can be seen that the neural
network configurations outperform the MNL model by 7.94% on average. It also shows
that the model with no hidden layer has worse performance than one with hidden layer(s).
This result suggests that when we have sufficiently large dataset for training, we can avoid
over-fitting in more complex models.
Table 5.3: Improvement of cross-entropy of the NN-0, NN-1 and NN-2 models over the




1 7.74% 8.39% 8.04%
2 7.74% 8.50% 7.74%
3 7.74% 8.18% 8.12%
4 7.74% 7.91% 7.96%
5 7.74% 8.08% 7.97%
6 7.74% 7.92% 8.06%
7 7.74% 8.19% 8.08%
8 7.74% 8.01% 7.65%
9 7.74% 8.31% 7.81%
10 7.74% 8.17% 7.74%
5.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we propose the neural network choice model, which build upon neural net-
work framework, to model general choice behaviors, either within RUM class or beyond
RUM class. Numerical experiments show that our proposed models consistently outper-
form other well-known discrete choice models, which belong to RUM class or beyond




RE-SOLVING HEURISTIC WITH UNIFORMLY BOUNDED LOSS FOR
NETWORK REVENUE MANAGEMENT
A.1 Proofs for Section 2.4
In this section, we provide complete proofs for the results on the IRT policy in Section 2.4.
A.1.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof of Theorem 1. Given remaining capacity C(t1) at time t1 ∈ [0,T ], let x(t1) be an op-









A jx j ≤C(t1)/(T − t1), and 0≤ x j ≤ λ j,∀ j ∈ [n]
}
.
For any t2 ∈ (t1,T ], let VSPA(t1, t2) denote the revenue earned in [t1, t2) under a static prob-
abilistic allocation policy, where class j customers are accepted with probability x j(t1)/λ j.
Let VSPA
′
(t1, t2) be the revenue earned in [t1, t2), where a class j customer is accepted with
the following probability:
• 0, if x j(t1)< λ j(T − t1)−1/4
• 1, if x j(t1)> λ j(1− (T − t1)−1/4)
• x j(t1)/λ j, otherwise.
Let V HO(t1,T ) denote the revenue earned from solving the hindsight optimum in [t1,T ].
That is, V HO(t1,T ) is the optimal revenue given the remaining capacity at t1 and a sample
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path of demand in (t1,T ], given by








A jy j ≤C(t1), and 0≤ y j ≤ Λ j(T )−Λ j(t1),∀ j ∈ [n]
}
.
Consider policy IRT2, which re-solves at t∗1 = T − T 5/6, and re-solves again at t∗2 =
T −T (5/6)2 = T −T 25/36. Let vIRT2 be the expected revenue of IRT2. The regret of this
policy can be decomposed as
vHO− vIRT
2














The first term of Eq (A.1) is bounded by O(Te−κT
1/6
) as stated in Proposition 1. For the

























Applying part (1) of Proposition 1 to the remaining problem in (t∗1 ,T ], which has a horizon
length T − t∗1 = τ1 = T 5/6, we get





HO(t∗2 ,T ))] = O(T
5/6e−κ(T


























Eq (A.3) follows the well-known result that static probabilistic allocation has a regret of
O(
√
k) for a problem with horizon length k (see Appendix A.2.2).








Now, consider policy IRT3, which follows IRT2 during t ∈ [0, t∗3), but re-solves again at
time t∗3 = T −T (5/6)
3
































. Note that the policy IRTK coincides with IRT. By induction, if the
decision maker re-solves K times, where the uth re-solving time is t∗u = T − T (5/6)
u
, the
regret is given by









































































Thus, the first term of the right hand side of Equation (A.5) is O(1). By the definition
of constant K, we have T (5/6)
K/2 ≤ e1/2. Thus, the second term in (A.5) is also O(1).
Therefore, we have vHO− vIRT = O(1). In addition, this constant factor is independent of
the time horizon T and the capacity vector C.
A.1.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Throughout this subsection, we focus on policies IRT1 and HO1 with only one re-solving
at t∗1 = T −T 5/6. We write t∗ := t∗1 for simplicity. Let Γ(T ) = α ∑ j:x∗j=λ j |Λ j(T )−λ jT |,
where α is a constant whose value is determined by the BOM matrix A = (al j)l∈[m], j∈[n].
More specifically, α is the maximum absolute value of the elements in the inverses of
all invertible submatrices of the BOM matrix A. In a special case when all entries of A are
either 0 or 1, we have α ≤max{1,m∧n−1}. We let ∆ j(t) be the deviation of the number of
arrivals of class j customer from its mean in (t,T ], i.e., ∆ j(t) = Λ j(T )−Λ j(t)−λ j(T − t).
Define z̃ j(t) as the number of class j customers accepted up to time t if the algorithm were
allowed to go over the capacity limits. For all j ∈ [n], we define the following events:
E1, j =
{



















Now we will prove Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 1. For all j : x∗j < λ jT
−1/4, z̃ j(t∗) = 0≤ T x∗j . For all j : x∗j ≥ λ jT−1/4,
event E in (A.8) implies z̃ j(t∗) ≤ (T − t∗)x∗j + t∗x∗j = T x∗j . So, suppose event E holds, the
capacity constraints for all resources are satisfied up to period t∗, and we have z j(t∗) =
z̃ j(t∗).
If x∗j < λ jT
−1/4, we have z̄ j− z j(t∗) = z̄ j−0≥ 0. (Recall that z̄ j is the solution to the
hindsight optimum; see Section 2.2.2.) Otherwise, suppose event E holds, by Lemma 9 in
Appendix A.4, we have
z̄ j− z j(t∗)≥ T x∗j −Γ(T )− z j(t∗)+ t∗x∗j − t∗x∗j
= (T − t∗)x∗j −Γ(T )− (z j(t∗)− t∗x∗j)≥ 0, (A.9)
where (A.9) follows from the condition (A.6) and the fact that z j(t∗) = z̃ j(t∗).
Similarly, if x∗j > λ j(1− T−1/4), we have z j(t∗) + Λ j(T )−Λ j(t∗)− z̄ j ≥ Λ j(t∗) +
Λ j(T )−Λ j(t∗)−Λ j(T ) = 0. Otherwise, suppose event E holds, by Lemma 9, we have
z j(t∗)+Λ j(T )−Λ j(t∗)− z̄ j = z j(t∗)+(T − t∗)λ j +∆ j(t∗)− z̄ j
≥ z j(t∗)+(T − t∗)λ j +∆ j(t∗)−T x∗j −Γ(T )
= (z j(t∗)− t∗x∗j)+(T − t∗)(λ j− x∗j)+∆ j(t∗)−Γ(T )
≥ (T − t∗)(λ j− x∗j)+(z j(t∗)− t∗x∗j)−|∆ j(t∗)|−Γ(T )
≥ 0, (A.10)
where (A.10) follows from the condition (A.7) and the fact that z j(t∗) = z̃ j(t∗).
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Therefore, combining (A.9) and (A.10), we have z j(t∗)≤ z̄ j ≤ z j(t∗)+Λ j(T )−Λ j(t∗).
In other words, the decision maker would still be able to achieve the hindsight optimum if
she uses probabilistic allocation up to t∗, and then gets perfect information from t∗ onwards,
because she can accept z̄ j−z j(t∗) of class j customers. If the decision maker re-solves once
at t∗, then the regret can be written as
vHO− vIRT
1
= E[V HO−V IRT
1






















] = E[V HO(t∗,T )−VSPA(t∗,T )] = O(
√
T − t∗) = O(T 5/12). (A.12)
Eq (A.12) follows the well-known result that static probabilistic allocation without re-
solving has a regret rate of O(
√
k) for a problem with horizon length k, where the constant
factor does not depend on the capacity vector C (see e.g. Reiman and Wang, 2008). For
completeness, we give a proof of this result in Appendix §A.2.
Recall that if the event E happens, the hindsight optimal is still attainable starting from
t∗. In other words, conditioned on E, the regret of HO1 is V HO−VHO1 = 0. Therefore, the
first term of (A.11) is given by
E[V HO−VHO
1








≤ E[V HO | Ec]P(Ec). (A.13)
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Note that the hindsight optimum is bounded almost surely by V HO ≤ ∑nj=1 r jΛ j(T ),
where Λ j(T ) is the total number of arrivals from class j. Moreover, Λ j(T ) follows Poisson
distribution with mean λ jT . By the Poisson tail bound (see Lemma 8 in Appendix A.4),
we have
































































































Combining the above inequality with Eq (A.13), we have
E[V HO−VHO
1

































































where the big O notation hides constants that are independent of the time horizon T and
the capacity vector C.
A.2 Additional Results
A.2.1 A note on the DLP upper bound
We establish the revenue loss of heuristics by comparing their revenues to the hindsight
optimum upper bound vHO. This bound is tighter than the DLP upper bound vDLP. The
following result suggests that vDLP is not an appropriate benchmark to prove O(1) revenue
loss, because even the gap between the optimal policy v∗ and vDLP is Ω(
√
T ).
Proposition 10. The gap between the optimal value of the DLP and the optimal value
obtained by dynamic programming is bounded below by
vDLP− v∗ = Ω(
√
T ).
Proof of Proposition 10. To prove Proposition 10, we consider the following instance. In
this instance, there is only one class of customer and one type of resource. So for simplicity,
we will suppress the subscriptions. Suppose the expected number of arrivals in one period
is Poisson process with rate λ . The revenue earned by accepting a customer is 1. The
resource has the capacity λT and the amount of the resource used to serve one customer is
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∣∣∣ x≤ λT/T = λ , 0≤ x≤ λ}.
It easily verified that, we have x∗ = λ and thus vDLP = λT .
On the other hand, it is obvious that the optimal policy is to admit all customers in
[0,T ] subject to the capacity constraint. Specifically, the optimal number of the admitted
customers is either the number of the arriving customers in [0,T ] or the capacity level,
whichever is lower. Therefore, the optimal revenue of the above problem instance is given
by
































Consequently, we can write






















λT (1−FT (1)), (A.16)
where FT is the cumulative distribution function of
λT−Λ(T )√
λT
. Let Φ denote the cumulative
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distribution function of standard normal distribution. Since
1−FT (1) = 1−Φ(1)+Φ(1)−FT (1)≥ 1−Φ(1)−|FT (1)−Φ(1)|. (A.17)
We use the Berry-Esseen theorem (Lemma 4 in Appendix A.4) to bound |FT (1)−Φ(1)|.
Let Xi = λ − (Λ(i)−Λ(i−1)) for i = 1, . . . ,T . From the stationary and independent incre-
ment properties of Poisson processes, we observe that Xi are i.i.d. with E[X1] = 0, E[X2] =
λ and E[|X31 |] = λ . Since














Combining (A.16), (A.17) and (A.18), we can write










Since vDLP = λT and 1−Φ(1) = 0.1587, it follows that
vDLP− v∗ ≥ 0.1587
√
λT −0.4748 = Ω(
√
T ).
A.2.2 Revenue loss of static probabilistic allocation
The following result is a well-known in the revenue management literature by Gallego and
van Ryzin (1994) and Gallego and Ryzin (1997); see also Cooper (2002) and Reiman and
Wang (2008).
Proposition 11. The gap between the optimal value of the DLP and the optimal value
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obtained by the static probabilistic allocation (SPA) heuristic is bounded above by
vDLP− vSPA = O(
√
T ).
The constant pre-factor depends on the customer arrival rate λ j (∀ j ∈ [n]), the revenues
per customer r j (∀ j ∈ [n]), and the BOM matrix A; however, it does not depend on the
starting capacity Cl (∀l ∈ [m]).
Since the revenue of the optimal policy, v∗, and the hindsight optimum, vHO, satisfies
v∗ ≤ vHO ≤ vDLP, a corollary of the result is v∗−vSPA = O(
√
T ) and vHO−vSPA = O(
√
T ).
In the revenue management literature, this result is often proved under the additional
assumption that resource capacities and customer arrivals are both scaled up at the same
rate. However, the result in fact holds for arbitrary capacity levels. We need this fact in the
proof of Theorem 1. To make the proof of Theorem 1 self-contained, we include a proof of
the proposition below.
Proof of Proposition 11. By Eq 2.2, we have vDLP = T ∑ j∈[n] r jx∗j . We bound v
SPA in two
steps. First, consider a hypothetical setting where remaining capacities are allowed to be-
come negative. Since SPA accepts each class j customer with probability x∗j/λ j if capacity














r jx∗jT = v
DLP.
In reality, remaining capacity is always nonnegative, and customers must be rejected if there
is insufficient capacity. So to correct the revenue calculation of the hypothetical setting, we
must subtract the revenue associated with customers who are rejected due to insufficient












where X j is the number of class j customers that would have been accepted by SPA without
capacity limits, which follow a Poisson distribution with mean x∗jT , and r
l
max is the largest
possible revenue gain by increasing the capacity of resource l by one unit, i.e., rlmax =




































where the first inequality follows the capacity constraints in DLP (2.2), and the last in-
equality follows from Cauchy-Schwarz inequality.
Note that X j’s mean and variance are both equal to x∗jT , and X j’s are independent for




































where the last inequality follows the demand constraints x∗j ≤ λ j in DLP (2.2). Substi-

















a2l jλ jT .
A.3 Proofs for Results in Section 2.5
In this section, we provide complete proofs for the results on the FR policy in Section 2.5.
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A.3.1 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof of Proposition 2. Let VFR denote the revenue earned under the FR policy. We know
that vHO− vFR = E[V HO]−E[VFR] = E[V HO−VFR]. From the law of total expectation, it
equals to
E[V HO−VFR|Q]P(Q)+E[V HO−VFR|Qc]P(Qc), (A.20)
for any event Q. Since V HO is an upper bound of VFR, i.e., V HO ≥ VFR a.s. and the prob-
ability of any measurable event is nonnegative, the second term of (A.20) is nonnegative.
Consequently,
vHO− vFR ≥ E[V HO−VFR|Q]P(Q).
That is, to complete the proof, we want to show that E[V HO−VFR|Q]P(Q) ≥ Ω(
√
T ) for
some appropriately chosen event Q.
Recall that we consider a problem instance with two classes of customers and one
resource. Customers from each class arrive according to a Poisson process with rate 1.
The arrivals from two classes are assumed to be independent. The initial resource capacity
is T . Customers from both classes, if accepted, consume one unit of the resource, but
pay different prices, r1 > r2. To proof the result, we will consider the situation when the
number of arrivals of class 1 customers in [0,T ] is above its mean which is T . Since the
initial capacity of the resource is T , the hindsight optimal policy is to accept only class 1
customer. More specifically, we should accept T of class 1 customer and none of class 2
customer. Failing to do so will result in a positive regret.
We will partition time in the interval [0,T ] into 3 phases of equal length. Let T ′ and T ′′
denote the beginning of phase 2 and phase 3 respectively. In other words, T ′ = T/3 and
T ′′ = 2T/3. We will define the events of the number of the arrivals of class 1 customer in
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each period as follows.
Q1 = {T ′−4
√
T ′ ≤ Λ1(0,T ′)≤ T ′−3
√
T ′}, (A.21)
Q2 = {(t−T ′)−2
√
T ′ ≤ Λ1(T ′, t)≤ (t−T ′)+2
√
T ′, ∀t ∈ (T ′,T ′′]}, (A.22)
Q3 = {T ′+6
√
T ′ ≤ Λ1(T ′′,T )≤ T ′+7
√
T ′}, (A.23)
where Qi restricts the number of the arrivals of class 1 customer in phase i. Let z j(t1, t2)
denote the actual number of class j customers admitted in (t1, t2]. We will further define
the events of the number of accepted customers as





B1 = {z1(0,T ′)< T ′−10
√
T ′}. (A.25)
If the event B happens, the decision maker will admit at least 16
√
T ′ of class 2 customers
which leads to a regret of at least (r1− r2)16
√
T ′ from the hindsight optimal. On the other
hand, if the event B1 happens, the decision maker will admit less than T ′−10
√
T ′ of class
1 customer; this means that even if the decision maker admit all arrivals of class 1 customer
in the second and the third phase, the total number of admitted class 1 customer is






T ′ = T −
√
T ′,
which results in a regret of at least (r1− r2)
√
T ′ from the hindsight optimal. Therefore, if
the event B or B1 happens with probability that is bounded away from zero, the incurred
a regret of is at least (r1− r2)16
√
T ′ from the hindsight optimal. If we can show that this
event happens with positive probability, then we are done. That is, we want to show that
P((B∪B1)∩Q1∩Q2∩Q3)> 0.
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where the first term of (A.26) follows since the arrivals of the customers in disjoint interval
are independent, i.e., Q1,Q2 and Q3 are independent, and the inequality (A.27) follows
because the event Bc∩Bc1∩Q1∩Q2∩Q3 is a subset of the event Bc∩Bc1∩Q1∩Q2. The
remaining part of the proof relies on the results of Lemma 11 in Appendix A.4. Combining







































A.3.2 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof Proposition 3. The FR algorithm divides the horizon [0,T ] into T periods: [0,1)∪
[1,2)∪ ·· · ∪ [T − 1,T ]. In each period [t, t + 1), the algorithm attempts to accept class j
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customers with probability x j(t)/λ j. If we ignore capacity constraints, the algorithm on
average accepts x j(t) customers from class j. However, the decision maker can poten-
tially reject customers due to capacity constraints; if that happens, the expected number of
admitted class j customers in period t is less than x j(t) per period.









A jy j ≤C(t), and 0≤ y j ≤ λ j(T − t),∀ j ∈ [n]
}
.





λ j(T−t) . If there is insufficient capacity for class j in period [t, t + 1), two cases
can happen: case 1) A j  C(t), i.e., there exists l ∈ [m] such that al j > Cl(t), so there is
insufficient capacity for class j when this period starts; case 2) A j ≤ C(t), namely there
is sufficient capacity when this period starts, but during [t, t + 1) the capacity of certain
resource runs out, and a class j customer that arrives at time s ∈ [t, t +1) finds A j C(s).
For case 1), A j  C(t) implies y j(t) < 1. So, the expected number of class j customers
that FR would accept, but that are not accepted because of the capacity constraint in period
[t, t +1) is less than λ j · 1λ j(T−t) =
1
T−t . The revenue loss from that group of customers over














r j (logT +1) ,






x dx = log(T ). For case 2), we note that this
situation can happen at most once during the entire horizon for each class of customers.
Since the expected number of class j customers that FR would accept, but that are not
accepted because of the capacity constraint in one period is bounded above by the expected
number of class j arrivals in one period which is λ j, the revenue loss caused by case 2) is
bounded by ∑nj=1 r jλ j.
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where the last two terms account for the lost sales of case 1) and case 2) respectively.
Therefore, the expected revenue loss of the re-solving heuristic can be bounded by






















r jλ j. (A.28)
Since the solutions to the DLP(x∗) and the LP solved under the FR policy(x(t)) only differ
in the right hand side of the capacity constraints (b and b(t)), we can write, for any time













where rlmax is the largest possible revenue gain by increasing the capacity of resource l by
one unit, i.e., rlmax = max j∈[n]{r jI(al j > 0)/al j}. Equation (A.29) holds because rlmax is an
















































(T − i−1)(T − i)
)]+
. (A.30)
Let z j(t) be the actual number of class j customers admitted in [0, t]. The change in the
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capacity of resource l is given by Cl(i)−Cl(i+1) = ∑nj=1 al j(z j(i+1)− z j(i)). Because of
the capacity constraint, the decision maker may fail to accept some customers. Therefore,
the actual number of the admitted customers in any period is bounded above by the number
of the customers admitted in that period by ignoring the capacity constraint.
More specifically, we define stochastic processes {z̃ j(t), t ≥ 1, j ∈ [n]}, such that z̃ j(t +
1)− z̃ j(t) follows Poisson distribution with mean x j(t) (the solution to the LP at pe-
riod t). Therefore, z̃ j(t + 1)− z̃ j(t) is the the number of class j customers that the al-
gorithm could have admitted if there were no capacity constraint in [t, t + 1). Since the
number of customers who are actually admitted, z j(t + 1)− z j(t), follows the same Pois-
son distribution with additional rejections due to capacity constraints, we always have









al j(z̃ j(i+1)− z̃ j(i)).
































where the second term in the RHS of (A.31) follows from the definition of bl(i) =
Cl(i)
T−i and
the inequality of (A.32) follows from the definition of the re-solving LP in Algorithm 2
which is ∑nj=1 al jx j(i)≤ bl(i).
We will use the result from Lemma 12 in Appendix A.4 to finish the proof. If we sum
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2)+nrmax (logT +1)+nrmaxλmax = O(
√
T ),
where rmax = max j∈[n] r j and λmax = max j∈[n]λ j.
A.4 Lemmas
Lemma 4 (Berry-Esseen theorem, Corollary 1 in Shevtsova (2011)). Let X1,X2, . . . be in-
dependent and identically distributed random variables (i.i.d.) with E[X1] = 0, E[X21 ] =














Lemma 5 (Doob’s maximal inequality, Theorem 1.7 in Revuz and Yor (1999), p. 54).
Suppose Mt is a martingale with paths that are right continuous with left limits. Then, for







Lemma 6 (Freedman (1975), Theorem 4.1). Given a sequence of real-valued supermartin-
gale differences (ξi,Fi)i∈{0}∪[n] with ξ0 = 0. Set Sk = ∑
k
i=0 ξi for k ∈ [n]. Then,
S = (Sk,Fk)k∈[n] is a supermartingale.
Let 〈S〉k = ∑ki=1E[ξ 2i |Fi−1]. Suppose ξi ≤ 1. Then, for all x,v > 0,







Lemma 7 (Chernoff Bound for Poisson Distribution, Boucheron, Lugosi, and Massart
(2013), p. 22–23). Suppose random variable X follows a Poisson distribution with pa-
rameter λ > 0, for any constant x > 0, we have










and, for any constant 0 < x < λ ,











where h(t) = 2((1+ t) log(1+ t)− t)/t2 for any t >−1.
Lemma 8 (Two-sided Poisson Tail Bound). If random variable X follows a Poisson distri-
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bution with parameter λ > 0, for any constant x > 0, we have







Proof of Lemma 8. This result is well-known and directly follows from Lemma 7. For
completeness, we provide a proof here.




2(1+t) , where h(t) = 2
(1+t) log(1+t)−t
t2 .
To this end, we define g(t) = (1+ t)t2h(t)− t2 = 2(1+ t)2 log(1+ t)−2t−3t2, and prove
that g(t) ≥ 0. We have g(0) = 0, g′(t) = 4(1+ t) log(1+ t)−4t, and g′′(t) = 4log(1+ t).











≥ x22(λ+x) . Therefore,











Next, we want to show that for −1 < t < 0, it holds that t22 h(t) ≥
t2
2(1−t) . To this end,
we define f (t) = (1− t)t2h(t)− t2 = 2(1− t2) log(1+ t)−2t + t2, and prove that f (t)≥ 0
for −1 < t < 0. We have f (0) = 0 and f ′(t) =−4t log(1+ t)< 0 for −1 < t < 0. We can
therefore conclude that f (t) ≥ 0 for −1 < t < 0, and hence t22 h(t) ≥
t2
2(1−t) . Combining












Combining these two cases, we obtain the result.
Lemma 9. There exists an optimal solution to the hindsight LP defined in (2.3), z̄ =
(z̄1, . . . , z̄n), such that
z̄ j ∈ [max{T x∗j −Γ(T ),0},min{T x∗j +Γ(T ),Λ j(T )}] for all j ∈ [n]. (A.35)
Proof of Lemma 9. Theorem 4.2 in Reiman and Wang (2008) shows that there exists an
optimal solution to the hindsight LP defined in (2.3), z̄ = (z̄1, . . . , z̄n), such that
z̄ j ∈ [T x∗j −Γ(T ),T x∗j +Γ(T )] for all j ∈ [n].
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The lemma immediately follows since any feasible solution to the hindsight LP satisfies
0≤ z̄ j ≤ Λ j(T ) for all j ∈ [n].







, where the constant κ is given by κ = λmin24(α|Jλ |+1)2 . The set Jλ = { j : x
∗
j = λ j}, and
α is a positive constant that depends on the BOM matrix A.













First, we will bound
P(Ec1, j) = P(z̃ j(t∗)− t∗x∗j +Γ(T )> (T − t)x∗j).
Observe that if the event Ec1, j happens, at least one of the following two events must happen:
{











Thus, we can apply the union bound and write
P(Ec1, j)≤ P
(











Let us consider three cases: 1) x∗j < λ jT
−1/4, 2) λ jT−1/4 ≤ x∗j ≤ λ j(1− T−1/4), 3)
x∗j > λ j(1−T−1/4). Case 1) is already eliminated in definition of event E, so we focus on
case 2) and 3). In Case 2), z̃ j(t∗) is Poisson random variable with parameter t∗x∗j . We use
the two-sided Poisson tail bound (Lemma 8) to bound such events.
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It follows from Lemma 8 that
P
(












































z̃ j(t∗)− t∗λ j >
(T − t∗)x∗j
2










Choose a constant T0 such that T 5/6/4≥ 2T 3/4 for T ≥ T0. It follows from Lemma 8 that
P
(
















































α|Λ j(T )−λ jT |>
(T − t∗)x∗j
2|Jλ |











Applying Lemma 8 again, we have
P
(



























(T 5/6 ·λ jT−1/4)2

































We can also apply the similar argument to bound P(Ec2, j). That is, if the event Ec2, j
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happens, at least one of the following three events must happen:
{

















We can apply the two-sided Poisson tail bound (Lemma 8) to these three events. We con-
sider only case 1) and case 2) here, because case 3) is eliminated in definition of event E.
For the first event, in case 1) we have z̃ j(t∗) = 0. It follows that
P
(
t∗x∗j − z̃ j(t∗)>
































Choosing a constant T0 such that T 5/6/3≥ T 3/4 for T ≥ T0, we have
P
(
t∗x∗j − z̃ j(t∗)>




In case 2), z̃ j(t∗) is Poisson random variable with parameter t∗x∗j , thus we have
P
(
t∗x∗j − z̃ j(t∗)>













































|Λ j(T )−λ jT |>







|Λ j(T )−λ jT |>






























(T 5/6 ·λ jT−1/4)2


















|Λ j(T )−Λ j(t∗)−λ j(T − t∗)|>



















































where the big O notation hides an absolute constant.










where the events Q1,Q2,Q3,B and B1 are defined in (A.21)–(A.25) respectively.
Proof of Lemma 11. We will apply Berry-Esseen theorem (see formal statement in Lemma
4) to bound P(Q1) and P(Q3). The probability P(Q1) can be written as
P(Q1) = P(T ′−4
√










= FT ′(−3)−FT ′(−4)
= Φ(−3)−Φ(−4)− (Φ(−3)−FT ′(−3))− (FT ′(−4)−Φ(−4))
≥Φ(−3)−Φ(−4)−|FT ′(−3)−Φ(−3)|− |FT ′(−4)−Φ(−4)|, (A.47)
where FT ′ is a CDF of
Λ1(0,T ′)−T ′√
T ′
. Recall that by the stationary and independent increment
properties of Poisson processes, Λ1(0,T ′)−T ′ can be thought as the summation of T ′ i.i.d.
Λ1(1)− 1 random variables with E[Λ1(1)− 1] = 0, E[(Λ1(1)− 1)2] = 1 and E[|Λ1(1)−
1|3] = 1. Hence, the second and the third term of (A.47) can be bounded by the Berry-
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We will apply the same argument to bound the probablity P(Q3). That is, we have
P(Q3) = P(T ′+6
√














where (A.50) follows from the Lemma 4. Next, to bound the probability P(Q2), we will
apply Doob’s maximal inequality (Lemma 5). Recall that the event Q2 is defined as
Q2 = {(t−T ′)−2
√
T ′ ≤ Λ1(T ′, t)≤ (t−T ′)+2
√
T ′, ∀t ∈ (T ′,T ′′]}.
Equivalently, this event can be re-written as
Q2 = { sup
t∈(T ′,T ′′]





P(Q2) = P( sup
t∈(T ′,T ′′]





|Λ1(T ′, t)− (t−T ′)|> 2
√
T ′). (A.52)
To bound the last term of (A.52), we first observe that Λ1(T ′, t)− (t−T ′) is a martingale
with paths that are right continuous with left limits, so we can apply Doob’s maximal




|Λ1(T ′, t)− (t−T ′)|> 2
√
T ′)≤ E[|Λ1(T

























Combining the result in (A.55) to (A.52), we get
P(Q2)≥ 1−0.5 = 0.5. (A.56)
Next, we will bound the probability P(Bc∩Bc1∩Q1∩Q2). If the event Bc∩Bc1∩Q1∩Q2
happens, we can observe that z1(0,T ′)≤ Λ1(0,T ′)≤ T ′−3
√
T ′ from Q1 and z2(0,T ′)≤
z2(0,T )< 16
√
T ′ from Bc, and hence the remaining capacity at time T ′ will be










Similarly, for any time t ∈ (T ′,T ′′], the event Bc∩Bc1∩Q1∩Q2 implies that





from Q1 and Q2 and z2(0, t)≤ z2(0,T )< 16
√
T ′ from Bc; therefore, the remaining capacity
at any time t ∈ (T ′,T ′′] will be
C(t) =C− z1(0, t)− z2(0, t)≥ T − (T ′−3
√










So the average capacity per period at time T ′ is
b(T ′)≥














and similarly the average capacity per period at any time t ∈ (T ′,T ′′] is given by
b(t)≥














Recall that for the problem instance we consider, the admission probability of class 1
customer, which is obtained from the LP described in Algorithm 2, is given by x1(t) =
min(b(t)/λ1,1) = min(b(t),1). Thus, (A.57) and (A.58) implies that the decision maker
must accept all arrivals of class 1 customer in phase 2. Hence, it follows from definition of
the event Q2 in (A.22) that, for any time t ∈ (T ′,T ′′], we have
(t−T ′)−2
√
T ′ ≤ z1(t,T ′)≤ (t−T ′)+2
√
T ′. (A.59)
Next, Bc1 implies that we can upper bound the remaining capacity at time T
′ as
C(T ′)=C− z1(0,T ′)− z2(0,T ′)≤ T − z1(0,T ′)≤ T − (T ′−10
√


















Similarly, we can upper bound the remaining capacity at time t ∈ (T ′,T ′′] using the results
in (A.59) which yields
C(t)=C− z1(0, t)− z2(0, t)≤ T − z1(0,T ′)− z1(T ′, t)
≤ T − (T ′−10
√
T ′)− ((t−T ′)−2
√
T ′) = T − t +12
√
T ′.
It follows that the upper bound of the average capacity per period at time t ∈ (T ′,T ′′] is
given by












Combining the results from (A.57), (A.58), (A.60) and (A.61), we obtain the bound of the






≤ b(t)≤ 1+ 12√
T ′
, (A.62)

























We will use Freedman’s Inequality (Lemma 6) to bound (A.63). For i ∈ [T ′], we let ξ0 = 0
and ξi = x2(T ′+ i− 1)− z2(T ′+ i− 1,T ′+ i). We observe that ξi is FT ′+i−1-measurable











x2(T ′+ i−1)− z2(T ′,T ′′).




























Var(z2(T ′+ i−1,T ′+ i)|FT ′+i−1) = T ′x2(T ′+ i−1).
Then, conditions in (A.63) imply that

































Since, for all i ∈ [T ′], we have ξi ≤ x2(T + i− 1) ≤ λ2 = 1, we can apply Freedman’s


























































































j=1 al j(z̃ j(i+1)− z̃ j(i))−∑nj=1 al jx j(i)
T − i−1
)2. (A.66)
The last line applies the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality.
Let {Ft ,0 ≤ t ≤ T} be the filtration generated by {Λ j(s),0 ≤ s ≤ t, j ∈ [n]}. By the













Since the conditional independence of the arrivals of the customers in different period im-
plies that the arrivals of the admitted customers in different period are also conditionally














From the description of the FR, we know that z̃ j(t + 1)− z̃ j(t) conditioned on Ft is dis-
tributed as Poisson distribution with parameter x j(t) (from the Poisson thinning property).
We use the definition of variance in Equation (A.68), and we use the observation that x(t)
is bounded above by λ j because x(t) is the solution to the LP in (A.69). It immediately fol-























































































A.5 Numerical Performance: Comparison with Algorithm proposed by Vera and
Banerjee (2021)
In this section, we compare the numerical performance of SPA, FR, IRT, IR and FRT with
Fluid Bayes Selector (FBS), which is recently proposed by Vera and Banerjee (2021). The
FBS re-solves the DLP when there is an arrival and accepts the arrival if the acceptance
probability exceeds 0.5. Instead of re-solving the DLP every time when there is an arrival,
we slightly modify re-solving schedule of FBS. Specifically, we divide the horizon into
T periods and let FBS re-solves the DLP at the beginning of each period. The complete
definition of FBS is given in Algorithm 11.
Algorithm 11 Fluid Bayes Selector: FBS
initialize: set C(0) =C and b(0) =C/T





j=1 r jx j
∣∣∣ ∑nj=1 A jx j ≤ b(t), and 0≤ x j ≤ λ j,∀ j ∈ [n]}
set C′←C(t)
for all customers arriving in [t, t +1) do
if the customer belongs to class j and A j ≤C′ (∀ j ∈ [n]) then




if the customer is accepted, update C′←C′−A j
else
reject the customer
set C(t +1)←C′ and b(t +1)← C(t+1)T−t−1
We consider the NRM with a single resource and two classes of customers (the same
setting as Sec. 6.1). Recall that the arrival process of each class of customer follows
an independent Poisson process with rate 1. Customers from both classes, if accepted,
consume one unit of resource, but pay different prices, r1 and r2.
Figure A.1 plots the regret under SPA, FR, FRT, IR, IRT and FBS over 1000 sample
paths. The first column shows the case when r1 = 2 and r2 = 1, while the second column
shows the case when r1 = 5 and r2 = 1. The first, the second and the third rows illustrate
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the case when b = 1, b = 1.1, and b = 1.5 respectively. Figure A.2 plots the regret under
FR, IRT and the FBS when r1 = 2,r2 = 1 and b = 0.5,0.6, . . . ,2 for T = 50000 over 1000
sample paths.
It can be observed from Figure A.1 and Figure A.2 that the regret of FBS remains
constant regardless of the horizon length or the average capacity per unit time, which is
consistent with the theoretical results in Vera and Banerjee (2021). In fact, the regret of
FBS is the smallest among the algorithms we consider.
Because IRT and FBS are proven to have O(1) revenue loss, we further investigate the
actual decisions made by these two algorithms. We compare the solutions obtained from
IRT and FBS when r1 = 2,r2 = 1,b = 1 and T = 250 over 1000 sample paths. Figure A.3
shows the probability that different decisions made by IRT and FBS (accept vs reject or
reject vs accept) in each time period when T = 250. Vertical dashed lines indicate re-
solving time under IRT. It can be observed that before the first re-solving time of IRT, both
algorithms perform almost exactly the same, that is, accept all class 1 customers and reject
all class 2 customers. Then, IRT and FBS start making slightly different decisions after
the first re-solving time of IRT. Also, we can observe a jump in probability of different
decisions made by these two algorithms after each re-solving time of IRT.
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(a) b = 1,r1 = 2 and r2 = 1














(b) b = 1,r1 = 5 and r2 = 1













(c) b = 1.1,r1 = 2 and r2 = 1















(d) b = 1.1,r1 = 5 and r2 = 1














(e) b = 1.5,r1 = 2 and r2 = 1














(f) b = 1.5,r1 = 5 and r2 = 1
Figure A.1: Regret under the SPA, the FR, the FRT, the IR, the IRT, and the FBS policies
for T = 500,1000, . . . ,5000.
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Figure A.2: Regret under the FR policy, the IRT policy and FBS policy for r1 = 2,r2 = 1
and T = 50000.







(a) class 1 customer







(b) class 2 customer




INTEGRATED PRICING AND ROUTING IN A NETWORK
B.1 Arc-based Formulation
Let v j,e be the demand of OD pair j on arc e for all j ∈J and e ∈ E . Let S j and D j
denote the origin and destination associated with OD pair j for all j ∈J . Furthermore, let
E −(i) and E +(i) denote the set of incoming and outgoing arcs of node i, respectively. The
integrated pricing and routing problem can also be formulated as
max
v,x,z ∑j∈J









z j for i = S j
0 for i ∈N , i 6= S j,D j,
−z j for i = D j
∀ j ∈J , (B.1b)
ve = ∑
j∈J
v j,e, ∀e ∈ E , (B.1c)
ve ≤ ke, ∀e ∈ E , (B.1d)
ve ≥ 0, ∀e ∈ E . (B.1e)
Constraints (B.1b) ensure demand is delivered from origin S j to destination D j for all OD
pairs j ∈J . Constraints (B.1c) determine the total flow on each arc in the network.
Constraints (B.1d) enforce the capacity restrictions for the arcs. Constraints (B.1e) ensure
that the demand allocated to an arc is non-negative. The arc-based formulation has |J |+
|E |+ |J ||E | decision variables and |N ||J |+2|E | constraints.
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B.2 Proofs of Theorems
B.2.1 Proof of Theorem 3
Proof of Theorem 3. Define L̃(z,y) = max z≥0
z j=∑p∈P j xp






























Because we apply Online Supergradient Ascent on a sequence of L̃(z,yt) which is strongly





















We have shown previously that x and y which solve MCMCF in (3.11) are identical to
x and y which solve miny≥0 max x≥0
∑p∈P j xp=z j
L(x,y). Therefore, from definition of xt and yt
in Algorithm 8, we have




∑p∈P j xp=z j,t
L(x,y) = max
x≥0






L(xt ,y) = max
x≥0
∑p∈P j xp=z j,t
L(x,yt). (B.3)
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By definition of L̃, we know that
L̃(zt ,yt) = max
x≥0
∑p∈P j xp=z j,t
L(x,yt) = L(xt ,yt). (B.4)


































where (B.5) follows the feasibility of x∗, (B.6) follows the convexity in y, and (B.7) follows









































L(xt ,yt)−T L(x∗,y∗), (B.11)
where (B.9) follows the feasibility of y∗, (B.10) follows the concavity of L in x, and (B.11)
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L(xt ,yt)−L(x∗,y∗)≤ 0. (B.12)
Combining (B.8) and (B.12), we can conclude that







B.2.2 Proof of Theorem 4
Proof of Theorem 4. Let xp = ρ j(p)z j for all p ∈P j, j ∈J , ∑p∈P j ρ j(p) = 1 for all
j ∈ J and ρ j(p) ≥ 0 for all p ∈ P j, j ∈ J . We define H(z,y∗) = ∑ j∈J r j(z j)−
∑e∈E ce ∑ j∈J ∑p∈P j δe(p)ρ j(p)z j +∑e∈E y
∗
e(ke−∑ j∈J ∑p∈P j δe(p)ρ j(p)z j). That is, we



























































where the last equation follows from Jensen’s inequality because ‖·‖2 is convex. Therefore,
we have







Lemma 13. Let x∗ = argmaxx∈X f (x). When f is β -smooth, under Algorithm 5, we have







Proof of Lemma 13. Since f is β -smooth, we have




= f (xs)+∇ f (xs)>(xs + γs(ws− xs)− xs)−
β
2
‖xs + γs(ws− xs)− xs‖2














where (B.13) follows the definition of zs and (B.14) holds because f is concave.





Let ∆s = f (x∗)− f (xs). (B.15) can be re-written as




When ∆s = 2s+2 . We can show by induction that ∆s ≤
2βR2
s+2 for s = 0,1, . . .. For base case
(s = 0), we have γ0 = 1, and hence, ∆1 ≤ βR
2
2 ≤ βR
2. Assume that ∆s ≤ 2βR
2
s+2 holds for


































where the inequality (B.16) holds because (s+2)2 ≥ (s+1)(s+3).
Lemma 14 (Theorem 3.3 in Hazan (2016)). For any sequences of µ-strongly convex func-













where ‖∇ f (x)‖ ≤ G for all x ∈ X.
Algorithm 12 Best Response
Input: T
for t = 0,1,2, . . . ,T do
Set xt ← argminx∈X `t(x)











Proof of Lemma 15. From the description of Best Response, for t = 1, . . . ,T , we have

















DYNAMIC PRICING AND MATCHING IN TWO-SIDED QUEUES
C.1 MDP Analysis
C.1.1 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof of Proposition 4. Since the delay-sensitive model and the holding cost model have
the same states, actions, and transition rates, a control policy π induces the same stationary
distribution under the two models. Let (λπ(q),µπ(q)) be the arrival rates under this policy
when the system state is q, and let Eπ [·] be the expectation operator under the stationary







































































































The last step applies Little’s Law:
E[λ πj (q)]Eπ [w
(c)
j (q)] = E
π [q(c)j ] and E
π [µπi (q)]Eπ [w
(s)
i (q))] = E
π [q(s)i ].
Note that the last line of the above equation is the long-run average profit under the holding
cost model, so the proof is complete.
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C.1.2 Monotonicity of the Optimal Prices (Single-Link Two-Sided Queues)
In this section, we consider a special case with n= 1 and m= 1, i.e., a single-link two-sided
queue given in Figure C.1. The goal of this section is to analyze the optimal pricing policy
for this special case, which will motivate our pricing policies for more complex systems.
Customer Server
Figure C.1: A single-link two-sided queue.
In single-link systems, there is no incentive for the system operator to hold customers or
servers. Whenever possible, we should match the incoming arrival immediately. Thus, at
any point of time, there can only be either customers or servers waiting in the system. This
enables up to reduce the state space by letting q = q(c)− q(s), the difference between the
number of customers and servers waiting in the system. Note that q can be either positive
























,∀q ∈ S (C.1)
where c is a uniformization parameter (see Definition 3) and S denotes the state space. (We
omit the subscripts for customer and server types, since n = m = 1). We now present the
monotonicity result below.
Proposition 12. For a single-link two-sided queue, there exists an optimal pricing policy
p(q)= (p(s)(q), p(c)(q)), where both the server price p(s)(q) and the customer price p(c)(q)
increases monotonically with the system state q.
This result motivates us to search for the optimal pricing policy in the restricted space
of monotonic pricing policies, which will be presented in Section C.1.3.
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To prove Proposition 12, we first show that the difference of the optimal bias functions,
∆h(q) ∆= h(q)−h(q−1), is monotonically decreasing in q. We consider the relative value
iteration method to compute h(q). The relative value iteration starts with an arbitrary initial
value h0(q); therefore we choose an initial bias function such that ∆h0(q) is decreasing. We
also choose any fixed state q0 ∈ S, say, q0 = 0. In each iteration k = 1,2, · · · , for all q ∈ S,










































As k→ ∞, we have hk(q)→ h(q). Now we will first present a lemma which is essential to
prove Proposition 12.
Lemma 16. The difference of the optimal bias function ∆h∗(q) that solves (C.1) is mono-
tonically decreasing in q.
Proof of Lemma 16. The proof is by induction using relative value iteration. In the base
case, as we can choose any initial bias function in the relative value iteration algorithm, we
pick a bias function such that ∆h0(q) is decreasing in q, say, h0(q) =−q.
Suppose we are at iteration k. Assume that ∆hk(q) is monotonically decreasing for all
q. We will now calculate ∆hk+1(q+ 1)−∆hk+1(q) and show that it is non-positive. The
relative value iteration step can be rewritten as
∆hk+1(q) = max
µ≥0,λ≥0
[F(λ )λ −G(µ)µ− s|q|+λ∆hk(q+1)−µ∆hk(q)]/c (C.2)
− max
µ≥0,λ≥0





+ [λ ∗(q+1)∆hk(q+2)−µ∗(q+1)∆hk(q+1)+R(µ∗(q+1),λ ∗(q+1))]/c
−2 [λ ∗(q)∆hk(q+1)−µ∗(q)∆hk(q)+R(µ∗(q),λ ∗(q))]/c
+[λ ∗(q−1)∆hk(q)−µ∗(q−1)∆hk(q−1)+R(µ∗(q−1),λ ∗(q−1))]/c, (C.3)
where (λ ∗(q0),µ∗(q0)) maximizes the Bellman equation (C.2) and R(µ∗(q),λ ∗(q)) is
equal to F(λ ∗(q))λ ∗(q)−G(µ∗(q))µ∗(q)−s|q|. Because (λ ∗(q),µ∗(q)) is the maximizer
for state q, we have
R(µ∗(q),λ ∗(q))+λ ∗(q)∆hk(q+1)−µ∗(q)∆hk(q)
≥R(µ∗(q+ i),λ ∗(q+ i))+λ ∗(q+ i)∆hk(q+1)−µ∗(q+ i)∆hk(q) for i ∈ {−1,1}.
(C.4)















Since the uniformization constant is chosen as c≥ λmax+µmax, we have 1−µ∗(q+1)/c−
λ ∗(q−1)/c≥ 0 for all q. By the induction hypothesis in iteration k, ∆hk(q+1)−∆hk(q)≤
0 for all q. Thus, the last line of the above inequality is nonpositive.
This proves that the relative value iteration step preserves the monotonicity of ∆hk(q).
As k→∞, ∆hk(q) converges to ∆h∗(q). Since the limit of a decreasing function is decreas-
ing, ∆h∗(q) is monotonically decreasing.
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Proof of Proposition 12. The equation to be maximize in (C.1) is separable in λ and µ .
The domain of λ is [0,λmax] and the domain of µ is [0,µmax]. By Assumption 2, it is also
concave in λ and µ . Thus, (λ ∗,µ∗) is an optimal solution to (C.1) either if it is on the
boundary of the domain or if it satisfies the first order necessary condition.
First, we consider the boundary case. We will show that if λ ∗(q0) = 0 for some q0, then
λ ∗(q) = 0 for all q > q0. Suppose λ ∗(q0) = 0. Then we have
F(λ )λ +∆h∗(q0)λ ≤ 0, ∀λ ∈ [0,λmax].
By Lemma 16, ∆h∗(q) is decreasing in q, so
F(λ )λ +∆h∗(q0 + k)λ = F(λ )λ +∆h∗(q0)λ +(∆h∗(q0 + k)−∆h∗(q0))λ
≤ (∆h∗(q0 + k)−∆h∗(q0))λ
≤ 0, ∀k ≥ 1.
The above inequality implies that λ ∗(q0+k) = 0. Similarly, if λ ∗(q0) = λmax then λ ∗(q) =
λmax for all q < q0. To see this, suppose
F(λ )λ +∆h∗(q0)λ ≤ F(λmax)λmax +∆h∗(q0)λmax, ∀λ ∈ [0,λmax].
For any k ≥ 1, adding (∆h∗(q0− k)−∆h∗(q0))λ on both sides of the above inequality, we
get
F(λ )λ +∆h(q0− k)λ ≤ F(λmax)λmax +∆h∗(q0)λmax +(∆h∗(q0− k)−∆h∗(q0))λ
≤ F(λmax)λmax +∆h∗(q0)λmax +(∆h∗(q0− k)−∆h∗(q0))λmax
= F(λmax)λmax +∆h∗(q0− k)λmax,
where the second inequality follows as λmax ≥ λ and ∆h∗(q0− k)−∆h∗(q0) ≥ 0. Thus,
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λ ∗(q) = λmax is the maximizer for all q < q0. Using the same argument, we can show that
if µ∗(q0) = µmax then µ(q)∗ = µmax for all q ≥ q0; if µ∗(q0) = 0 then µ∗(q) = 0 for all
q≤ q0.
We now consider the case when the optimal solution in (C.1) is in the interior of the
domain, i.e., λmax > λ ∗(q) > 0 and µmax > µ∗(q) > 0. By the first-order condition, we
have
[F(λ ∗(q))λ ∗(q)]′+∆h∗(q+1) = 0,
[G(µ∗(q))µ∗(q)]′+∆h∗(q) = 0.
Note that the derivatives are well defined because F and G are differentiable by Assump-
tion 1. Since ∆h∗(q) is monotonically decreasing in q by Lemma 16, it implies that
[F(λ ∗(q))λ ∗(q)]′ and [G(µ∗(q))µ∗(q)]′ are monotonically increasing in q. By Assump-
tion 2, [F(λ )λ ]′ is decreasing in λ and [G(µ)µ]′ is increasing in µ . Thus, by the chain
rule, λ ∗(q) is monotonically decreasing in q and µ∗(q) is monotonically increasing in q
when λmax > λ ∗ > 0 and µmax > µ∗ > 0.
Combining the boundary case and the interior case, we prove that λ ∗(q) is monotoni-
cally decreasing in q. As the demand curve is monotonically decreasing by Assumption 1,
the optimal customer price (p(c))∗(q) is monotonically increasing. Also, µ∗(q) is mono-
tonically increasing in q. As the supply curve is monotonically increasing by Assumption
1, the optimal server price (p(s))∗(q) is monotonically increasing.
C.1.3 LP-based Approximation Algorithm
Throughout this section, we assume the queue length is bounded by some fixed constant.
Specifically, we assume that the state space is given by S= {q∈Zm+n : 0≤q≤ 1m+nqmax}
for some qmax < ∞. The Bellman equation (4.3) for the uniformized DTMDP defined in the
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subject to γ ≥R(q,z)+ cE[h(q′) | q,z]− ch(q) ∀q,z ∈ S×Z(q), (C.6)
where R(q,z) is the expected profit (see Equation (4.2)) and E[h(q′) | q,z] is the expec-
tation of the bias function after one transition. However, it is difficult to solve this linear
program directly, since it has a separate decision variable h(q) for each state q, and the
number of constraints in (C.6) is equal to the number of state-action pairs. Due to the curse
of dimensionality, the state space will increase exponentially with the customer and server
types.
Polynomial Bias Function Approximation.
We consider an approximation of the MDP in the value space. In particular, we approximate































for some degree r ∈ Z+. Here, bl is a vector (b
(s)
l1
, . . . ,b(s)ln ,b
(c)
l1
, . . . ,b(c)lm ) for all l ∈ [r].
If we apply this approximation to the linear programming formulation (C.5), it in fact
leads to an upper bound approximation of the original MDP (see e.g. Adelman, 2007).
Proposition 13. Suppose h(q) is replaced with ∑rl=1
〈
bl,q
l〉 in the optimization problem
(C.5). The optimal objective value is an upper bound of the optimal average cost of the
original MDP.
Proof of Proposition 13. Rewriting the Bellman equation using the approximation of the
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bias function gives us the following semi-infinite linear program:
min γ














The decision variables in the above optimization problem are γ and bl ∀l ∈ [r]. Let the










Since h(q) and γ∗ are a feasible solution to the optimization problem (C.5), the optimal
value of (C.5) is less than or equal to γ∗.
By approximating the bias function by a polynomial function of degree r, the number
of variables is reduced from qm+nmax to (m+n)× r. We will later see that this approximation
reduces the computational time of the semi-infinite linear program drastically. As the de-
gree of the polynomial r increases, the upper bound becomes tighter. Therefore, r can be
selected to balance the trade-off between approximation accuracy and the computational
time.
Matching Policy under Value Function Approximation.
We now focus on matching policies when h(q) is approximated by polynomial functions,
in particular, linear and quadratic functions. We denote by (λ∗(q),µ∗(q)) the optimal
















, ∀q ∈ S.
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∀q ∈ S. (C.8)
Suppose we approximate the bias functions by linear functions, say, h(q) = 〈−b,q〉 for





















































Note that we ignore terms that are independent of x in the second to last equality. Thus,
the optimal matching decision is given by a maximum-weight bipartite matching problem
with fixed (vertex) weights b and feasibility set X(q).
Alternatively, suppose we approximate the bias function by a quadratic function of









































































We consider two cases. If X(q) = {0}, namely, there is no feasible matching given
state q, then we trivially have x∗(q) = 0. Otherwise, if X(q) 6= {0}, then there exists a




> 0, which means that x= 0 cannot
be a maximizer of the above equation. This means that under quadratic value function
approximation, customers and servers should be matched instantly when they arrive. Recall









= 1+1= 2 when X(q) 6= {0}.


































































i (q)) dominates either λ
∗
j (q) or µ
∗
i (q), especially when n and m are large. This
approximation leads to the max-weight matching policy defined in Section 4.2.3.
Constraint Generation Algorithm.
In this section, we use the constraint generation technique to solve the optimization problem
(C.5) given approximated bias functions. The constraint generation steps are described in
Algorithm 13.
Algorithm 13 Constraint Generation with Bias Function Approximation
initialization: b0l = 0, ∀l ∈ [r],γ
0 =−∞,k = 0,ε =+∞
2: initialize master LP: {minγ,subject to ∅} Master Problem: (LP0)
while ε > tolerance do















δ k(q)←maxz∈Z(q)T k(q,z) # Sub-Problem
6: if δ k(q)> γk then
qk,zk = argmaxq,zT k(q,z)
8: add the constraint γ ≥ T k(qk,zk) to the master LP (LPk)
let (γk+1,bk+1l ∀l ∈ [r]) be the solution to (LP
k) # Master-Problem
10: ε ← γk+1− γk
k← k+1
12: output: γ ← γk,bl ← bkl , ∀l ∈ [r]
The algorithm starts with some initial values of the weights b, say b= 0. The algorithm
also maintains a master LP that approximates (C.5). In each iteration, the algorithm finds a























If the optimal value of the above subproblem is larger than the optimal value of the master-
problem, then a violating constraint is found and added to the master-problem. We then
solve the master-problem to get the updated values of bl ∀l ∈ [r] and γ . This process is




We present some simulation results obtained by approximating the bias function by poly-
nomial functions. Figure C.2 shows the pricing policy obtained by linear and quadratic
approximation of the bias function, as well as the optimal pricing policy. We observe that
both linear and quadratic approximation result in pricing policies that are monotonic, which
is consistent with the monotonic structure of the optimal pricing policy. As the penalty co-
efficient s increases, the approximation error becomes larger.
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Figure C.2: Comparison of pricing policies with bias approximation s = 0.05 (left) and
s = 0.01 (right).
In the linear approximation case, we also compare the solution from the constraint
generation algorithm to the least squares fit of the exact bias function. Our experiment uses
both constant elasticity supply/demand functions and linear supply/demand function. The
result is presented in Tables C.1 and C.2. We observe again that the approximation error
increases with s. We can also see that the optimal objective value γ obtained by constraint
generation is an upper bound on the optimal value of the MDP. This verifies Proposition 13.
C.2 Asymptotic Optimality of the Fluid Pricing Policy
C.2.1 Proof of Proposition 5
First note that, under a given pricing and matching policy, if E[q(c)j ] = +∞ for some j ∈M
or E[q(s)i ] = +∞ for some i ∈ N, then R(q,z) = −∞ and the theorem is trivially true, as
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Table C.1: Comparison of constraint generation solution with the optimal solution with
constant elasticity supply and demand curves.
s
Cons. Generation Least Squares Fit % Error
b0 b1 γ b0 b1 γ b0 b1
0.01 -1.73 -0.007 3.07 -1.69 -0.008 3.03 2% 10%
0.02 -1.73 -0.010 3.07 -1.80 -0.013 3.03 4% 25%
0.05 -1.73 -0.013 3.06 -1.89 -0.019 3.03 9% 34%
0.1 -1.73 -0.014 3.06 -2.05 -0.025 2.95 16% 43%
0.2 -1.73 -0.016 3.06 -2.59 -0.034 2.8 24% 53%
0.5 -1.73 -0.017 3.06 -2.59 -0.051 2.48 33% 67%
Table C.2: Comparison of constraint generation solution with the solution with linear sup-
ply and demand curves.
s
Cons. Generation Least Squares Fit % Error
b0 b1 γ b0 b1 γ b0 b1
0.01 -0.014 -2.49 3.11 -0.016 -2.51 3.06 12% 1%
0.02 -0.020 -2.49 3.10 -0.023 -2.51 3.02 13% 1%
0.05 -0.032 -2.48 3.09 -0.037 -2.52 2.93 14% 1%
0.1 -0.048 -2.48 3.07 -0.054 -2.53 2.81 12% 2%
0.2 -0.071 -2.46 3.04 -0.081 -2.55 2.63 12% 3%
0.5 -0.121 -2.44 2.98 -0.144 -2.58 2.24 16% 5%
the optimal objective function value (4.6a) is greater than or equal to 0 because λ̃ = 0m
and µ̃ = 0n is a feasible solution of the fluid optimization problem. So without loss of
generality, we assume that all queue lengths have finite expectations.
We will now show the following lemma.
Lemma 17. For any stationary pricing and matching policy under which the system is
stable and E[q(s)i ]< ∞,E[q
(c)
j ]< ∞ for all i ∈ N, j ∈M, the expectation of actions E[λ(q)],
E[µ(q)] and c ·E[y(q)] satisfy the constraints in the fluid LP (4.6b)–(4.6d).
Proof of Lemma 17. We consider the uniformized DTMC induced by a pricing and match-




where the expectation is with respect to the stationary distribution of the uniformized
DTMC. Let a(k) be the new arrival at period k and let x(k) be the matching decision at pe-
riod k. (Recall that y(k) ∈ Znm+ represents the matching decision for each customer-server
pair and x(k)∈Zn+m+ represents the number of matches for each customer and server type.)
We can rewrite the stability condition as
E[a(k)] = E[x(k)].
Thus, we have
cE[x(k)] = cE[a(k)] = cE [E[a(k) | q(k)]] = (E[λ(q(k))],E[µ(q(k))]) ,
where λ(q(k)) and µ(q(k)) are the arrival rates under the given pricing policy in state q(k).










yi j(k)≤ q(s)i (k) ∀i ∈ N,
yi j(k) = 0 ∀(i, j) /∈ E.
Since the matching policy is stationary, the expectation of the matching decision will not
depend on k. Taking expectation on both sides with respect to the stationary distribution
and defining χi j
∆

















< ∞ ∀ j ∈M,

















= χi j(k) = 0 ∀(i, j) /∈ E.
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Thus, for any pricing and matching policy under which the system is stable, the expectation
of actions satisfy the constraints (4.6b)–(4.6d).
Proof of Proposition 5. Note that the Uniformized DTMC is aperiodic as we will always
have transition from a state back to itself. By the ergodic theorem for Markov chains, the
long run average profit for a given policy is E[R(q,z)]. Also, we have
E[R(q,z)]≤ E[〈F(λ),λ〉−〈G(µ),µ〉]≤ 〈F(E[λ]),E[λ]〉−〈G(E[µ]),E[µ]〉 ,
where the first inequality holds by excluding waiting costs, and the second inequality fol-
lows from Jensen’s Inequality and Assumption 2. Thus, the optimal value of the fluid
problem (4.6a) provides an upper bound for the average profit under any stationary pric-
ing and matching policy. By Lemma 17, a given policy should also satisfy the constraints
(4.6b)–(4.6d).
C.2.2 Proof of Theorem 5














+ 〈s,E[q]〉 . (C.11)






2. Consider the unformized DTMC under the fluid pricing and max-weight
matching policy. Suppose q is the system state in any given period after the matching
decision x (or equivalently, y) has been taken. Similarly, let q′ be the state in the next
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period after the matching decision has been taken. We have
ηc
(
















































































































































































































The first equality holds because the next arrival is a customer of type j with probability
ηλ ∗j /(ηc), and is a server of type i with probability ηµ
∗
i /(ηc). The second equality fol-
lows as yi j ∈ {0,1}. The first inequality follows from the fact that (1−∑ni=1 yi j)≤ 1 for all
j ∈ M and ∑mj=1 yi j ≤ 1 for all i ∈ N, because there can be at most one matching in each
period under the max-weight policy. The third equality follows from the definition of the
max-weight matching policy (4.5). The last equality follows because (λ∗,µ∗,χ∗) is the
optimal solution to the fluid model and satisfies (4.6b)–(4.6d).
We take expectation with respect to the steady state distribution of q. As q ≤ 1qηmax,
V (c)(q) is bounded, so E[V (c)(q)] is finite. By the assumption of that q follows the steady
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state distribution, we have E[V (c)(q′)−V (c)(q)] = 0, so the expectation of the left hand




























































































}.) The third inequality holds because max j′∈N(i) q(c)j′ ≥ q(c)j for
all j such that (i, j) ∈ E. By substituting qηmax = γ
√
η in (C.14) for an arbitrary positive





















































of (C.11) is O(1/
√
η).
Now we will bound the second term in (C.11). The queue length q under the fluid
pricing policy always satisfies q ≤ 1n+mqηmax. Thus, it is trivially true that 〈s,E[q]〉 ≤
qηmax 〈1n+m,s〉= γ
√





















C.2.3 Proof of Proposition 6
Proof of Proposition 6. To prove the lower bound of profit loss, we only need to consider
single-link queues, that is, n = m = 1. In the proof, we omitted the subscript for the type
of customers and servers. Under the fluid pricing policy, the steady state distribution of
q = q(c)− q(s) is uniform in [−qηmax,qηmax], as q behaves like a symmetric simple random
walk. Thus, the expected value of the sum of queue length q(s)+q(c) can be computed in








The probabilities of q(s) = qηmax and q(c) = q
η
max are




























The inequalities above show that the profit loss is minimized with respect to η if qηmax =
γ
√
η for some positive constant γ . To see this, if qηmax = γη0.5+ε for some ε > 0, then
due to the second term in (C.16), Lη = Θ(η0.5+ε). On the other hand if φ ηmax = γη0.5−ε




η in (C.16), the optimal profit loss is Lη = Θ(
√
η).
C.3 Asymptotic Optimality of the Two-Price Policy
C.3.1 Proof of Lemma 1












Consider the uniformized DTMC for the η th scaled system under the two-price pricing
policy. Suppose q is the system state after the matching decision x (or equivalently, y) has
been taken. We use q′ to denote the state in the next period. The drift of V (c)(q) after one
192




































































































































































































































Under the max-weight matching policy, new arrivals are immediately matched to compati-
ble counterparts if their queues are nonempty. Thus, ∑ni=1 yi j and yi j (for all j) are either 1
or 0. Step (a) then follows from the fact that (1−∑ni=1 yi j)2 = 1−∑ni=1 yi j and (yi j)2 = yi j.
Step (b) holds because ηλ ∗j −θ jση1{q(c)j >τηmax} < ηλ ∗j as θ jση > 0 and 1−∑ni=1 yi j ≤ 1,
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and because ηµ∗i −φiση1{q(s)i >τηmax}< ηµ∗i as φiση > 0 and ∑mj=1 yi j ≤ 1. Step (c) follows
from the definition of the max-weight policy in (4.5). In Eq (C.17), the event q(s)i > τ
η
max
implies that all compatible types of i have empty queues. Similarly, the event q(c)j > τ
η
max
implies that all compatible types of j have empty queues. Then, step (d) follows from the
definition of the optimal fluid solution (λ∗,µ∗,ξ∗) given by (4.6). Lastly, step (e) follows
because q(c)j ≤max j′:(i, j′)∈E q
(c)
j′ .
By the same argument, we can bound the drift of V (s)(q) by
ηc
(
E[V (s)(q′) | q]−V (s)(q)
)







































where B ∆= 2η 〈1m,λ∗〉+2η 〈1n,µ∗〉> 0 is a positive constant that is independent of q.
Consider the following finite set:
Bη =
{













∀i ∈ N, j ∈M
}
.




E[V (q′) | q]−V (s)(q)
)
≤−B, ∀q /∈Bη . (C.21)
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Thus, by the Foster-Lyapunov theorem (Srikant and Ying, 2014), the uniformized DTMC
under the two-price and max-weight policy is positive recurrent for any η . The first half of
the lemma is proved.
To prove the second half of the lemma, we apply the moment bound theorem (Hajek,


























where the expectation is taken over the stationary distribution under the two-price and max-








} and then using the fact that
E[q(s)i 1{q(s)i ≤τηmax}]≤ τηmax, we get the desired result.
C.3.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Before proving Lemma 2, we first prove the following claim.
Claim 1. Consider a pricing and matching policy that has the following form:
λ j(q) = ηλ
∗
j + f̃ j(q,η) ∀ j ∈M, (C.22)
µi(q) = ηµ
∗
i + g̃i(q,η) ∀i ∈ N. (C.23)




























ξi j χ̄ i j1χ∗i j=0,
where χ̄ i j and ξi j are some nonnegative constants.
Proof of Claim 1. Denote the objective function (4.6a) of the fluid model by rη : Rm+n→
R. Denote the left-hand sides of the constraints (4.6b)–(4.6c) by h : Rm+n+mn → Rm+n.
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Recall that (ηλ∗,ηµ∗,ηχ∗) is an optimal solution to the fluid problem. Since the fluid
problem is convex and satisfies Slater’s condition, by the KKT conditions, there exists
Lagrange multipliers κ ∈ Rm+n and ξ ∈ Rm×n+ such that
∇rη(ηλ∗,ηµ∗,ηχ∗)+∇h(ηλ∗,ηµ∗,ηχ∗)>κ+ ∑
(i, j)∈E
ξi jei j + ∑
(i, j)/∈E





ηF ′(λ∗)λ∗+ηF(λ∗), −ηG′(µ∗)µ∗−ηG(µ∗), 0
)
and ei j ∈ Rm+n+mn is a vector with the component m+ n+ (i, j) being 1 and all other
components being 0.
Let λ̄ = E[λ(q)], µ̄ = E[µ(q)]. Since the system is positive recurrent under the given
policy, by Lemma 17, there exists a vector χ̄ such that the constraints (4.6b)–(4.6d) of the
fluid model are satisfied. We define a vector d ∈ Rn+m+mn given by
d= (ηλ∗,ηµ∗,ηχ∗)− (λ̄, µ̄, χ̄) = (−E[f̃(q,η)], −E[g̃(q,η)], ηχ∗− χ̄).
Because the function h is linear, it holds that
〈∇h,d〉= h(ηλ∗,ηµ∗,ηχ∗)−h(λ̄, µ̄, χ̄) = 0. (C.25)
By complementary slackness, we have
ξi j(ηχ
∗
i j− χ̄i j) =−ξi j χ̄i j1χ∗i j=0, ∀(i, j) ∈ E. (C.26)
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Moreover, since χ∗i j = 0 and χ̄i j = 0 for all (i, j) /∈ E, we have
ξi j(ηχ
∗
i j− χ̄i j)=0, ∀(i, j) /∈ E. (C.27)
Thus, by taking the inner product on both the side by d in (C.24) and using (C.25), (C.26)
and (C.27), we get the desired result.
Proof of Lemma 2. According to definition of the two-price policy (4.9), for all j ∈M, we
have































Similarly, for all i ∈ N, we have







Define a vector d ∈ Rn+m+mn given by
d= (ηλ∗,ηµ∗,ηχ̄∗)− (E[λ(q)],E[µ(q)],E[y(q)]),
where y(q) ∈ Rmn+ is the matching decision under the two-price policy in state q. We let
χT Pi j = E[yi j(q)].
By Lemma 1, the system is positive recurrent under the two-price policy for any θη >
0m, φη > 0n and ση with E[〈1m+n,q〉] < ∞. Also, the two-price policy falls under the
197























































where the last inequality follows from Theorem 10.5 of Schrijver (1998).
C.3.3 Proof of Theorem 6
Proof of Theorem 6. We will first calculate the profit loss given by (4.8) as follows:
Lη = γη∗ − (γη −〈s,E[q]〉)

















































































































We apply Taylor’s theorem to the terms Fj(λ ∗j − θ jση/η) and Gi(µ∗i − φiση/η). For





















































































where the last equality holds because (ση)2/η = η1/3. Similar inequality holds for the
































By Lemma 2, we can simplify the first two terms in the above equation and get





+O(η1/3)+ 〈s,E[q]〉 . (C.29)


























































j } > 0,
we haveE[〈s,q〉]=O(η1/3). By substituting this term in (C.29) and substituting ση =η1/3,
we have the desired result.
C.4 Lower Bounds
C.4.1 Proof of Theorem 7
First, we will present a lemma that provides a lower bound on the expected value of the
sum of the queue length E [〈1n+m,q〉].




























≥ ε ∀η > M . (C.31)













Now, we will define a new DTMC {z̃(k) : k ∈ Z+} and couple it with the uniformized
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DTMC {q(k),z(k) : k ∈ Z+} with uniformization constant c such that |z(k)| ≥ z̃(k) for all
k ∈ Z+ for all η ≥ 1 if z(0) = z̃(0).























Figure C.3: Coupled Birth and Death Process
















/c if j = i+1, ∀ j ∈ Z+, ∀i > 0,
P̃η11
∆
= 1− (〈1n,µ∗〉+ 〈1m,λ∗〉)/c if j = i, ∀ j ∈ Z+, ∀i > 0,(
〈1m,λ∗〉− (〈1n,N〉+ 〈1m,M〉)ηβ−1
)





/c if j = 0, i = 0,
0 otherwise,
where c is the uniformization constant given by Definition 3. See Figure C.3 for an illus-
tration of the new DTMC. Note that, under Condition 1(a), we have P̃ηi j ≥ Pr[|z(k+ 1)| =
j, ||z(k)|= i, q(k) = q̄] for all q̄ ∈ S if j < i and P̃ηi j ≤ Pr[|z(k+1)|= j, ||z(k)|= i, q(k) =
q̄] for all q̄ ∈ S if j > i for all η > 0. Thus, we can couple these system using a common
source of randomness, such that z̃(k) ≤ |z(k)| for all k ∈ Z+ on each sample path. Hence,
we have Pr[z̃(k)≤K ]≥ Pr[z(k)≤K ] for all k≥ 1 and K ∈R Thus, in the limit as k→∞,
we have Pr[z̃(∞) ≤K ] ≥ Pr[z(∞) ≤K ] where, z̃(∞) and z(∞) denotes random variables
following the stationary distributions of {z̃(k) : k ≥ 1} and {z(k) : k ≥ 1}, respectively. So,
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we have
E [z̃(∞)]≤ E [|z(∞)|] . (C.33)
































where the second equality uses the definition of P̃ηi j above and the fact that 〈1n,µ∗〉 =
〈1m,λ∗〉. Finally, note that |z| ≤ 〈1n+m,q〉. Thus, we have




where the second inequality uses (C.33) and the last equality uses (C.34). This completes
the first part of the proof.
Next, as z̃(∞)≤ |z(∞)| almost surely, for any constant K , we have























= 1(n+m)K+1 = 1.


































and the first inequality follows from the Bernoulli’s inequality, which says that (1+ x)r ≥
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1 if α +β < 1,
b if α +β = 1,
where the first equality holds because the limit of the product of two sequences is equal
to the product of the limits of the two sequences. Thus, when Condition 1(b) is satisfied,
namely α +β ≤ 1, for any given bδ 2 > ε > 0, there exists a constant M such that for all
η > M , it holds that
Pr [|z(∞)|> (n+m)Kηα ]≥ ε
δ 2
.
By the definition of z in Eq (C.34), the event
{|z|> (n+m)Kηα} ⊂ {‖q‖∞ > Kηα} .


















≥ δ 2 ∀q : ‖q‖∞ > kηα .


























Claim 2. It holds that
A j
∆























i )> 0 ∀i ∈ N.











|F ′′j (λ̃ j(q))−F ′′j (λ ∗j )|< c̃ ∀ j ∈M,
sup
q∈S
|G′′i (µ̃i(q))−G′′i (µ∗i )|< c̃ ∀i ∈ N.
Proof of Claim 2. As−Fj(λ j)λ j for all j ∈M and Gi(µi)µi for all i ∈ N are strictly convex






= 2A j > 0 ∀ j ∈M,
d2
dµ2i
(Gi(µi)µi) = 2Bi > 0 ∀i ∈ N.





}> 0, there exists δ ′ > 0
such that for any l ∈ [λ ∗j −δ ′,λ ∗j +δ ′] we have
|F ′′j (l)−F ′′j (λ ∗j )|< c̃.
As β < 1, we have ηβ−1 → 0 as η → ∞. Consider η ′ such that for all η > η ′ we have




|F ′′j (λ̃ j(q))−F ′′j (λ ∗j )|< c̃.
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The proof for G′′i (µ) is similar.
Proof of Theorem 7. Without loss of generality, we can assume that
E[〈1n+m,q〉]< ∞; (C.35)
otherwise, the holding cost will be infinity and the lower bound holds trivially. We calculate
the profit loss and use Lemma 18 to lower bound the expected queue length. We have


























































where the second equality follows from the definition of the asymptotic regime (Definition
4) and the assumptions on the pricing policy Equation (4.10). Now, we will use Taylor’s

















































































































































































































































































































2 can be simplified







































































































[∣∣∣∣ f 3( qηα )
∣∣∣∣]+E[∣∣∣∣g3( qηα )
∣∣∣∣]) .




































For simplicity, we let K1 = (〈1m, |F ′′(λ∗)|〉+ 〈1n, |G′′(µ∗)|〉+ 2c̃)/2. Finally, A4 can be
lower bounded using Lemma 18. Combining everything, for all η >η ′ (recall the definition






































[∣∣∣∣g3i ( qηα )
∣∣∣∣]
)




































































where the last equality follows as the coefficient of the terms η2β−1 and η1−β are strictly














and the proof is complete.
C.4.2 Proof of Proposition 7
Lemma 19. Under the hypothesis of Proposition 7, if α +β > 1, there exists c̃1 > 0, c̃2 > 0





























where f (q/ηα) =−θ1{q(c)≥ηα} and g(q/η
α) =−φ1{q(s)≥ηα}.












where q = q(c)−q(s). Also, we have min{q(c),q(s)}= 0 for single-link queues. Consider a












Because λ̃ (q)≤ λ (q) and µ̃(q)≥ µ(q) for all q≥ 0 and λ̃ (q)≥ λ (q) and µ̃(q)≤ µ(q) for
all q ≥ 0, we can couple the two systems such that |q̃(t)| ≤ |q(t)| for all t ≥ 1. Thus, we
have Pr[|q(t)| ≤K ]≤ Pr[|q̃(t)| ≤K ] for all t ∈Z+. Since {q(t) : t ≥ 0} is irreducible and
positive recurrent by assumption and {q̃(t) : t ≥ 0} has only one irreducible and positive
recurrent class by construction, the stationary distributions exist for both q and q̃. We have
Pr[|q(∞)| ≤K ]≤ Pr[|q̃(∞)| ≤K ] ∀K ∈ R ⇒ E[|q(∞)|]≥ E[|q̃(∞)|],
where q(∞) and q̃(∞) are random variables following the stationary distributions of {q(t) :













where (q(s)(∞),q(c)(∞)) are random variables which follows the stationary distributions of
{q(s)(t),q(c)(t) : t ≥ 0}. The first equality follows as |q(t)| = q(s)(t) + q(c)(t) a.s. This
proves the first inequality in the lemma.
Now, we will lower bound Pr[|q| ≥ ηα ] for a given two-price policy. Since λ ∗ = µ∗,
the stationary distribution under a given two-price policy denoted by {πi}i∈Z is given by
πk =

















Pr[|q(∞)| ≥ ηα ] = η
1−β (µ∗/θ +λ ∗/φ)









1−α−β ∀η ≥ 1,























≥min{θ 2,φ 2}Pr [|q(∞)| ≥ ηα ]≥ c̃1η1−α−β .
Thus, the second inequality of the lemma is proved.
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Similarly, we have
Pr[|q(∞)| ≥ ηα ]≤ η
1−α−β (µ∗/θ +λ ∗/φ)
η1−α−β (µ∗/θ +λ ∗/φ)+2−η−α
≤(µ∗/θ +λ ∗/φ)η1−α−β ∆= c̃2
max{θ 3,φ 3}
η
1−α−β ∀η ≥ 1,
where we replace dηαe by ηα in the first inequality, and the second inequality follows as
α ≥ 0 and 1−α−β < 0. This implies that
E
[∣∣∣∣ f 3( qηα
)∣∣∣∣]+E[∣∣∣∣g3( qηα
)∣∣∣∣]= θ 3 Pr[q(c)(∞)≥ ηα]+φ 3 Pr[q(s)(∞)≥ ηα]
≤max{θ 3,φ 3}Pr [|q(∞)| ≥ ηα ]≤ c̃2η1−α−β .
This proves the last inequality of the lemma.
Proof of Proposition 7. When α +β ≤ 1, by Theorem 7, we know that Lη ≥ Kη1/3. So
we will only prove Proposition 7 when α +β > 1. As the two-price policy is a special case




























































































where the infimum is achieved when α = 1/3, β = 2/3.
C.5 Further Analysis on Max-Weight Matching
Proof of Lemma 3. By the CRP condition, there exists a constant δ > 0 such that for all

















j −δ . (C.40)




















χi j, ∀i ∈ N (C.41b)
χi j = 0, ∀(i, j) /∈ E. (C.41c)




i − δn2 |N(i)|)
n
i=1
satisfy the Hall’s condition, which is implied by (C.40).
Let χ∗i j =
δ
n2 + χi j for all (i, j) ∈ E and χ
∗





















i j, ∀i ∈ N (C.42b)
χ
∗
i j = 0, ∀(i, j) /∈ E. (C.42c)
Note that (C.42) is the same as the constraints in the fluid problem (4.6), so (λ∗,µ∗,χ∗) is a
feasible solution. In addition, 〈F(λ∗),λ∗〉−〈G(µ∗),µ∗〉 is the optimal objective function
value, so (λ∗,µ∗,χ∗) is an optimal solution. As δ > 0, we have χ∗i j > 0 for all (i, j) ∈
E.

































We will first prove the following lemmas, which will assist us in proving Proposition 8 and
Proposition 9.
Lemma 20. Under any pricing policy and max-weight matching policy, for all q ∈ S, we
have












































































































































The last equality above follows because E contains edges connecting type i server to type
i customer by Condition 3. Thus, for the max-weight matching policy, either q(s)i = 0 or
q(c)i = 0.
Lemma 21. Under any pricing policy and max-weight matching policy, for all q ∈ Zm+n+ ,
we have





j − maxi′:(i′, j)∈E










Proof of Lemma 21. By the definition of T (q), we have
T (q) = ∑
(i, j)∈E
(















As the graph E is connected (implied by the CRP condition), consider a path P from imin =
mini∈N q
(s)
i to imax = maxi∈N q
(s)









































Note that, q(s)imin and q
(c)
jmin cannot both be non-zero by the definition of the max-weight algo-
rithm. Without loss of generality, we assume q(c)jmin = 0. We consider two cases:















Case II: q(s)imin > 0. This implies that q
(s)
i > 0 for all i ∈ N, so we must have q
(c)
j = 0 for all

































Lemma 22. Under any pricing policy and max-weight matching policy, the drift of U(q),
defined as ∆U(q) = (U(q(k+1))−U(q(k)))1{q(k)=q}, satisfies
|∆U(q)| ≤ 4, ∆U(q)≤ 1
2U(q)
(∆V (q)−∆Wz(q)).






































where (a) follows from Lemma 20; (b) and (c) follow by the triangle inequality; (d)
follows because projection onto a subspace is non-expansive and ‖q(l)(k+1)−q(l)(k)‖ ≤
‖q(k+1)−q(k)‖ for l ∈ {1,2}; finally, (e) follows as there can be at most one arrival and
one matching in one time epoch of the unformized DTMC. This proves the first part of the
lemma.
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where the inequality follows as h(x) =
√
x is concave and hence






We start with a lemma that established the state space collapse. Recall the definition of the
imbalance process z(k) in Eq (C.32).
Lemma 23 (State Space Collapse). Under the fluid pricing policy and max-weight match-











Proof of Lemma 23. By Lemma 22, the drift of the Lyapunov function U(q) is uniformly
bounded. In the proof below, we want to show that the drift is negative outside an appro-
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priately defined finite set. We start by calculating the drift of V (q). By (C.13), the drift of
V (c)(q) for the uniformized DTMC is
cE
[






























Similarly, for V (s)(q) we will have
cE
[






























Adding the two inequalities above, we have



































































i − maxj′:(i, j′)∈E














































where the last inequality uses Lemma 21. The drift of ∆Wz(q) can be bounded as








































































































j , and the last inequality uses
the fact that z/n≤ qηmax by the definition of the fluid pricing policy.
Combining the inequalities above, by Lemma 22, for any U(q) > 2n(〈1n,λ
∗〉+〈1n,µ∗〉)
min(i, j)∈E χ∗i j
,
we have
























Thus, we have established that the drift of U(q) is uniformly bounded and is negative
outside a finite set. By Eryilmaz and Srikant (2012, Lemma 1), we have









≤Fr ∀ η ≥ 1 ∀r ∈ Z+. (C.46)
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−λ ∗i 1{q(c)i (∞)=qηmax}
)]
. (C.47)







































































where the second equality above follows from Condition 3 and the fact that q(s)i (∞) ·
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q(c)i (∞) = 0. Furthermore, q
(s)
i (∞) = q
η
max implies that q
(s)
⊥i (∞) ≥ 0, and q
(c)
i (∞) = q
η
max























































































This proves the first part of the proposition.
Note that the proof so far applies to any matching algorithm. In the rest of the proof,





































































where the second inequality follows by Lemma 23 (which requires the matching algorithm
to be max-weight) and the fact that q(s)i (∞) · q
(c)
i (∞) = 0, and the third inequality follows
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and similarly for Pr[q(s)i (∞) = q
η














































Because qηmax → ∞ as η → ∞, the second term in Eq (C.49) vanishes. Combined with
Eq (C.48), we obtain the second part of the proposition.
C.5.2 Proposition 9
Similar to Lemma 23, we establish the state space collapse for the two-price policy.
Lemma 24 (State Space Collapse). Under the two-price policy and max-weight matching,












Proof of Lemma 24. By Lemma 22 we already know that the drift of the Lyapunov function
U(q) is uniformly bounded. Now, we will show that the drift of U(q) is negative outside a
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finite set. The drift of V (q) for the uniformized DTMC is (by Eq (C.18))
cE[∆V (c)(q) | q(k) = q]




























































where the last inequality uses the assumption that τηmaxση ≤ η . Similarly, by Eq (C.20),
we have

















Combining the two inequalities above, since ∆V (q) = ∆V (s)(q)+∆V (c)(q), we have









j − maxi′:(i′, j)∈E








Next, the drift of Wz(q) is bounded by



































































































j and the last inequality holds
because |z| ≤ 〈12n,q〉.
Let B = 2(〈1n,λ∗〉+ 〈1n,µ∗〉)+4n+2. Combining Eq (C.50) and Eq (C.51), for any
U(q)≥ Bn/(2min(i, j)∈E χ∗i j), we have














j − maxi′:(i′, j)∈E




















where the first inequality is by Lemma 22 and the third inequality is by Lemma 21. This
proves that the drift is negative outside a finite set. By Eryilmaz and Srikant (2012, Lemma
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1), we have









≤Tr, ∀ η ≥ 1.
Lemma 25. Under the two-price policy and max-weight matching policy, for all η ≥ 1, we
have E[z2(∞)]< ∞.
Proof of Lemma 25. We use
√





∣∣‖q(k+1)‖−‖q(k)‖∣∣1{q(k)=q} ≤ ‖q(k+1)−q(k)‖1{q(k)=q} ≤ 1.






























j − maxi′:(i′, j)∈E


























where the second equality follows from Eq (C.50). So the drift is negative outside a finite
set. By Eryilmaz and Srikant (2012, Lemma 1), we have E[‖q‖2] < ∞ and hence E[z2] <
∞.
Proof of Proposition 9. Consider the Lyapunov function Wz(q). By Lemma 25, we have
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E[Wz(q)] < ∞. In the steady state, it holds that E[∆Wz(q(∞))] = 0. By (C.51), we expand










































≥ η 〈1n,λ∗〉+η 〈1n,µ∗〉−σηn.


































































This proves the first part of the proposition. Note that Eq (C.54) holds for any matching
algorithm.


































































































































where the first equality uses the definition of q⊥, the second inequality uses the fact that
‖x‖1 ≤
√
n‖x‖2 for any x ∈ Rn, the second inequality uses Lemma 20, and the final in-
equality uses Lemma 24 (which requires the matching algorithm to be max-weight) with
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r = 2.





















































































Note the the last two terms in the first equality are equal to zero because q(s)i (∞)q
(c)
i (∞) = 0










Combining the upper bound Eq (C.56) with the lower bound Eq (C.54), under the max-














































Proof of Lemma 26. Recall that the loss Lη (4.8) is composed of the holding cost term
and the revenue loss term. The holding cost term depends on the queue length vector q.
According to the definition of the fluid pricing policy, we have q≤ qηmax12n a.s. Thus, it is




max. For the revenue loss term,









































































where the constant F2 is defined in Lemma 23 and is independent of η . Setting q
η
max =√





























Lemma 27. Under the fluid pricing policy with randomized matching (Algorithm 10), for
qηmax = γ
√
























as the Lyapunov function. By Eq
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The third inequality above follows from the definition of the randomized matching algo-
rithm (Algorithm 10): when q(c)j > 0, if a type i server arrives, the conditional probability
that the server is matched to a type j customer is at least χ∗i j/µ
∗
i . The last equality holds




i j for all j ∈M by Eq (4.6b).





































































































{Fj(λ ∗j )}+ 〈1n+m,s〉γη1/2.
Proof of Theorem 8. In Lemma 26, we have shown that limsupη→∞ L
η/η1/2 = O(n1/2)
for the max-weight matching algorithm. By Lemma 27, we know that the profit loss is
O(η1/2) for the randomized matching policy. To complete the proof, we want to show










Figure C.4: The “long chain” graph used in the proof.
To this end, we consider the following instance. Consider a bipartite graph with cus-
tomer type j is connected with server type j and type j + 1 modulo n (see Figure C.4).
We assume that the demand curve is Fj(x) = 2− 0.5x for all j ∈ N and the supply curve
is Gi(x) = 0.5x for all i ∈ N. It is easy to verify that λ∗ = µ∗ = 1n, χii = 1 for all i ∈ N
is an optimal solution to the fluid problem. It is also easy to see that the graph and the
fluid solution satisfy both Condition 2 and Condition 3. As χi j = 0 for all i 6= j, the system
behaves like n independent two-sided queues under the randomized matching algorithm.
For each single-link two-sided queue (with loss Lη/n), by Eq (C.16) in Proposition 6, the
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To minimize the order of η on the right-hand side, we set qηmax = γη1/2. Therefore, using
the AM-GM inequality (a+b)/2≥
√

















Lemma 28. Under the two-price and max-weight matching policy, for θ = 1n and φ= 1n,









































Proof of Lemma 28. By (C.28), the profit loss under the two-price policy is





























































































































+ 〈s,E[q(∞)]〉 , (C.57)
where the second equality uses Taylor’s theorem. By Lemma 3, there exists a fluid optimal




























η Pr[q(s)i > τ
η
max] = 0.

















Substituting the above two equations in Eq (C.57) and setting θ j = φi = 1, ση = n−1/3η2/3
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Lemma 29. Under the two-price and randomized matching policy (Algorithm 10), for
ση = η2/3 and τηmax = γη1/3, we have
Lη = O(η1/3).





as the Lyapunov function. By Eq
236























































































































































































































i . The third inequality follows by the
definition of Algorithm 10: when q(c)j > 0, if a type i server arrives, the conditional proba-
bility that the server is matched to a type j customer is at least χ∗i j/µ
∗
i . The second equality




i j for all j ∈M by Eq (4.6b). The last equality follows as for




Similarly, we can calculate the drift of V (s)(q) to get













Combining the two inequalities above, since V (q) =V (c)(q)+V (s)(q), we have

















































By the Foster-Lyapunov theorem, the uniformized DTMC is positive recurrent. Moreover,

































Given the above bound on the expected queue length, we can bound the profit loss to be
O(η1/3) using the identical proof in Theorem 6, so we omit the details.
Proof of Theorem 9. By Lemma 28 we have the required bound for profit loss under max-
weight matching. By Lemma 29, we know that the profit loss is O(η1/3) under randomized
matching policy. To complete the proof, we will show that liminfη→∞ Lη/η1/3 = Ω(n) for
the two-price randomized matching algorithm.
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We use the same graph and fluid solution as in the proof of Theorem 9 (see Figure C.4)
and show that the limiting scaled profit loss is of the order n. Note that as χi j = 0 for
all i 6= j, the system behaves like n independent two-sided queue under the randomized
matching algorithm. For each single-link two-sided queue under any two-price pricing

































(Recall that A j and Bi represent the second derivative of −F(λ j)λ j and G(µi)µi, respec-











C.5.5 Relaxing Condition 3
In this section, we show that Condition 3 can be relaxed without loss of generality. Suppose
we are given a graph G(Ns∪Nc,E) and the fluid solution (λ∗,µ∗) such that the CRP condi-
tion is satisfied but Condition 3 is violated. We will construct another graph G′(N′s∪N′c,E ′)
such that Condition 3 is satisfied and use max-weight matching and fluid price policy/two-
price policy for this new graph. Then, we will conduct a similar analysis as in Theorem 8
and Theorem 9 to get the limiting bound on the scaled loss in profit.
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Fluid price policy and max-weight matching policy.
The idea of the graph construction is to split each customer/server type into multiple types
so that we can eventually achieve the same number of customer and server types. We
assume that there exists a δ > 0 and such that the fluid solution (λ∗,µ∗) are integral mul-
tiple of δ . (In practice, if the model parameters are rational numbers, this can always be
achieved.) In addition, let λmax be an upper bound of the entries in (λ∗,µ∗).
Specifically, for each customer type j ∈M, we split arrivals into λ ∗j /δ separate queues.
Let q(c)jl for all l ∈ [λ
∗
j /δ ] denote the queue length of the l
th replication. Suppose the arrival







. Then, the arrival
rate of each split queue is λ ηjl (q) = ηδ1{q(c)jl <q
η
max}
. We split the server types similarly.
This leads to a modified graph G′(N′s∪N′c,E ′) with Nc = { jl : l ∈ [λ j/δ ], j ∈M}, |N′c|=
〈1m,λ∗〉/δ and Ns = {im : m ∈ [µi/δ ], i ∈ N}, |N′s| = 〈1n,µ∗〉/δ . The edges E ′ of the
modified graph satisfy the following: (i, j) ∈ E if and only for all l ∈ [λ j/δ ] and for all
m ∈ [µi/δ ], we have (im, jl) ∈ E ′. We continue to use the max-weight matching algorithm
under the modified graph G′(N′s∪N′c,E ′).
Next, we show that Condition 3 holds for the modified graph. Since 〈1m,λ∗〉= 〈1n,µ∗〉,

















im∈N′c:∃ jl∈J,(im, jl)∈E ′
δ = δ |N(J)|, (C.59)
where the second inequality follows from the CRP condition and the third equality follows
as
{im : i ∈M,m ∈ [µ∗i /δ ],∃ jl ∈ J,(i, j) ∈ E} ⇐⇒ {im ∈ N′c : ∃ jl ∈ J,(im, jl) ∈ E ′}.
Eq (C.59) is Hall’s condition for all the customer types. We can similarly verify Hall’s
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condition for any subset of servers. This implies that there exists a perfect matching in
G′(N′s∪N′c,E ′). Thus, Condition 3 is satisfied for this modified graph.



















































Two-price policy and max-weight matching policy
As in previous subsection, we split customer and server types to satisfy Condition 3. For




denote the queue length for the lth replica-







replicate the servers as well. We apply the two-price max-weight matching policy for the









Next, we analyze the profit loss similarly as in the proof of Theorem 9. By using the
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where the third equality holds by claim 1: as the CRP condition is satisfied, there exists a
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Jansen, Omer Reingold, and José D. P. Rolim. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Hei-
delberg, pp. 16–28. ISBN: 978-3-540-74208-1.
Banerjee, Siddhartha, Daniel Freund, and Thodoris Lykouris (2017). “Pricing and Opti-
mization in Shared Vehicle Systems: An Approximation Framework”. In: Proceed-
244
ings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation. Cambridge, Mas-
sachusetts, USA, pp. 517–517.
Banerjee, Siddhartha, Ramesh Johari, and Carlos Riquelme (2016). “Dynamic pricing in
ridesharing platforms”. In: ACM SIGecom Exchanges 15.1, pp. 65–70.
Banerjee, Siddhartha, Yash Kanoria, and Pengyu Qian (2018). “State dependent control of
closed queueing networks”. In: ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review
46.1, pp. 2–4.
Berbeglia, Gerardo (2018). “The generalized stochastic preference choice model”. In: arXiv
preprint arXiv:1803.04244.
Bertsekas, Dimitri P. (2005). Dynamic Programming and Optimal Control, 3rd Edition.
Athena Scientific. ISBN: 1886529264.
Bertsekas, Dimitri P (2007). Dynamic Programming and Optimal Control. 4th. Vol. II.
Athena Scientific.
Besbes, Omar, Francisco Castro, and Ilan Lobel (2018). Surge pricing and its spatial supply
response. Columbia Business School Research Paper.
Besbes, Omar and Assaf Zeevi (2012). “Blind Network Revenue Management”. In: Oper-
ations Research 60.6, pp. 1537–1550.
Bodea, Tudor, Mark Ferguson, and Laurie Garrow (2009). “Data Set—Choice-Based Rev-
enue Management: Data from a Major Hotel Chain”. In: Manufacturing & Service Op-
erations Management 11.2, pp. 356–361.
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